

SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ON PRE-DEPLOYMENT MISSION READINESS PREPARATION OF PERSONNEL TO BE DEPLOYED IN PEACE MISSIONS



BY
Charles Ross

A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL COMPLETION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF
The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations



Peace Operations Training Institute®

**SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ON PRE-
DEPLOYMENT
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BY

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¹ The views reflected in this Thesis do not reflect the official views of the South African National Defence Force.

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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

“The worst moment for me came in Congo (DRC) in 2003 when there was suddenly a risk that the whole situation in the north-eastern part of the country (DRC) would unravel. Massacres were happening in Ituri and Bunia. We (MONUC) clearly did not have enough troops on the spot for the crisis, and our reserve force consisted of only one battalion that was not trained to address an emergency like this one.”²

Conflict has been part of mankind since the earliest days with the strongest emerging victorious as the norm. Conflicts have largely been between clans or tribes or nations in pursuit of one or other resource that was not available to them or in pursuance of power in the region. Attempts to resolve conflicts peacefully, or conduct “peacekeeping”, did not come about until late in the 10th Century through the medieval Catholic Church vide its “Peace of God and Truce of God” initiatives. During the 17th century the first “concept” of getting world leaders to resolve their differences by peaceful means emerged in the idea of Emeric Crucé who proposed that “world leaders would meet in a neutral location to resolve the issue”.³

The first International attempt to prevent future conflicts escalating into international armed conflict that could plunge the World into a new war was the establishment of the League of Nations following the 1st World War. Intention of the League of Nations was to be “*an association of states designed to replace traditional power politics in an organisation that would use peaceful negotiations to maintain International peace and security*”.⁴ While the League of Nations enjoyed some success it however met with repeated challenges and a number of member states withdrew. The League of Nations was however unable to prevent the 2nd World War and was ultimately replaced by the United Nations (UN).

² Interview with Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno by European Affairs, Spring/Summer 2006, Contemporary Peacekeeping is State-Building : The UN Embraces “Robust Peacekeeping,” including use of Force. <http://www.europeanaffairs.org> accessed 17 August 2006.

³ Ram, S. Prof. History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War : 1945 to 1987. United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations : New York : 2007

⁴ Harney, M. “Ineffectiveness in Action : The failure of the League of Nations”. :

Following the end of the 2nd World War the UN was established with a charter that called on member states to resolve their conflict peacefully by means of negotiation, mediation and facilitation. Early days of the UN saw the deployment of military observers and military forces as inter-positioning forces in conflicts of inter-state nature for which, it is anticipated, little or relatively low pre-deployment training was required. The reason for this is the fact that the military was the major participator in the peace process and “only had to keep the fighting forces apart”.

Today peacekeepers face a totally different environment with numerous role players in the peace process as well as in the conflict. Majority of today’s conflicts are of intra-state nature where the “opposition” is rarely identifiable and the conflict of a nature that may even differ from one area of operation to another area of operation. This may be due to the fact that some belligerents or opposition are not necessarily fighting another belligerents or opposition force on a political issue, but rather for the control of natural resources. The latter may be exported in accordance with an agreement that would in return provide weaponry and other logistics to sustain the fighting⁵.

In today’s conflicts the military is integrated into a multidimensional peace mission where it is required to create an environment within which the diplomatic and political process can proceed to secure a lasting peace agreement. In executing this task the military are today often deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter where the use of force may be required. It is important to remember that peace cannot be achieved by the military alone. If this were the case a very large military force, which is currently not available to the UN, would be required and would have to force the belligerents into compliance with the peace process.

Where there is no peace to keep the UN may “*Authorise the Coalition of the Willing*”, directed by a lead nation, who have both the political will and military capacity to bring and end to the conflict using all necessary means. The latter is obviously not what is required in support of a peace mission, however the situation may arise where such aggressive

⁵ Lind, J. and Sturman, K. 2002. *Scarcity and Surfeit : The Ecology of Africa’s Conflicts*. African Centre for Technology Studies and the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria. P 14.

action is required. Although this type of interventions are authorised by the Security Council (SC), they are not conducted under UN command.⁶

In addition to the multidimensional nature of today's peace missions conflicts are of a much more violent nature and peacekeepers are often confronted with atrocities seldom heard of, or seen before. Add to these atrocities the fact of being confronted by child and women soldiers then the question can be asked, how are peacekeepers prepared, not just physically, but also mentally to handle situations likes this?

Today's development in the communication spectrum brings conflicts to the lounges of everybody who owns a television or mobile telephone, as it happens. This means that current deployed peacekeepers should always be aware of this and that any negative action that is taken will be broadcasted to the world even before his/her commander is informed. Positive use of the media to promote the mission is something that needs to be addressed and the paper will address it in more detail later.

To be able to participate in these complex and multidimensional peace missions' personnel should be highly professional, trained and equipped. Troop contributing countries should therefore take serious notice of what is required, and the consequences, when deploying under Chapter VII and this paper intend returning to this later.

The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the United States of America (USA) on 11 September 2001 by the Al Qaeda terrorist organisation added a new dimension to the threat to International Peace and Security. Suddenly the "*Global War against Terrorism*" became the topic of the day with the launching of a number of "intervention" operations against alleged terrorist territories and strongholds. Are these operations classified as peacekeeping operations? *No these are not peacekeeping operations, but rather intervention operations involving multi-national forces not under command of the UN.*

⁶ Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations : Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit : December 2003, p 56.

EMPLOYMENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

In accordance with the South African Constitution the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) can be deployed under the following conditions :

Section 200 (2) : The primary objective of the Defence Force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.

Section 201 (2) : Only the President, as head of the National Executive, may authorise the employment of the Defence Force :

In cooperation with the Police Service

In defence of the Republic

In fulfilment of an International Obligation

The SANDF comprises 4 (four) Services, Army, Air Force, Navy and Military Health Services who are the primary providers of combat forces to the Joint Operations Division. The Services are supported by a number of Divisions providing supporting services. Joint Operations Division is responsible for all *“actions associated with executing the Department of Defence decisions and orders with regard to the deployment of forces within the context of the Department of Defence’s policy and strategy”*.

In accordance with the Military Strategy, South Africa will participate in operations with a “Mission Based Task Force” that have received “Mission Essential Training”. To comply with this concept the SANDF needs to identify “Mission Essential Training” at an early stage during the preparation phase to ensure that both Combat Readiness⁷ and Mission Readiness⁸ training is done.

⁷ Combat readiness is a state of readiness achieved by a military organization, or part thereof, capable of performing a specified type of military task or action in accordance with a predefined norm.

⁸ Mission readiness is a state of preparedness achieved by a joint or multi-national combat ready force, or part thereof, to successfully conduct specific predetermined tasks, missions or operations and is to be achieved as part of mobilisation.

This paper will address the evolution of peacekeeping operations, analyse all guidance that are provided and how these impact on the preparation of personnel, tasks that are to executed as identified from the guidance, skills that are required to execute the identified tasks, training that needs to be provided during Combat Readiness and which during Mission Readiness. Experiences gained during South African deployments will be analysed to determine amendments to preparedness. Finally the paper will address the role of the various Services and Divisions and their responsibilities to ensure South Africans deploy with the correct attitude, improved skills and the necessary knowledge to contribute to the success of their mission.

A schematic illustration of the process is attached as Appendix A to this paper.

CHAPTER 2 : CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE THESIS

“Once some level of significant violence has begun, it is prone to escalate because an interactive process of attack and retaliation leads to a self-perpetuating cycle”⁹

a. **EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

The UN Charter, signed on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco, describes the main purpose of the organisation as “to maintain International Peace and Security”. This assumption was based on the continued cooperation between the World War II allies, China, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom and the United States of America who later became the 5 Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Where other states could not resolve their disputes peacefully the UNSC would act together to resolve the dispute peacefully.

The increase in tension between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) after the 2nd World War impeded on the functioning of the Security Council, who had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the UN.

While the term “Peacekeeping” does not appear in the UN Charter, Mr Marrack Goulding, United Nations Under Secretary General for Political Affairs characterised peacekeeping as *“Field operations, established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations Command and Control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extend necessary”*.¹⁰ Soon after 1947 peacekeeping became a pragmatic instrument to manage conflict in a divided world where major players in the International system nevertheless sometimes shared a common interest in containing regional conflicts and prevent them from escalating into wider confrontation¹¹.

⁹ Lind, J. and Sturman, K. 2002. *Scarcity and Surfeit : The Ecology of Africa's Conflicts*. African Centre for Technology Studies and the Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria. P 14.

¹⁰ Cillers, J., Mills, G. 1995, *Peacekeeping in Africa, Volume 2*, Institute for Defence Policy, page 11.

¹¹ *“United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Doctrine”*, Draft Document compiled during a Workshop held by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations and the Stimson Centre in Carlisle over the period 10 to 12 January 2007.

In terms of the UN Charter international peace and security had to be maintained in accordance with Chapters VI, peaceful resolution, and VII, enforcement measures. Chapter VIII provides for the UN to utilise regional organisations to become involved in resolving regional conflicts. Where the situation demands immediate action to prevent genocide or to prevent grave human rights violations the UN have called on the “coalition of the willing” to undertake such intervention operations on behalf of, but not commanded by, the UN.

This paper will analyse the evolution of peacekeeping in an attempt to establish the impact that the evolution had on the preparation of individuals and force structure elements for deployment. It will however not investigate each mission and the possible impact that the mission had on preparation. Specific missions which may have had an impact will be discussed in more detail.

Organisation for African Unity.

When the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 its Charter did not provide for “*collective security*” and the powers of the Administrative Secretary General was purposely limited. Lack of enthusiasm of the member states to become involved in the resolution of conflict is evident in that the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was established and places filled in 1968, but never functioned.¹² This situation forced the OAU to rely on Ad-Hoc committees and/or eminent persons for conflict resolutions.

i. PERIOD 1945 TO 1987.

During this period peacekeeping operation were primarily deployed to maintain ceasefires and stabilising situations on the ground to establish an environment within which the Political and Diplomatic process could continue to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. To achieve this the UN primarily deployed Military Observers and lightly armed troops who monitored the ceasefires or peace agreements, investigated and reported on violations of the ceasefire or peace agreements and assisted with confidence building. Deployment during this period was done with the consent of the relevant parties or

¹² Bernman, E., and Sams, K. 2000. *Peacekeeping in Africa : Capabilities and Capabilities*. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa. P 46.

countries involved in the conflict and tasks varied between observing compliance with ceasefires, and reporting and investigating of any breaches of the ceasefire agreements.

It is interesting to note that during the 1st peacekeeping operation, United Nations Good Office Commission (UNGOC), utilised the locally deployed military attaches to fulfil the function of observing compliance with the ceasefire agreement and the repatriation of the Dutch forces¹³. As the personnel were already in country, it can be assumed that they did not receive any additional or special training for the execution of their tasks.

Another important aspect during this period is the fact that a number of missions were established utilising personnel from already established missions to ensure that the new missions are established very quickly.

The UN Mission in the Congo¹⁴ (ONUC), established following the mutiny of the Congolese Armed Force, requires mentioning. In accordance with the mandate ONUC had to assist the Congolese Government with “such military assistance as may be necessary until the Congolese Security Forces could take over the tasks”.¹⁵ To ensure a speedy deployment forces from UNTSO and UNEF were re-deployed while a number of African States provided forces. Achieving the objectives, restore law and order and ensure speedy withdrawal of Belgium Forces proved more difficult than initially anticipated, however it was eventually achieved. Changes in the mandate, to use of force in an attempt to avert a full scale civil war in the Congo” and “to use force to remove mercenaries from Katanga” was required to achieve this. Achieving this finally required, for the 1st time in the history of the UN, the use of combat aircraft¹⁶. While it would appear that ONUC should have had a Chapter VII mandate no evidence could be found that was so. Was this possible an oversight?

¹³ Sunil, R. 2007. *The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War : 1945 to 1987*. A United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations.

¹⁴ Today's Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

¹⁵ Sunil, R. 2007. *The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War : 1945 to 1987*. A United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations.

¹⁶ Sunil, R. 2007. *The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War : 1945 to 1987*. A United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations. Page 57.

Appendix B reflects the peacekeeping operations that were established during this period.

Organisation for African Unity.

A request during 1963 by the OAU for the deployment of military officers to supervise a ceasefire between Algeria and Morocco met with no response from member states while the OAU was sidelined in attempting to resolve the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1964 and the ongoing conflict in the Congo¹⁷. It also failed to intervene meaning fully in the Nigerian Civil War during 1967 to 1970.¹⁸

The OAU did intervene in the Chadian civil war that started in 1960 with political and diplomatic efforts and later with the deployment of the large scale multinational Neutral Force in Chad during the crisis of 1981 – 1982. Prior to the deployment of the Neutral Force various regional peacekeeping deployments occurred. The OAU claimed “ownership” of some of these deployments.

ii. **PERIOD 1988 to 1996**

Following the end of the Cold War the UNSC began to function more as a cohesive council allowing the council to proceed with the establishing of peacekeeping operations and other intervention operations. This revitalised situation however also brought with it the eruption of historical ethnic and religious conflict, greedy and ambitious leaders which were prevented from escalating due to the pressure of the super powers.

The period immediately following the end of the Cold War did bring success to the peacekeeping operations deployed, resulting in the UN being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1988. This achievement and the decisive actions taken during the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq contributed to new expectation from the International community that the UN is able to “ensure International Peace and Security”. Unfortunately this expectation was tarnished with the challenges experienced in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda.

¹⁷ Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

¹⁸ Sunil, R. 2007. *The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War : 1945 to 1987*. A United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations. Page 47

During this period peacekeepers were confronted by some of the most brutal violence and human rights abuses ever experienced. Most conflicts were accompanied by massive humanitarian requirements, which resulted in an increase in the number of non-governmental and private volunteer organisations into the mission areas. As a result of this more and more people were displaced, either as internally displaced persons or refugees.

While the majority of the peacekeeping operations authorised during this period remained observer missions with the primary objective of observing and verifying implementation of peace agreements, a small number had to be mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter. *The shift from inter-state to intra-state conflicts continued with only two of the peacekeeping operations mandated was for inter-state conflicts.* Appendix C reflects the peacekeeping operations that were established during this period.

Peacekeepers were deployed under a variety of mandates ranging from traditional peacekeeping to multidimensional peacekeeping to the utilisation of “the coalition of the willing”. The latter being led by a member state and authorised to “use all measures” to restore the situation. These types of operations are very expensive and require nations with suitable forces available, something the United Nations does have on call. During this period the United Nations were forced to authorise 4 such operations, UNITAF (Somalia), Operation TURQUOISE (Rwanda), Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY (Haiti) and IFOR (Yugoslavia).

Another phenomenon that arose during this period originated from the fact that member states were losing personnel in some of the multidimensional of “robust” peacekeeping operations. As a result of this member states imposed caveats on their respective contingents deploying in peacekeeping operation. Caveats placed on national contingents included the “non participation in Chapter VII actions” or the restriction on the lowest sub-sub-unit that can be deployed or restricted to a specific sector or area. This placed additional burdens on the respective Force Commanders as deployment of these contingents had to consider continuously resulting in that the force could not optimally achieve its military objectives.

Organisation for African Unity

During 1990 the OAU decided to deploy a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda, known as the Military Observer Team (MOT), which indicated a change in the approach of the organisation. Finding member states to participate remained a challenge and when the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) was authorised with strength of 50, only 40 were deployed by the time NMOG was replaced by NMOG II.¹⁹ While NMOG II, with an anticipated force level of 240 military observers, faced many operational difficulties it did achieve the political goal in “forcing” the UNSC to become involved in Rwanda. NMOG II was incorporated into UNAMIR in Nov 93. The OAU then deployed the observer mission in Burundi, OMIB.

iii. PERIOD 1997 to 2007

Peacekeeping operations up to 1997 was largely categorised with the deployment of operations under Chapter VI²⁰ of the UN Charter and was mandated to verify, monitor and observe peace agreements. While a number of peacekeeping operations established since 1997 was still deployed to verify, monitor and observe, the majority of the operations were deployed authorising the operation to execute specific tasks under Chapter VII of the Charter. Appendix D reflects the peacekeeping operations authorised during the period.

Of the 20 missions that were authorised since 1997, 10 were mandated under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In addition the UN authorised 4 additional operations in support of existing United Nations peacekeeping operations. One of these, UNITAF (a UN sanctioned joint multinational operation also known as Operation RESTORE HOPE and led by the USA), was authorised under Chapter VIII of the Charter and deployed in support of UNOSOM 1 over the period December 1992 to May 1993 where after UNOSOM 2 was established. This was possible the first time that such a deployment mandated under Chapter VIII.

¹⁹ Berman, Eric and Sams, Kate. 2000. *Peacekeeping in Africa : Capabilities and Capabilities*. Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, p 59.

²⁰ While the specific United Nations Security Council resolutions do not specifically reflect the deployment in accordance with Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, the fact that the resolution does not reflect it being in accordance with Chapter VII it is assumed that it is in accordance with Chapter VI.

Deployment of Civilian Police (United Nations Police – UNPOL) increased during this period while formed police units also deployed in specific peacekeeping operations like the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). In MONUC police units assisted the local police in crowd control in the run-up and during the elections in 2006. During the elections in the DRC the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of European Union Force in the DRC (EUFOR RD Congo) over the period June to November 2006. EUFOR RD Congo deployed independently in support of MONUC.

United Nations Organisation Mission In The Democratic Republic Of Congo (MONUC)

MONUC can be described as the mission where the United Nations demonstrated its intension to utilise its mandate of Chapter VII to the fullest in “Robust Peacekeeping”. MONUC established the Eastern Divisional Headquarters where for the first time a Division comprising 3 Brigades, with the relevant support elements (inclusive of attack helicopters) were deployed in a UN peacekeeping operation.

Continued unrest in the Ituri region the UNSC authorised the deployment of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF), Operation ARTEMIS, under Chapter VII of the Charter. Operation ARTEMIS was a European Union initiative led by France and had as objective to “stabilise the situation to allow the peace process could move forward” and deployed over the period 12 Jun 03 to 15 Sep 03.

Following the deployment of IEMF the Ituri Brigade was established which managed to contain the security situation to a degree while getting on with the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process. However early in 2004 some of the newly integrated soldiers of the new DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) mutinied against the new appointed commander. Ituri Brigade was reinforced with units from elsewhere in the mission area and by November 2004 was able to consolidate its position.

This prompted the UNSC to further increase the troop strength of MONUC to 16 700, well below the recommended strength of 23 000. This also authorised the establishment of the Eastern Division Brigade on 24 January 2005 who went onto the “offensive in terms of its mandate” almost immediately when on 1 March 2005 a major cordon and search operation

was conducted in Ituri. This “offensive” was led by Units from the Ituri, North and South Kivu Brigades and was supported by attack helicopters and resulted in the killing of 50 renegade militia and arresting a number of belligerent that were responsible for the earlier attacks on MONUC. Since then the Eastern Division continued to execute its mandate aggressively.

MONUC, supported by the European Union Force (EUFOR RDC) which was deployed under a UNSC Chapter VII resolution, conducted numerous operations in support of the elections during 2006. One of the major tests for MONUC was the unrest that developed following the announcement of the results of the first round of elections and the forceful disarming of the personal guards of the former Vice President by the FARDC.

Organisation for African Unity / African Union

The OAU continued with smaller observer type peacekeeping missions in support of elections in Comoros. In July 2002 the African Union was established, replacing the OAU. The African Union (AU) soon launched its first peacekeeping operation when it took over the South African Protection and Support Detachment (SAPSD) in Burundi and established the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) on 01 May 2003.

AMIB was taken over by the United Nations on 01 June 2004 by the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). During July 2004 the AU established its second peacekeeping operation when the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was established while maintaining the very important person’s protection function in Burundi with the African Union Protection Force. In addition to these missions the AU is also involved in the peacekeeping mission in Somalia with the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

iv. **COMMENTS**

The above illustrated that today’s peacekeepers require comprehensive mission readiness training prior to deployment to enable them to execute the mandate entrusted to them. To

meet this requirement “strategic corporals” are required. *“A good peacekeeper should be trained for the widest spectrum of violence ; fighting a war”*.²¹

b. **GUIDING PARAMETERS**

For each United Nations, and it is anticipated that in the future it will apply to African Union, peace missions a number of guiding parameters is provided which should guide troop contributing countries in the preparation of its personnel, both force structure elements²² and individuals for deployment in that specific mission.

In South Africa the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) plays a major role in the decision making process on the participation of South Africa in peace missions. Foreign policy and the interest influence the decision while the position of country in the international and/or regional arena will be a contributing factor. Aspirations of being selected to the UNSC or the African Union Peace and Security Council are examples of the latter.

The various documents that guide South Africa’s participation in peace missions will be discussed.

i. **SOUTH AFRICAN WHITE PAPER ON PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE MISSIONS**²³

Domestic and International expectations regarding the role of South Africa as a responsible and respected member of the International community increased following the peaceful and successful transformation to democracy in 1994. Expectations included the hope that South Africa will play a leading role in various International, Regional and Sub-regional forums while it will actively become involved in attempts to resolve International

²¹ Cammaert, Maj Gen Patrick, C. *“Learning to Use Force on the Hoof in Peacekeeping : Reflections on the Experience of MONUC’s Eastern Division”*. Institute for Security Studies : Situation report dated 03 April 2007.

²² This is the generic terminology used in South Africa to refer to a formed military unit, ie an Infantry Battalion.

²³ White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, Approved by the South African Cabinet on 21 October 1998 and Tabled in Parliament on 24 February 1999. It is currently under review.

and Regional conflicts. The expectations are largely due to the recent past of South Africa during which it peacefully²⁴ transformed to a democracy.

South Africa intends contributing civilians, armed forces and police officers to African Union (AU), UN or South African Development Communities (SADC) mandated peace missions. For this purpose a standby procedure will be established to enable civilians to be deployed at short notice. Participation of civilians will include a wide range of experts which will be managed by the South African Government.

Entry and exit criteria of the participation are very important while an international mandate will be required. In addition a national mandate (ie a parliamentary approval) and funding will have to be obtained prior to deployment while sufficient means must be available to participate and sustain the deployment. Finally quality of the contribution is more important than the size. The latter may not be totally relevant today as the White Paper was compiled at a time when South Africa was only supposed to participate with one Battalion.

In accordance with the White Paper South Africa will participate in peace missions which include Peace Support Operations, Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping Operations, Peace Enforcement, Peace Building, Humanitarian Assistance and Humanitarian Intervention, each with its own definition.

The role of the Military *“to peace missions is through the conduct of peace support operations includes those activities where the military operates in support of the political, diplomatic and humanitarian objectives of the broader mission”*. It includes tasks such as the separation of combatants, disarmament of irregular forces, demobilisation and transformation of regular and irregular forces into a unified army, assistance with reintegration into civil society and assistance with elections for the new governments. Realities have however overtaken these tasks and today the SANDF is called upon to execute much more than indicated in the White Paper.

The White Paper refers to the importance of the International Law (IL) in the areas of authorisation and competence while Rules of Engagement (ROE) provide political

²⁴ While some internal conflict occurred during the transformation process during the period 1991 to 1994, the transformation process is generally being hailed as peaceful.

direction. Use of force, should be authorised, must be in accordance with the ROE. In accordance with the White Paper SANDF forces and personnel will be under Operational Control (OPCON) of the relevant Force Commander (FC), but will remain under Operational Command (OPCOM) of Chief of Joint Operations (C J Ops)

Within the South African context the White Paper is the National guiding document that guides the participation of the SANDF in peace missions and is currently being reviewed.

ii. **UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING TRAINING MANUAL**

In accordance with the general guide in the manual it is to *“provide guidelines for actual or prospective troop contributing governments in the preparation and training of their personnel for assignments with United Nations peacekeeping operations”* which should, if utilised optimal, will result in prospective troop contributing countries preparing its military forces according to a standard and allow contingents from different troop contributing countries to operate with one another.

Apart from the training manual the UN DPKO has developed Standard Training Modules (STM) which covers a large variety of aspects of the UN. Three levels of The Standard Training Modules have been developed. The levels includes the Standardised Generic Training Modules for United Nations Peacekeeping (Level 1, aimed all personnel destined for deployment in support of UN peace missions), Standardised Training Modules Specifications for UN Military, Police and Key Personnel (Level 2) and the Senior Management Leaders (Level 3, aimed at senior members of UN peace missions).

The Standardised Generic Training Modules for United Nations Peacekeeping covers the following modules :

Peacekeepers Introduction to the United Nations and United Nations Peace Operations.

Structure of United Nations Peace Operations.

Legal Framework of United Nations Peace Operations.

Stress Management.

Behaviour of Peacekeepers (Code of Conduct, Cultural Awareness, Child Protection and Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse).

Personal Security Awareness.

Landmine and Unexploded Ordnance Awareness.

Human Rights in Peacekeeping.

Humanitarian Assistance.

United Nations Civil-Military Coordination.

Communication and Negotiations.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.

Media Relations.

Personnel in Peacekeeping.

Logistics in Peacekeeping.

Personal Medical (HIV/AIDS, Malaria, Basic Life Support and Personal Hygiene)

Gender Equality in Peacekeeping.

Unfortunately during a recent study conducted by the UN DPKO, involving 100 troop contributing countries to which only 38 responded, it was found that only 10 percent of the responding troop contributing countries fully utilised the UN DPKO training material fully²⁵.

²⁵ Holt, V., and Berkman, T. 2006. *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations*. The Henry L. Stimson Centre. Washington DC, USA. P 136.

The training manual contains the following important information which is important for the preparation of personnel for deployment in UN peacekeeping operations :

Background to UN peacekeeping which include the charter, innovations and composition of peacekeeping, development of the military strategy and documents that are required.

Weapons training and familiarity with theatre weapons and vehicles are also included. In addition this section deals with night vision equipment, radar, nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, mine awareness training and field exercises.

General military training, which includes physical training, map reading and voice procedure is also included while more specific UN operating techniques such as positions and observation posts, checkpoints, road blocks, patrolling and the use of force are included.

The manual concludes with information on safety measures and precautions, specialised training areas and some annexes which include safe precautions, perimeter defence, layout of check point positions and mobile checkpoints.

iii. **UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION**

The fundamental status of a UN peacekeeping force in a host country is derived from Articles 104 and 105 of the UN Charter which confers on the UN the legal capacity, privileges and immunities that are necessary to fulfil its purpose. It can therefore be described as the authority of the international community for the UN to deploy, conduct peacekeeping operations and use force, where necessary.

The UNSC resolution provides the mandate under which the mission is to execute its tasks and provides important information to troop contributing countries which should guide the country in its participation and preparation of its forces. Most important is the initial duration of the mission and the chapter under which the mission is to execute its tasks. Clear understanding and interpretation of the chapter is very important as it will influence the ability of the FC to utilise the specific contingent to execute his/her tasks.

The UNSC resolution²⁶ also indicates which tasks may be executed under Chapter VII, should the mission be deployed under this chapter. Typical tasks include the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and UN personnel and facilities under imminent threat of physical violence, territorial security of the host nation, disarmament and demobilisation of foreign and indigenous armed groups and security sector reform (SSR). In addition the mission may also be responsible for the implementation of other UNSC resolutions, ie arms embargo's and the monitor of the proliferation of small arms.

In additional tasks with regards to the following are also included in recent UNSC resolutions :

UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women in Peace and Security.

UNSC Resolution 1612 (2005) on Children in Armed Conflict.

UNSC Resolution 1674 (2006) on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict.

iv. **GUIDELINES FOR TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING MILITARY FORCES TO A SPECIFIC MISSION²⁷**

Guidelines for Troop Contributing Countries (TCC Guidelines) is compiled and distributed to all Troop Contributing Countries who intend to have Military elements and/or military observers to specific United Nations peacekeeping operations at the beginning of the operations and may from time to time be updated. It is possible the single most important document in respect of information about the specific operation.

It provides valuable information in respect of the origin of the conflict, geography and infrastructure of the country. The latter is of importance to the troop contributing country as it may influence the way it sustain its deployed contingent or elements. It further provides information on the mandate of the mission, concept of operations and the mission structure. The concept of operations provides a broad overview of the intended operations

²⁶ United Nations Security Council resolution 1756 (2007) dated 15 May 2007 on the future of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)

²⁷ Guidelines for Troop Contributing Countries to the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) issued by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Military Division, Force Generation Service issued June 2005 was used as model.

and should provide guidance on the type of preparations required for the personnel destined for deployment.

Detail information with regards the mission structure which includes the mission area, mission structure, force structure, operational authority, capabilities of the various military units and staff officers, administration and integrated support services. Important to understand the mission structure as it provides information on both the military and the non-military component. Capabilities of Military Units and Staff Officers are very important as it indicates what military units should be able to do and includes the following :

Deploy to the mission area at short notice.

Able to interpret the English language at unit and sub-unit level.

Able to identify and mark landmines, explosives and other ordnance.

Able to provide internal communications.

Capable of a two-year deployment, with rotations after six months of continuous deployment in the mission area.

Staff Officers should hold substantive ranks and be proficient in English, while knowledge of the French language would be a distinct advantage and be prepared to work long hours in an international environment. Following skills are required :

Adequate knowledge of staff duties including military symbols, map reading, map marking, signal procedures, military operations and logistic terminology, service support and related routine staff work.

Able to operate computers and radios.

Experience of working in a regimental, brigade or higher HQ.

Staff work related to the handling of personal documentation, confidential matters, pay and allowances and procedures of boards of inquiry.

Experience in training, particular with other nationalities.

Experience in civil-military affairs is desirable.

Administration and Logistics chapter provides information on the logistic concept in respect of what will be provided, or expected to be, by whom in the mission area and includes specific services like garbage removal, janitor services etc. In addition it addresses contingent owned equipment and issues relating to letters of assist, standard of self-sustainment, preparation of vehicles, clothing and personal equipment to be provided. This includes what the UN will be providing on arrival in the mission area. How deployment will take place is addressed and the responsibilities of the TCC and the UN is spelled out and should be complied with to ensure smooth deployment, inclusive of clearances and dangerous cargo.

Additional information with regard self-sustainment and the various responsibilities are provided to ensure that personnel arriving in the mission area are able to comply with UN procedures. Accommodation, vehicle operations, medical and dental arrangements, administrative matters, financial arrangements, repatriation of individuals and claims are addressed. This includes tasks that are deemed to be national responsibilities.

Chapter on personnel provides information on general preparation, training requirements and conduct of personnel. Training requirements provides the minimum training that should be provided prior to deployment and includes the following :

Units and personnel required training.

Shelter building and fortification training.

First aid, personal hygiene and international humanitarian law.

Additional training, on mission mandate and operations.

v. **FORCE REQUIREMENT**

This document is the official request by the UN DPKO to a specific troop contributing country to contribute a specific military unit to a specific mission. Force requirement contains an overview of the concept of operations and the specific requirement, ie Infantry Battalion comprising 850 personnel and organised into specific configurations. Information with regard the organisation includes the capability of each sub-unit and also indicates the possible area of operation.

A list of tasks for each of the sub-units is included while it also indicates the type of combat support that is to be provided. Special requirements include additional requirements, such as that one platoon is to be trained and equipped with riot control while all equipment should be C-130 or MI 26 transportable. A list of major equipment is included as a guide to the troop contributing country, which must be discussed and agreed upon by the troop contributing country and the UN DPKO during MOU discussions. Administration and Logistics section includes the level and composition of medical support that is required and is to be provided.

vi. **CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

This is issued by the specific force commander and provides the broad plan for how the operations will be conducted. This is very important as it provides clear indication of what would be expected from the contingent as well as what additional mission readiness training is required.

vii. **LETTER OF ASSIST**

These are compiled and agreed upon by both the troop contributing country and the UN DPKO and refer to the deployment of aircraft, vessels and other specialist assets in a specific mission. It contains the tasks that are expected to be performed by the asset and the minimum requirements of the personnel operating the specific equipment or assets. In return the UN DPKO agrees to pay the troop contributing country a specific rate for utilisation of the equipment or asset.

CHAPTER 3 :TASKS, SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDE REQUIRED FOR SUCCESSFUL PARTICIPATION IN A PEACE MISSION

a. TASKS

The purpose of this chapter is not to attempt to identify all the tasks, skills and knowledge that will be required to provide the correct attitude in the preparation of personnel destined for deployment in a peacekeeping operation. It would rather attempt to identify a list of tasks that is expected from the current South African contingent deployed in support of MONUC. Once the tasks, skills and knowledge at the strategic, military-strategic, operational and tactical levels have been confirmed the skills that will be required will be identified. Tasks, skills and knowledge requirements will be linked to specific posts within the SANDF and confirmed if the skill or knowledge is a combat readiness or a mission readiness requirement.

During joint planning, based on the various guidance received documents, the tasks (which are divided between mission readiness and combat readiness) will be identified as tasks that the South African contingent deployed in support of MONUC should be prepared for.

i. **STRATEGIC**

Provide strategic guidelines on participation. This is done in conjunction with the Department of Foreign Affairs and is based on the foreign policy of South Africa. The latter may be influenced by South Africa's position within the UN, ie current non-permanent member of the UNSC.

Obtain presidential authority. In accordance with the South African constitution only the Head of the Executive, ie the President, can authorise the deployment of the SANDF in support of South Africa's international obligations. There is a prescribed procedure to be followed to obtain this.

Informing the Authorities. Brief the relevant authorities, ie Portfolio Committee on Defence and Cabinet as part of the procedure for obtaining presidential authority.

Advise the military-strategic level on participation and provide guidelines for participation.

ii. **MILITARY-STRATEGIC**

Interpret UNSC resolution and confirm any uncertainties with the strategic level.

Brief strategic level on the execution of the deployment in cooperation with the various Services and Divisions, and if required assist with the compilation of the strategic briefing.

Conduct joint military-strategic planning. This is done at a very early stage of the request to assist the strategic level to finalise the response to the requesting authority, ie AU, UN or SADC.

Recommend national caveats. During the planning certain limitations may be identified which should be brought to the attention of the strategic level for consideration as national caveat(s).

Issue military-strategic directive. Once approval is obtained from the strategic level to proceed with the deployment a military-strategic directive is issued on behalf of Chief of the South African National Defence Force (CSANDF) to guide the Joint Operational Headquarters (J Op HQ) and all Services and Divisions on their respective involvement. J Op HQ is given overall responsibility to prepare (mission), mobilise, deploy, sustain, rotate and re-deploy the personnel.

Assist with the compilation of the Memorandum of Understanding for the specific mission. In cooperation with the J Op HQ, Services and Divisions that will be participating in the deployment compile Annexes A (personnel), B (major equipment) and C (self-sustainment) of the MOU. Participate in the team that will negotiate the final MOU with the UN DPKO.

Monitor the mission for any changes in mandate, concept of operations and rules of engagement and advise the strategic level of these changes, which may involve changes to national caveats. This is done by means of briefings to the strategic level on the impact of the changes and, if required, the issue of additional guidelines and directive.

iii. **OPERATIONAL**

Final joint planning. On receipt of the military-strategic directive the J Op HQ conduct final joint planning with all Services and/or Divisions that will participate in the deployment. This may include an operational level reconnaissance to the deployment area to confirm sustainment of the contingent due for deployment. This is not done for the deployment of individuals, ie MILOBS and MSO's.

Issue deployment instruction. Based on military-strategic directive and final joint planning the J Op HQ issues a deployment directive stipulating deployment procedure, sustainment concept and procedures, combat readiness requirements and command and control arrangements.

Conduct mission readiness training. A mission readiness program is to be compiled which includes a mission readiness training exercise.

Report on any operational changes to the concept of operations and the impact thereof on the deployed contingent to the military-strategic level.

Assist the military-strategic level when required.

iv. **TACTICAL**

The following is a list of tasks contained in UNSC Resolution 1756 (2007) dated 15 May 2007 :

Assist in the provisioning of security for electoral and humanitarian operations including the protection of MONUC personnel and installations and the electoral offices as directed.

Act as the Eastern Division Reserve with one company at six hours notice to move for operations within and outside the Eastern Division's area of operations.

Ensure security of designated MONUC facilities.

Provide reinforcement to other MONUC battalion locations as required.

Provide protection to civilians under imminent threat.

Assist in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration, Redeployment and Repatriation (DDRRR) operations against armed groups within the Eastern Division's area of operations.

Assist in the evacuation of UN or electoral personnel in an emergency.

Following is a list of requirements listed in the UN DPKO Force Requirement dated October 2006 for the Infantry Battalion :

Medium mortar platoon able to fire from two different locations.

Hand held anti-tanks weapons are required.

Integral light and medium machine guns in rifle companies.

One platoon in each company to be equipped and trained in riot control.

Provide a level 1 Medical facility to support the Infantry Battalion. Must be able to break into 4 forward medical teams.

Following is a list of tasks prescribed in the Engineer Company UN DPKO Force Requirements dated October 2006 :

Conduct engineer reconnaissance of proposed and identified deployment areas.

Assist with construction of protective fortifications and security positions for the identified deployment areas.

Construct/prepare close support facilities for the identified deployment.

Carry out limited vertical construction in support of the brigade, including hard standing, accommodation, ablution facilities, electrical and building construction/repair.

Conduct limited airfield and road repair.

Construct temporary sewages and drainage systems.

Prepared to conduct Explosive Ordnance Disposal tasks.

Conduct limited mine clearing of specific sites to be used by MONUC personnel/units, and other agencies as may be directed.

Provide bulk potable water for deployed elements.

Assist with the destruction of confiscated small arms, medium weapons and ammunition.

Conduct limited River, port and wharf repairs.

Repair or span small gap crossings using MONUC provided Bailey Bridging equipment.

Conduct GIS related tasks including overlay analysis and map/graph visualisation.

Provide level 1 medical support to the Engineer Company and be able to deploy independent medical teams for up to 30 days. Maintain malaria detection capability.

Following is a list of prescribed in the Specialist Contingent UN DPKO Force Requirement dated January 2001 :

Load and off-load aircraft, trucks and barges²⁸ within the mission area.

²⁸ During the initial deployment the focus was on the loading and off-loading of cargo aircraft while the loading and off-loading of barges were included later during the deployment.

Provide airfield crash, rescue and fire fighting capability at an identified airport.

Provide aero medical evacuation capability, inside and outside the mission area.

Provide military police capability.

Transport UN or approved agency cargo by road between various locations.

During a workshop, hosted by the Stimson Centre, on the operationalising The Responsibility to Protect Civilians the following tasks were identified²⁹:

Secure safe corridors and the passage of convoys.

Establishing safe havens.

Separate armed elements (especially in relation to border control, Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps and roads)

Military observation and surveillance.

Preventing mob violence and crowd control.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR).

Coercive disarmament.

Seizing arms caches.

Demining.

Facilitating humanitarian access to conflict areas.

²⁹ Holt, V., and Berkman, T. 2006. *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations*. The Henry L. Stimson Centre. Washington DC, USA. P 43

Securing key facilities and cultural properties.

Enforce curfews.

Ensure freedom of movement.

Supporting police presence and patrols.

Protecting Very Important Persons.

Providing backup for high-risk arrests.

Eliminating special threats.

Handling detainees.

Preventing looting and pilfering.

Supporting the prosecution of human rights abuses.

Transmitting information about human rights abuses to monitoring groups.

Training local security forces.

Providing intelligence support focussed on civilian protection.

Stopping hate media.

Direct force against killers.

b. **ATTITUDE, KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS**

To ensure that personnel are properly prepared to execute the tasks that would be required from them, they are to be empowered with knowledge and skills. It is not the intention of this paper to attempt to identify ALL the knowledge and skills that will be

required, it will focus on a number of important issues that could impact on the ability of the deployed personnel to execute their tasks. By providing the personnel with the relevant knowledge and skills it should provide them with the right frame of mind or attitude to deploy and contribute to the overall success of the specific mission.

i. **STRATEGIC**

Interpret the origin of the conflict and how (if at all) it impact on the South African foreign policy. This is very important and is primarily done by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Ministry of Defence advised on how the conflict, or the participation in the peace process, will influence the country's foreign policy. In the event of it not been in the interest of the country to participate in the peace process, the Ministry of Defence will be informed accordingly. In addition the DFA should indicate South Africa's future intension (or not) in post conflict reconstruction activities.

Provide guidance to the military-strategic level should national caveats have to be imposed on the deploying contingent and/or personnel. Consider national caveats that are proposed by the military-strategic level taking into account the impact thereof on ability of the contingent to execute its tasks within the greater concept of the Force Commanders concept of operations.

Understand and accept or deny the risks that may be identified at the military-strategic level.

Have a clear knowledge of the contents of the MOU for the specific mission in respect of the possible risks that may arise from the fact that the UN may not accept all the changes that is recommended. Interpret the advice from the military-strategic level on the ability to meet the required force levels, inclusive of equipment and special training needs, and the ability to sustain the force for a prolonged period. Advise on the position of personnel that may have to be deployed as national responsibility personnel.

ii. **MILITARY-STRATEGIC**

Understanding the origin and the background of the conflict is of paramount importance as it will guide the operational planners in determining the composition of the South African

contingent destined to deploy in the specific peacekeeping operation. The type of weaponry available to each of the parties and if any of the parties are proxy forces, if yes for who and what is the ability of the proxy to provide more and better weaponry. This is valid not only for military elements, but also for General / Flag Officers that may become involved in peace discussions between warring parties.

Interpret the UNSC resolution for the specific mission and provide advice to the Strategic level with specific reference to the interpretation of statements like “mandated under chapter VII of the UN Charter” and the possible impact on the deployment of the South African contingent. It is of paramount importance that the purpose of the peacekeeping mission is clearly understood and that the strategic level is briefed on all the implications, ie participating in the mission with a Chapter VII mandate could result in South Africa taking casualties. Should South Africa institute national caveats? This will be addressed further under the topic National Caveats.

Placing of national caveats on a national contingent is a serious issue as the consequences of such on the execution of the peacekeeping operations needs to be carefully considered. Participating in a peacekeeping operation mandated under Chapter VII with a national caveat not to participate in Chapter VII activities will seriously impede on the overall execution of the Force Commander’s concept of operations.

Interpretation of the TCC Guidelines for the specific mission and advice on how sustainment of the mission is to be executed. Identify additional equipment and/or training that may be required. Determine if South Africa is able to comply and sustain the requirements as indicated. If South Africa is not in a position to meet the requirements, the strategic level is to be informed and alternatives recommended.

While the UN utilises a standard MOU which primary aim is to regulate the discipline, troop and equipment contribution and self-sustainment capabilities and the reimbursement thereof by the UN the annexes still requires to be negotiated between the UN and the Government of South Africa.

The UN Force Requirement is the guiding document used during the joint planning at both the military-strategic and operational levels to determine the following :

If South Africa can meet its own doctrine with regard deployment of personnel within the stipulated number in the Force Requirement. If not, the number of additional personnel is to be determined. The strategic level is to be briefed on the increase number of personnel and why it is important to deploy the additional personnel. Annex A of the MOU is to be negotiated.

How does South African doctrine compare with the requirement contained in the Force Requirement with regard major equipment. Measuring the identified tasks and the background of the conflict provides relevant information with the major equipment recommended in the Force Requirement guides the planners in determining the number of major equipment South Africa wishes to deploy. The strategic level is to be briefed on the increase in number of major equipment and why it is important to deploy the additional major equipment. Annex B of the MOU is to be negotiated.

Ability of South Africa to sustain the self-sustainment categories as indicated in both the Force Requirement and the TCC guidelines. How does this impact on South Africa's own doctrine. The strategic level is to be briefed on the changes in the requested self-sustainment and why this is required. Annex C to the MOU to be negotiated.

The Joint Operations Divisional Headquarters (J Ops Div HQ) is responsible to compile the Annexes to the MOU and play an important role in the Department of Defence (DOD) team that negotiates the MOU with the UN. Interpret the reimbursement received to ensure that it corresponds with own records of serviceability of major equipment. Any discrepancies should be investigated.

Clear understanding of the rules of engagement is required to be able to provide clear guidelines to the Operational Headquarters to be rehearsed during mission readiness training. Rules of engagement need to be very simple and concise to enable the lowest rank to memorise it. In addition every conceivable scenario should be exercised to ensure that personnel are comfortable in the application of the rules of engagement.

Clear understanding of the concept of operations (CONOPS) is required to ensure that additional skills that are to be honed during mission readiness are identified at a very early

stage. Should it require the use of equipment that is specifically procured for the deployed, these should be made available at a very early stage to ensure that personnel are properly trained prior to deployment. Similarly where personnel will be required to operate equipment provided by another TCC or the UN, proper training should be provided.

While the evacuation of deployed personnel is the primary responsibility of the specific mission, a thorough understanding of the mission evacuation plan could contribute to the rendering of assistance to the mission, should it be required.

What is the long term vision of South Africa with regard to post conflict reconstruction? If known prior to deployment it can assist the commander on the ground in identifying possible areas where assistance can be provided.

While Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) is the responsibility of the UN to negotiate with the host nation, it is important that the contents be understood with specific reference to issues like over-flight and landing procedures of sustainment flights and the procedure to be followed in obtaining these. Items that are prohibited from being imported to the host nations. The latter is very important in respect of items that may be provided as part of welfare.

iii. **OPERATIONAL**

An in-depth understanding of the origin of the conflict is required as this will be required during the planning for and execution of the mission readiness training. Modus operandi of the various belligerent groups is of paramount importance, this includes the type of weapons and tactics used.

The TCC Guidelines requires a thorough study as it is the main document providing guidance on the logistic concept of the mission and should form the basis of the South African sustainment concept. This should assist the J Ops HQ in determining the number and frequency of the South Africa sustainment flights as well as the stockpiling to be kept in the mission area to ensure serviceability.

A thorough understanding of the concept of operations is required as this will guide the mission readiness exercise and will also assist the J Ops HQ to identify those skills that must be honed during combat readiness. It guides the J Ops HQ with regard the impact that it may have on the deployed major equipment, ie additional distances that may be required to be travelled under difficult conditions.

J Ops HQ is to ensure that rules of engagement are practiced during the mission readiness training exercise at all levels. Assist with the compilation of own rules of engagements based on that of the mission to ensure that it is understood to the lowest level.

Knowledge of national caveats and how these may influence the deployed contingent. In addition the J Op HQ is to monitor the situation on the ground and report any changes which may require amendments to national caveats. J Ops HQ is to ensure that national caveats and the responsibility thereof at the various tactical levels, are included in the mission readiness exercise.

Interpret the negotiated Memorandum of Understanding and the responsibilities to ensure compliance with the required standards. This includes the planning for the replacement of specific equipment during the deployment and the provisioning of adequate spare parts to the mission area to ensure serviceability. The most important issue is the knowledge of how the serviceability, as prescribed in the MOU, influences the amount of reimbursement paid by the UN DPKO to South Africa. Reporting of serviceability in accordance with South Africa prescribes is of paramount importance as it will allow the military-strategic level to compare serviceability reported with reimbursement received.

Thorough knowledge of the mission evacuation procedure should be obtained from the mission headquarters to facilitate in the compilation of an assistance evacuation plan.

Military-strategic level should advise the J Ops HQ at an early stage of South Africa's involvement with post conflict reconstruction, with specific focus on security sector reform (SSR), in the deployed country. This includes the possibility of the deployment of another mission to the country in accordance with a bi-lateral agreement to assist with SSR.

iv. **TACTICAL**

At this level the overall knowledge of the origin of the conflict will not be the same for all the deployed personnel. It is recommended that the leader element have a more detail knowledge of the conflict to enable them to guide subordinates.

While the concept of operations should form the basis of the mission readiness training the command element of the contingent deploying should have a clear understanding of it as it closely linked to national caveats and the ability of the contingent to execute assigned tasks given the equipment provided for in the MOU. Deployed command personnel are the first to become aware of changes in the concept of operations on the ground and should communicate this to the J Ops HQ as a matter of urgency. Changes in the concept of operations may inevitable require a review of major equipment that is deployed.

Commanders at all levels should have a clear understanding of the rules of engagement while the national senior should be in a position to advise subordinate commanders on the implementation thereof. Flexibility, as a concept of warfare, should always be applied.

Very important that the responsibilities of the UN, within the mission, and that of South Africa are clearly understood to ensure that the deployed contingent receives commodities on time. Cognisance should be taken of issues like medical treatment, repatriation and claims in the event deaths and/or disabilities.

Compilation of rules of engagement remains a command responsibility and as such commanders at all levels should continuously monitor the rules of engagement to ensure that deployed personnel are adequately provided for with ROE that is simple and easily understood at all levels.

A broad understanding of the resolution or mandate is required at all levels to ensure that all deployed personnel strive towards a common goal, ie peace, security and stability in the mission. The level of knowledge within the command structure may vary and it is up to the commander to ensure that sufficient information on the resolution or mandate is disseminated.

Interpretation of the Memorandum of Understanding and the compliance with the standards laid down and agreed upon. National Senior should have a clear understanding of the limitations of the deployed contingent in respect of personnel and equipment to allow him/her to measure assigned tasks and decides when which are to be referred back to South Africa for guidance.

The link between the MOU, Verification Inspections (VR) and reimbursement is to be clearly understood by commanders at all levels. Attitude of the contingent members towards verification inspections is of paramount importance as it has a direct influence on reimbursement paid to South Africa. Thorough preparation for VR's is critical.

The responsible personnel should master the United Nations and/or Mission Procedures at a very early stage of deployment and any challenges should be forwarded to the J Ops HQ. South Africa currently deploys these personnel for 12 months and they are rotated out of synchronisation with the rest of the contingents to ensure continuity.

While it is mainly the medical personnel who should have thorough knowledge of the mission medical concept, commanders at all levels, should have a working knowledge of the procedure. Obtaining of all medical records of South African personnel that were treated in medical facilities of other TCC's should be obtained or the J Ops HQ be informed to request these via the Joint Operations Division. Commanders at all levels are required to have a working knowledge of the medical evacuation procedure and how it will be implemented and executed.

Commanders are to ensure that all personnel, required to operate foreign (ie not South African) equipment receives adequate training from the provider of the equipment. Relevant competencies are to be certified. Any challenges are to be forwarded to the J Ops HQ.

It is envisaged that, given the current deployment of the South African Contingent deployed in support of MONUC, the following special skills should be addressed :

Crowd Control. While crowd control is primarily a civilian police function it is important that troops are trained in this skill as it is very useful in the protection of

own facilities. The ability to gradually go from “nothing” to “extreme” provides the commander the ability to increase the use of the level of force.

It terms of the tasks that have been identified the following skills should be honed during the preparation of the formed military elements and individual personnel :

Observation and Surveillance. What is most important is the ability to report correctly on what has been observed during the surveillance as incorrect reporting can lead to incorrect follow up actions been taken.

Cordon and Search Operations. The conduct of these under hostile conditions and in a semi-urban environment utilising minimum force.

High Visibility Vehicle and Foot patrols. With focus on dominating the area to prevent any possible attack on the local population. Attitude of the deployed forces is of paramount importance to ensure that a very standard of discipline is portrayed.

Convoy Protection. This includes the protection of humanitarian convoys which may consist of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), Private Volunteer Organisations (PVO) and International Organisations (IO) as well as UN organisations. This also includes the freedom of movement of humanitarian organisations in areas of conflict.

Static Protection. Static protection of infrastructure, own, mission and assigned. This includes the prevention of looting and pilfering.

c. **CONCLUSION**

Attached, as Appendix E, is an example of how the knowledge and skills that are required by various personnel are depicted while it also indicates which are mission readiness and which are combat readiness. The chart can also be utilised to determine for which skills formal courses may have to be developed and presented as part of formal training or as skills training.

CHAPTER 4 : PRE-DEPLOYMENT COMBAT READINESS PREPARATIONS

a. INTRODUCTION

As mentioned in Chapter 1 of this paper Combat Readiness of personnel, inclusive of formed military units, is the responsibility of the various Services and/or Divisions while preparing personnel for the specific mission is the responsibility of the Joint Operations Division. The latter will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Preparing personnel to be combat ready includes various activities and involves not just the specific unit, but also the South African Military Health Services (SAMHS) who is responsible for the certification of the medical status of the personnel. In addition Defence Intelligence (DI) is responsible to clear all personnel in respect of security clearance requirements.

b. FORMED MILITARY UNITS

Primary requirement to get a Formed Military Unit (FMU) combat ready is to ensure that all posts in the unit is staffed with suitable qualifies personnel who meet both the medical and security clearance standards. This includes all personnel that are to be attached to the main unit for the deployment, such as a Level 1 Medical Facility.

Preparing a FMU to be combat ready should commence at least 4 to 6 months prior to the deployment of the unit to the mission. This is essential to ensure that any challenges that may be encountered during combat readiness can be corrected prior to commencing with mission readiness.

In addition to medical and security clearance related requirements, all personnel are to be in possession of required personal kit and applications for official passports are submitted. Any additional kit that may be required for the specific mission is to be provided. Where the additional kit is not part of the service's or division's inventory, Joint Operations Division is to ensure that it is procured in time for issue to personnel during combat readiness. This is very important where training on the new equipment is required prior to mission readiness training.

In addition to the requirements prescribed in the combat readiness directive the following subjects, contained in the Training for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Manual, should be addressed during combat readiness of all personnel destined for deployment in peacekeeping missions :

Background to UN Peacekeeping. During this only the documentation, medical examination, kit inspection, kit issue and personnel aspects should be addressed.

Weapon Training, Familiarity with Theatre Weapons, Vehicles and Equipment.

While some of these topics can be classified as mission readiness requirements, it will be to the advantage of personnel to be exposed to it during combat readiness preparations. The events of 11 September 2001 has also influenced how personnel are being prepared for peacekeeping missions with specific reference to mine awareness and lately Improved Explosive Devices (IED) which may be used as road side explosives.

General Military Training. All the topics reflected in the manual should be addressed with specific reference to map reading. Quality of the maps that may be available may not be to the standard that the personnel are used and may require additional orientation during combat readiness.

UN Operating Techniques. All the topics should be addressed.

Safety Measures and Precautions. All topics should be addressed.

i. **INFANTRY BATTALIONS**

Infantry Battalions normally comprises the bulk of most deployments in support of current peacekeeping operations and as such usually present some unique challenges in being made combat ready. Apart from ensuring that the battalion is fully staffed with suitably qualified personnel, ensuring that all the joining attachments does so in good time to ensure that proper marrying-up drills are conducted.

All South African Infantry Battalions face a challenge when being committed to United Nations peacekeeping operations as the standard battalion comprises only 3 Rifle

Companies while the UN requires 4 Rifle Companies. In addition the UN stipulates the overall strength of such a battalion which again provides challenges with regard the inclusion of an accounting section to account for all equipment in the mission area and logistic support personnel. Often the Infantry Battalion needs to adjust its doctrinal structure to accommodate the peacekeeping requirements.

Having ensured that the battalion is fully staffed it is time to address the knowledge and skills that is required for combat readiness. In the directive issued by the Joint Operations Division the battalion may be guided to which knowledge and skills needed to be honed during combat readiness. Certain knowledge and skills that have been identified as mission readiness requirements may be included in combat readiness preparation. This may include the origin of the conflict which will give the battalion a better insight into the nature of the conflict into which they are to deploy.

Should the battalion being readied for deployment in a UN peacekeeping operations, the Standard Generic Training Program should be covered in addition to the knowledge and skill requirements identified in Appendix E and stipulated in the Joint Operations Division Directive. This will ensure that the battalion has a basic knowledge of the UN systems when it arrives for mission readiness training.

If it is the first deployment of the battalion to a new mission, major equipment that are to be included in the MOU is confirmed and forwarded to the Joint Operations Division for inclusion in the negotiations. All self-sustainment categories are also confirmed and where gaps are determined, the Joint Operations Division is informed.

Final phase in the combat readiness preparation is to ensure that all administrative actions are completed, ie last will and testaments are in place and all members are in possession of official passports. In addition a family support structure should be in place to ensure support to the families during deployment of the battalion.

At the end of the combat readiness training the battalion is to be certified as being combat ready and ready for the next phase, mission readiness training.

ii. **ENGINEER SQUADRONS**

Engineer Squadrons is one of the most sought after units in any peacekeeping operations and is a force multiplier as it, apart from its military tasks, it can be utilised in quick impact projects (QIPS) which serves to gain the hearts and minds of the local population. It is unfortunately also a unit that can be miss-used in peacekeeping operations.

First priority is for the squadron to be made combat ready in respect of personnel, fully staffed with suitable qualified personnel which include all attachments. Ensuring that the correct equipment is deployed during the initial deployment is a major challenge during combat readiness which makes it a priority that a thorough reconnaissance be conducted to the mission area. All major equipment that is to be included in the MOU is confirmed and forwarded to the Joint Operations Division for inclusion in the negotiations. All self-sustainment categories are also confirmed and where gaps are determined, the Joint Operations Division is informed.

Having ensured that the squadron is fully staffed the knowledge and skills that are required for combat readiness need to be addressed. In the directive issued by the Joint Operations Division the squadron may be guided to which knowledge and skills needed to be honed during combat readiness. Certain knowledge and skills that have been identified as mission readiness requirements may be included in combat readiness preparation. This may include the origin of the conflict which will give the squadron a better insight into the nature of the conflict into which they are to deploy.

Should the squadron being readied for deployment in a UN peacekeeping operations, the Standard Generic Training Program should be covered in addition to the knowledge and skill requirements identified in Appendix E and stipulated in the Joint Operations Division directive. This will ensure that the squadron has a basic knowledge of the UN systems when it arrives for mission readiness training.

Final phase in the combat readiness preparation is to ensure that all administrative actions are completed, ie last will and testaments are in place and all members are in possession of official passports. In addition a family support structure should be in place to ensure support to the families during deployment of the squadron.

At the end of the combat readiness training the specific squadron is to be certified as being combat ready and ready for the next phase, mission readiness training.

iii. **AIR UNITS**

Making Air Units combat ready differs somewhat to that of an Infantry Battalion and an Engineer Squadron in that the Air Unit is mostly smaller and requires more specialist personnel which may deploy for shorter tours of duty. The composition may however differ from mission to mission and may be influenced by issues such as who is responsible for protection of the unit and the proposed deployed base.

Combat readiness of an air unit also commences by ensuring that the identified personnel meet the deployment requirements and that all administrative actions are completed, ie last will and testament, and all members are in possession of official passports. A family support structure should all be established and functioning prior to the deployment of the unit. The latter may have to be established as various bases as members are often drawn from a number of air units. Should it be required that a medical unit or sub-unit be attached to the air unit, this should be done well in advance to ensure that marrying-up-drills are adhere to.

As air units will in most instances be operating in mission areas where normal ground based navigational aids is non-existent or limited, honing of skills to operate without these is a combat readiness requirement. In certain instances it would be required from rotary wing aircraft to deploy with some form of self-protection in the form of door mounted machine guns. While this is primarily a mission readiness requirement, ensuring that air crews are trained on this capability during combat readiness will save time during mission readiness.

Certain knowledge and skills that have been identified as mission readiness requirements may be included in combat readiness preparation. This may include the origin of the conflict which will give the air unit a better insight into the nature of the conflict into which they are to deploy.

Should the air unit being readied for deployment in a UN peacekeeping operations, the Standard Generic Training Program should be covered in addition to the knowledge and

skill requirements identified in Appendix E and stipulated in the Joint Operations Division directive. This will ensure that the unit has a basic knowledge of the UN systems when it arrives for mission readiness training.

All major equipment that is to be included in the MOU is confirmed and forwarded to the Joint Operations Division for inclusion in the negotiations. All self-sustainment categories are also confirmed and where gaps are determined, the Joint Operations Division is informed.

The air unit is to be certified as combat ready prior to commencing with mission readiness.

iv. **MARITIME UNITS**

Major War Ships³⁰

Combat readiness of Maritime Units is very similar to that of air units. A ship normally have a ship's compliment or company who's medical status should be confirmed while all members should also be in possession of official passports. This also applies to any joining members. Members joining the ship should do so at an early stage to ensure that the ship's company becomes a unit.

Ships may often be required to operate in areas where shore infrastructure is non-existing or limited which requires that, although it is a mission readiness requirement, should be addressed during combat readiness to ensure that should any additional equipment be required, these be identified at an early stage.

Should the ship(s) being readied for deployment in a UN peacekeeping operations, the Standard Generic Training Program should be covered in addition to the knowledge and skill requirements identified in Appendix E and stipulated in the Joint Operations Division directive. This will ensure that the ship(s) has a basic knowledge of the UN systems when it arrives for mission readiness training.

³⁰ Refers to maritime units that will operate on the oceans and would normally be a war ship or a combat support ship.

Certain knowledge and skills that have been identified as mission readiness requirements may be included in combat readiness preparation. This may include the origin of the conflict which will give the ship(s) a better insight into the nature of the conflict into which they are to deploy.

All major equipment that is to be included in the MOU is confirmed and forwarded to the Joint Operations Division for inclusion in the negotiations. All self-sustainment categories are also confirmed and where gaps are determined, the Joint Operations Division is informed.

Ship(s) should be certified combat ready prior to commencing with mission readiness training.

Other Maritime Units³¹

Making other Maritime Units combat ready differs somewhat to that of an Infantry Battalion and an Engineer Squadron in that the Maritime Units is mostly smaller and requires more specialist personnel which may deploy for shorter tours of duty. The composition may however differ from mission to mission and may be influenced by issues such as who is responsible for protection of the unit and the proposed deployed base.

Combat readiness of a Maritime Unit also commences by ensuring that the identified personnel meet the deployment requirements and that all administrative actions are completed, ie last will and testament, and all members are in possession of official passports. A family support structure should all be established and functioning prior to the deployment of the unit. The latter may have to be established as various bases as members are often drawn from a number of air units. Should it be required that a medical unit or sub-unit be attached to the Maritime Unit, this should be done well in advance to ensure that marrying-up-drills are adhere to.

Certain knowledge and skills that have been identified as mission readiness requirements may be included in combat readiness preparation. This may include the origin of the

³¹ This refers to Maritime Units such as Riverine Units operating on Rivers and Lakes.

conflict which will give the Maritime Unit a better insight into the nature of the conflict into which they are to deploy.

Should the Maritime Unit being readied for deployment in a UN peacekeeping operations, the Standard Generic Training Program should be covered in addition to the knowledge and skill requirements identified in Appendix E and stipulated in the Joint Operations Division directive. This will ensure that the unit has a basic knowledge of the UN systems when it arrives for mission readiness training.

All major equipment that is to be included in the MOU is confirmed and forwarded to the Joint Operations Division for inclusion in the negotiations. All self-sustainment categories are also confirmed and where gaps are determined, the Joint Operations Division is informed.

The Maritime Unit is to be certified as combat ready prior to commencing with mission readiness.

v. **MEDICAL UNITS**

In AU and UN peace mission's medical units are normally deployed as Level 1 or 2 Medical facilities and the priority in making these combat ready is to ensure that the South African medical units are composed in accordance with the United Nations requirements as stated in the United Nations Medical Handbook and the TCC Guidelines. This usually means that the South African units are composed of personnel from various units. All personnel that form the medical units are to meet the South African deployment standards, ie medical and security.

Should the medical unit being readied for deployment in a UN peacekeeping operations, the Standard Generic Training Program should be covered in addition to the knowledge and skill requirements identified in Appendix E and stipulated in the Joint Operations Division directive. This will ensure that the medical unit has a basic knowledge of the UN systems when it arrives for mission readiness training.

Should the medical unit deploy as a part of another FMU, Level 1 Medical facility of an Infantry Battalion or Air Unit, certain knowledge and skills that have been identified as

mission readiness requirements may be included in combat readiness preparation. This may include the origin of the conflict which will give the Medical Unit a better insight into the nature of the conflict into which they are to deploy.

All major equipment that is to be included in the MOU is confirmed and forwarded to the Joint Operations Division for inclusion in the negotiations. All self-sustainment categories are also confirmed and where gaps are determined, the Joint Operations Division is informed.

The deployment of an Aero Medical Evacuation Team will be addressed under the Specialist Units as it would normally form part of such a unit.

Medical Units should be certified combat ready prior to commencing with mission readiness training.

vi. **SPECIALIST UNITS**

Specialist units (also referred to as Enablers) comprising various sub-units such as cargo handling teams and airfield crash rescue and fire fighting teams are often called for in AU and UN peacekeeping missions. South Africa current has such a unit deployed and this paper will address combat readiness of the various sub-units.

Air Cargo Handling Teams.

The SANDF do not have formed units such as these and are normally composed from personnel from the Air Force, Army and Logistic Units³². The UN Force Requirement will indicate the composition of, and the major equipment required by each team. In some instances, like in the case of the South African teams, some equipment, not part of the current inventory, had to be procured prior to deployment.

Teams are to be composed at an early stage according to the UN Force Requirements and made combat ready. All personnel are to meet the deployment standards prior to commencing with combat readiness.

³² Personnel such as drivers may also be provided by the Navy or other Divisions.

Where personnel are required to operate equipment not part of the normal inventory, thorough training on the new equipment must form part of the combat readiness training. Each operator should receive a competency certificate indicating that he/she is qualified to operate the said equipment. Where personnel are required to operate more than one piece of equipment certification on all are required. Certification on inventory type equipment should also be confirmed.

Should the teams being readied for deployment in a UN peacekeeping operations, the Standard Generic Training Program should be covered in addition to the knowledge and skill requirements identified in Appendix E and stipulated in the Joint Operations Division directive. This will ensure that the teams have a basic knowledge of the UN systems when it arrives for mission readiness training.

Certain knowledge and skills that have been identified as mission readiness requirements may be included in combat readiness preparation. This may include the origin of the conflict which will give the teams a better insight into the nature of the conflict into which they are to deploy.

All major equipment that is to be included in the MOU is confirmed and forwarded to the Joint Operations Division for inclusion in the negotiations. All self-sustainment categories are also confirmed and where gaps are determined, the Joint Operations Division is informed.

Air Cargo Handling Teams should be certified combat ready prior to commencing with mission readiness training.

Airfield Crash Rescue and Fire Fighting Teams.

Force Requirements will indicate the composition of this sub-unit in respect of personnel and equipment. Equipment would usually be the type that is required to operate at major airfields or airports and includes the capability to deal with incidents involving aircraft. Teams are to be composed at an early stage according to the UN Force Requirements and made combat ready. All personnel are to meet the deployment standards prior to commencing with combat readiness.

Should the teams being readied for deployment in a UN peacekeeping operations, the Standard Generic Training Program should be covered in addition to the knowledge and skill requirements identified in Appendix E and stipulated in the Joint Operations Division directive. This will ensure that the teams have a basic knowledge of the UN systems when it arrives for mission readiness training.

Certain knowledge and skills that have been identified as mission readiness requirements may be included in combat readiness preparation. This may include the origin of the conflict which will give the teams a better insight into the nature of the conflict into which they are to deploy.

All major equipment that is to be included in the MOU is confirmed and forwarded to the Joint Operations Division for inclusion in the negotiations. All self-sustainment categories are also confirmed and where gaps are determined, the Joint Operations Division is informed.

Airfield Crash Rescue and Fire Fighting Teams should be certified combat ready prior to commencing with mission readiness training.

Aero Medical Evacuation Team

The composition of an Aero Medical Evacuation Team (AMET), deploying as part of an AU or UN peacekeeping mission, is described in the Force Requirement and the UN Medical Handbook. This usually means that the South African units are composed of personnel from various units. All personnel that form the AMET are to meet the South African deployment standards, ie medical and security.

Should the AMET being readied for deployment in a UN peacekeeping operations, the Standard Generic Training Program should be covered in addition to the knowledge and skill requirements identified in Appendix E and stipulated in the Joint Operations Division directive. This will ensure that the AMET has a basic knowledge of the UN systems when it arrives for mission readiness training.

Certain knowledge and skills that have been identified as mission readiness requirements may be included in combat readiness preparation. This may include the origin of the conflict which will give the teams a better insight into the nature of the conflict into which they are to deploy.

All major equipment that is to be included in the MOU is confirmed and forwarded to the Joint Operations Division for inclusion in the negotiations. All self-sustainment categories are also confirmed and where gaps are determined, the Joint Operations Division is informed. AMET's is normally supported by a South African Command and Support Unit or in some instances are supported by another TCC.

AMET should be certified combat ready prior to commencing with mission readiness training.

Military Police Unit

The composition of a Military Police Unit (MPU), deploying as part of an AU or UN peacekeeping mission, is described in the Force Requirement. This usually means that the South African units are composed of personnel from various units. All personnel that form the MPU are to meet the South African deployment standards, ie medical and security.

Should the MPU being readied for deployment in a UN peacekeeping operations, the Standard Generic Training Program should be covered in addition to the knowledge and skill requirements identified in Appendix E and stipulated in the Joint Operations Division directive. This will ensure that the MPU has a basic knowledge of the UN systems when it arrives for mission readiness training.

Certain knowledge and skills that have been identified as mission readiness requirements may be included in combat readiness preparation. This may include the origin of the conflict which will give the teams a better insight into the nature of the conflict into which they are to deploy.

All major equipment that is to be included in the MOU is confirmed and forwarded to the Joint Operations Division for inclusion in the negotiations. All self-sustainment categories

are also confirmed and where gaps are determined, the Joint Operations Division is informed. Military Police Units are normally supported by a South African Command and Support Unit or in some instances are supported by another TCC. UN normally supplies all major equipment.

Military Police Units should be certified combat ready prior to commencing with mission readiness training.

Command and Support Unit

A Command and Support Unit (CSU) due to support a Specialist Unit may be compiled from various units or may be drawn from a standing brigade headquarters. Which ever option is exercised the unit should meet the requirements as laid down in the approved structure and all personnel should meet the deployment requirements with regard medical and security clearances. Should the unit be compiled from various units it should be done well in advance of the mission readiness phase to ensure that a coercive unit is established.

Should the CSU being readied for deployment in a UN peacekeeping operations, the Standard Generic Training Program should be covered in addition to the knowledge and skill requirements identified in Appendix E and stipulated in the Joint Operations Division directive. This will ensure that the medical unit has a basic knowledge of the UN systems when it arrives for mission readiness training.

Certain knowledge and skills that have been identified as mission readiness requirements may be included in combat readiness preparation. This may include the origin of the conflict which will give the CSU better insight into the nature of the conflict into which they are to deploy.

All major equipment that is to be included in the MOU is confirmed and forwarded to the Joint Operations Division for inclusion in the negotiations. All self-sustainment categories are also confirmed and where gaps are determined, the Joint Operations Division is informed.

CSU should be certified combat ready prior to commencing with mission readiness training.

vii. **Support Elements**³³

Although support elements are inherent to all FMU's and such should receive Combat Readiness training along with its parent unit, this paper intend focussing on the importance of these elements during peacekeeping missions. This may require some adjustments to the standard doctrine for South Africa due to the allocated force strength and the number of major equipment that is deployed in accordance with the Force Requirement (the latter is almost always remarkable less then what is deployed during a conventional deployment). This may require an adjustment in the composition of the support elements.

The success of any peacekeeping mission is largely dependent on the ability of the support elements to sustain the deployed forces to execute the force commander's operational plans and to ensure that South Africa receives the reimbursement it is entitled to. While maintaining the equipment at the required operational levels primarily for the conduct of operations, reimbursement remains a very important part of serviceability.

Ideally all support personnel should complete the following UNITAR – POCI courses as part of combat readiness :

An Introduction to the United Nations System : Orientation for Serving on a United Nations Field Mission

Logistical Support to United Nations Peacekeeping

Operational Logistical Support of United Nations Peacekeeping : Intermediate Logistics.

Advanced Topics in United Nations Logistics : The Provisioning of Troops and Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) and the Method for Reimbursement.

³³ For the purpose of this paper Support Elements will refer to Human Resource Support, Logistic Support, Technical Support and Communication Support.

In addition senior personnel should have completed the Management of Mission Resources at the PMTC.

c. **INDIVIDUALS**

i. **OFFICERS COMMANDING**

Command and Control in any peacekeeping operation is of paramount importance which requires that the appointed commanders, at all levels, be thoroughly prepared prior to their deployment. The ideal situation is obviously to deploy FMU's with their own commanders. Where this is not possible, replacement commanders should be identified at a very early stage to ensure that they are accepted by their new subordinates prior to commencing with mission readiness training. Where FMU's conduct combat readiness training new commanders should be appointed prior to commencing with this.

All officers' commanding that have been identified for possible deployment to peacekeeping operations should complete the following United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Programme for Correspondence Instruction (POCI) prior to commencing with combat readiness :

Introduction to the UN System.

Principles of Peace Support Operations

Commanding Peacekeeping Operations.

Ethics in Peacekeeping.

All logistic commanders should complete the Peace Mission Logistic Officer's and Peace Mission Support courses at the Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTTC) as part of combat readiness. Logistic officers should be encouraged to complete the three (3) UNITAR-POCI logistic courses on their own. All senior commanders should complete the Integrated Peace Mission course at the PMTC.

While completion of the above mentioned courses may not be possible for officer's commanding deploying at the start of a new mission, relieving commanders should be encouraged to complete the courses. The ideal situation would be for all officers' commanding to complete at least the above mentioned courses as part of combat readiness.

ii. **DELEGATES**

Flag and General Officers that may form part of diplomatic missions to conflict areas to mediate between warring parties should be identified and should complete the UNITAR-POCI course on Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution. In addition they should attend the negotiation course at the PMTC.

iii. **MILITARY OBSERVERS**

As Military Observers (MILOBS) are in many ways the eyes and the ears of a peacekeeping operation preparation is of paramount importance and should preferably come from the "teeth arms".

MILOBS should have completed the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), Programme of Correspondence Instruction (POCI) course for MILOBS prior to commencing with the residential phase of MILOBS training course during which the Standardised Generic Training Modules for United Nations Peacekeeping should have been covered. In addition the following practical training should have been covered :

Driving Skills.

Map work and the use of Global Positioning System (GPS)

Landmines, Unexploded Ordnances (UXO) and Improvised Explosion Devices (IED)

Personal Security

Investigation and Verification

Negotiation and Mediation

Briefing and Staff Skills

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Sensitisation

Radio Communication

MILOBS should meet the deployment standards with regard medical status and security clearance. MILOBS should maintain curriculum vitae for both the AU and the UN and must complete AU or UN medical at short notice to enable deployment at short notice.

A family support structure should all be established and functioning prior to the deployment of the individuals.

iv. **MILITARY STAFF OFFICERS**

Military Staff Officers (MSO) should complete the Peace Mission Staff Officers course at the PMTC during which the Standardised Generic Training Modules for United Nations Peacekeeping should have been covered. The following practical aspects should have been included in the course :

Driving Skills.

Personal Security.

Landmines, Unexploded Ordnances (UXO) and Improvised Explosion Devices (IED).

MSO should meet the deployment standards with regard medical status and security clearance and should maintain curriculum vitae for both the AU and the UN and must complete AU or UN medical at short notice to enable deployment at short notice.

A family support structure should all be established and functioning prior to the deployment of the individuals.

d. **FORMAL TRAINING**

The SANDF conducts formal training on peacekeeping operations at various levels. Training at the Tactical level is conducted at each of the Service Training institutions while training at the Operational level is conducted at the SA National War College during the Joint Senior Command and Staff Program. The latter prepares officers as Staff Officers and Commanders at the Operational Level. Training at the Military-Strategic level is conducted at the SA National Defence College. In addition to the formal training opportunities a number of peacekeeping conferences are held at various locations while a number of Joint and Multi-national training exercises are conducted. A course on the role and function of Maritime Forces has been developed and is presented to the appropriate level.

CHAPTER 5 : PRE-DEPLOYMENT MISSION READINESS PREPARATION OF PERSONNEL

“You (deployed peacekeepers) should be able to change from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and back to peacekeeping again at very short notice” Maj Gen Cammaert³⁴

a. **INTRODUCTION**

In an article by Maj Gen Cammaert, published by the South African Institute for Security Studies (ISS), he stressed the importance being well prepared for modern “robust” peacekeeping operations and stated that peacekeepers should be “trained for war”. This serves to illustrate the importance of being properly prepared prior to deploying into a peacekeeping operation. The latter is put in context by the fact that more than 50% of all peacekeeping operations that have been mandated by the UNSC since 1999 have been mandated with UN Chapter VII tasks.

Whilst the previous chapter on combat readiness preparation focussed exclusively on the tactical level, this chapter will attempt to illustrate that mission readiness is a requirement at the strategic, military-strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. Each level has unique requirements which should guide the next subordinate level to ensure that all involved in the peace mission has the same understanding.

The importance of a mission readiness training exercise should never be underestimated and while it is primarily aimed at the tactical level the involvement of the strategic, military-strategic and operational levels should be considered. Mission readiness training exercises should strive to expose the personnel to every conceivable scenario and situation that they encounter in the mission area. Incidents which will require higher, ie strategic, military-strategic or operational, intervention should be included to ensure that when such incidents happens while deployed the various levels would have experience in handling such an incident.

³⁴ Statement made by Maj Gen Cammaert in a farewell address to the personnel that were deployed as part of the MONUC Eastern Division.

b. **STRATEGIC**³⁵

Participation in any peacekeeping mission should start at the strategic level from where clear and concise guidelines are to be issued to the military-strategic level for further developing into guidelines to the operational level and further to the tactical level. The entire mission readiness at this level should start with a clear and concise statement from the DFA indicating the political will to participate in the specific mission and, at this early stage, an indication of the long term involvement of South Africa, ie post conflict reconstruction involvement.

A clear understanding of the UNSC resolution should be the priority. What is understood with terminology like “mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to”. There appear to be a misconception that when the UN refers to Chapter VII of the Charter it automatically refers to peace-enforcement. Since 1999 the UNSC authorised eighteen (18) peacekeeping operations of which nine (9) were mandated with Chapter VII tasks.

In an Interview with Mr Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the Under-Secretary General of Peacekeeping, by European Affairs, entitled “Contemporary Peacekeeping is State-Building : The UN Embraces “Robust Peacekeeping,” including use of Force, reference is made to this new concept of peacekeeping operations as “robust” or “comprehensive” peacekeeping. A term frequented by commanders like Maj Gen Cammaert. This new concept of peacekeeping requires careful consideration at the strategic level as it could result in a casualties. How many is South Africa prepared to accept? Should this be indicated by the strategic level?

In accordance with the White Paper on Participation in International Peace Missions a comprehensive media campaign, led by the South African Government Communication Information Services (GCIS), and assisted by the DOD, should be developed for each peace mission in which South Africa participate. This should address the possibility that South Africa could sustain casualties and explain why the population should embrace the participation and accept the casualties. How many casualties the population will accept remains a challenge which should be monitored continuously.

³⁵ Whilst this is cover a wide spectrum for the purpose of this paper this refers to the South African Cabinet, Standing Committee on Defence, Portfolio Committee on Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence.

Knowledge and skills, as per Appendix E, are required at this level to ensure that suitable guidelines are provided to the military-strategic level which should guide the preparation, deployment, sustainment, rotation and ultimately final repatriation of all personnel : The following is emphasised :

UNSC Resolution. The contents should be understood as it should guide the strategic level on possible national caveats and the media campaign. Should the strategic level decide not to impose national caveats at this stage, they should be well conversed with the content to make rulings on caveats that could be recommended by the military-strategic level.

CONOPS. Whilst it may be difficult for the strategic level to fully understand this, they may require the military-strategic level to provide a comprehensive briefing on the CONOPS indicating specific challenges that may influence participation. The latter is of paramount importance should new equipment be required.

TCC Guidelines. A clear understanding of who is responsible for what in respect of sustainment during the deployment is required. This may require a comprehensive briefing by the military-strategic level indicating challenges. The latter is important where additional expenditure will be required.

MOU. A standing UN MOU format, which was approved by the UN General Assembly, is utilised for all deployments in support of UN peace missions. The aim of the MOU is “to establish administrative, logistics and financial terms and conditions to govern the contribution of personnel, equipment and services provided by the Government”.³⁶ The conception that a variety of restrictions or limitations (caveats) are included in the MOU should be clearly understood at this level.

National Caveats. Imposing national caveats may protect the South African contingent with regard limiting possible casualties, but may impede on the ability of

³⁶ Article 3 of the standing UN MOU. The standard MOU is in the process of being reviewed and South Africa supported the amended Article 3 which states “to establish the administrative, logistics and financial terms and conditions to govern the contribution of personnel, equipment and services provided by the Government in support of (UN peacekeeping mission) and to provide for the maintenance of discipline and good order among such personnel and the investigation of, and accountability for, violations”.

the respective force commander's to utilise the contingent in achieving his/her objectives. There should be a balance and may require comprehensive briefings by the military-strategic level.

Origin of the Conflict. An understanding of the origin of the conflict is very important. Governments supporting the various belligerents should be identified and should be approached on the political and diplomatic level to cease their involvement in the specific conflict.

Gender. Gender refers to more than just deploying women in peace missions and should be understood at this level to provide guidelines on the topic to the military-strategic level.

c. **MILITARY-STRATEGIC**

Primary role of the military-strategic level is to convert the political guidelines received from the strategic level into executable military operational objectives which should guide the commanders on the tactical level to participate in the specific peace mission to ensure overall success of the mission.

At the same time the military-strategic level should conduct its own analysis of all the documents that are provided to the strategic level to enable it to brief the strategic level on a number of issues, ie the concept of operations and the UNSC resolution. To achieve this it is paramount importance that planners at this level conduct a reconnaissance to the mission area followed by a visit to the UN DPKO to clarify any misunderstandings that may arise out of the planning.

Knowledge and skills, as per Appendix E, are required at this level to ensure that suitable guidelines are provided to the operational level which should guide the preparation, deployment, sustainment, rotation and ultimately final repatriation of all personnel : The following is emphasised :

UNSC Resolution. Any uncertainties with regard the interpretation of the mandate of the mission should be clarified during the reconnaissance and visit to the UN DPKO and any uncertainty should be brought to the attention of the strategic level.

The mandate should guide the military-strategic level in providing both guidelines for combat and mission readiness. The report of the Secretary-General to the UNSC on the mission, which normally precedes the approval of the UNSC resolution, should be thoroughly studied as it provides the background to the UNSC resolution on the specific mission and will provide additional information on the mission. If it is an established mission reports are to be studied with the idea of obtaining additional information that may influence the participation. A summary of the resolution(s) are to be compiled and forwarded to the operational level.

CONOPS. Next to the UNSC mandate is the most important document that requires comprehensive understanding as it provides insight into the force commander's concept of how he/she intends executing the mandate and tasks provided in the UNSC resolution. Uncertainties should be cleared with the force commander or the UN DPKO during the reconnaissance and/or the visit to the UN DPKO. To ensure that all role players are on the same level, the strategic level is to be briefed on this as soon as possible. This document is to be studied in conjunction with the UN Force Requirements which indicates the number and type of major equipment that is recommended for the contingent as well recommendations for self-sustainment. Whilst South Africa does not have to accept the recommendations, it provides a basis from which negotiations for the MOU can take place.

Force Requirement. The requirement by the UN is to be clearly understood at this level as it will, in most instances, not be in line with SANDF doctrine. How the requirement will impact on SANDF doctrine needs to be thoroughly analysed and how this may, or may not, impact on the ability of the requested force to function optimally. If South Africa decides to accept the force requirement it should ONLY deploy what is requested. Deploying structures not requested may result in challenges during the verification inspections, if a level 1 medical facility is requested it is what the inspectors wants to see during inspections. The strategic level is to be briefed on any influences on own doctrine. The latter may lead to the implementation of national caveats.

TCC Guidelines. As this document may influence the negotiations of the MOU the wealth of information on the mission and more specifically on sustainment of the

specific mission requires thorough understanding at all levels. The military-strategic level is primarily responsible to ensure that the strategic level is briefed on the requirements from South Africa and the impact that it may have on the budget. Unambiguous guidelines should be provided to the operational and tactical levels with regard to sustainment requirements. This document, along with any additional guidelines, should be forwarded to the operational and tactical levels.

MOU. This level is responsible to compile and negotiate the MOU for the specific mission. It is also responsible for the maintenance of the MOU and all amendments are to be distributed to all involved. Utilising the standard UN MOU it is only the Annexes that are to be compiled and negotiated. The aim of the MOU should be clearly understood by all involved and the command cadre of every new contingent should receive a thorough briefing on it as part of mission readiness preparations. A briefing should be provided to the strategic level on the various responsibilities. Clear guidelines on how serviceability are to be reported by the tactical level to the operational level and ultimately to this level are to be included in the directive issued.

Caveats. Any National Caveats that are imposed by the strategic level should be thoroughly analysed with regard to the possible impact thereof on the overall mission and the strategic level be informed of these. This level is also responsible to recommend and any additional caveats and the impact thereof on the mission. Once approved these should be included in the mission readiness directive and the command cadre of each contingent should be briefed on these. Continuous monitoring of the mission and caveats are to be done to ensure that additional caveats are generated or those no longer necessary recalled.

Gender. A clear understanding of UNSC resolutions *1325 (2000) dated 31 October 2000* is required at this level to enable the military-strategic level to brief the strategic level on the requirements and the compliance, or not, of the South African contingent. Ensure that a comprehensive briefing on this topic is included in the mission readiness training program for all personnel due for deployment.

AU/UN Logistic Systems. This should be closely studied with the relevant TCC Guidelines. A thorough understanding of the following is important :

Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual).

Medical Manual.

AU/UN Medical Support. Medical support to deployed personnel is always a major area of concern and to ensure that injured personnel receives the best possible medical support understanding of the procedures is very important. Procedures to be followed to obtain patient documents from the AU/UN needs to be clearly identified and forwarded to those involved. The latter includes the procedures to be followed in respect of claims for the loss of life or limbs or death while serving in the mission area. The latter is also applicable to claims that may arise long after completion of the tour of duty.

Media. Whose “rules” on talking to the media are applicable during the participation in AU/UN peacekeeping operations? The strict rules and guidelines govern talking to the media within the SANDF and these appear to be in conflict with the approach by the AU/UN. A clear understanding of the AU/UN approach will assist with the preparations of personnel prior to deployment.

Having studied all the available documents and obtained additional information where gaps were identified, a comprehensive deployment directive should be issued to all involved in the preparation, mobilisation, deployment, sustainment, rotation and/or final repatriation of the personnel. The directive should include focus aspects that are of paramount importance in the mission preparedness of specifically formed military units which should empower the deploying personnel with the necessary knowledge and skills to have a positive attitude.

d. **OPERATIONAL**

At this level the guidelines provided by the military-strategic level is converted into executable military tasks at the tactical level. This includes the mission readiness exercise that is to be conducted prior to the deployment of formed military units. This level is

ultimately responsible for the conduct of the mission readiness exercise for formed military units while individual personnel are to receive the necessary training prior to their deployment.

Knowledge and skills, as per Appendix E, are required at this level to ensure that suitable guidelines are provided to the tactical level which should guide the preparation, deployment, sustainment, rotation and ultimately final repatriation of all personnel : The following is emphasised :

UNSC Resolution. The core military tasks included in the resolution should be clearly understood at this level and it is recommended that a summary of the resolution by the military-strategic level be utilised for this. Any uncertainty should be cleared with the military-strategic level.

CONOPS. In all probability the most important document for this level as it will guide this level with regard the mission readiness of all personnel, specifically formed military units and should be clearly understood. The military-strategic level may provide additional guidelines. The concept should form the basis for any mission readiness training exercise.

TCC Guidelines. The successful sustaining of the deployed formed military units depends on the thorough understanding of this document and any additional guidelines that may be provided by the military-strategic level.

MOU. A thorough understanding of the responsibilities of both the AU/UN and South Africa is required to ensure that South Africa is able to execute the force commander's concept of operations and ensure optimal reimbursement. Guidelines with regard the reporting on serviceability of major equipment is to be developed in cooperation with the guidelines received from the military-strategic level to ensure that problems are identified and rectified at an early stage. The reporting procedure also serves as the South African source documents to verify reimbursement received from the AU/UN. It is recommended that these be tested during the mission readiness training exercise of formed military units.

National Caveats. As this may influence the participation of the South African contingent in the force commander's concept of operations it needs to be handled with the necessary sensitivity, but should be clearly understood by all. Any uncertainty should be cleared with the military-strategic level. These should also be included in the appointment directive of the South African National Senior in the mission area. Continued communication between the National Senior and this level is required to ensure that any amendments are done in good time.

Origin of the Conflict. Clear understanding of this will ensure that mission readiness exercises are done in the right context which should provide the personnel clear guidelines in respect of the belligerent groups in the mission area and their reason for participation as well how they are supported. Continuous updating of the situation is required to ensure that relevant personnel are informed of changes.

Gender. Continuous monitoring of the gender guidelines provided by the military-strategic level is required.

e. **TACTICAL LEVEL**

i. **FORMED MILITARY UNITS**

All personnel deploying as part of formed military units should receive briefings on the following topics during mission readiness preparation :

UNSC Resolution. The core military tasks included in the resolution should be clearly understood at this level and it is recommended that a summary of the resolution by the military-strategic level be utilised for this. Any uncertainty should be cleared with the military-strategic level.

CONOPS. In all probability the most important document for this level as it will guide this level with regard the mission readiness of all personnel, specifically formed military units and should be clearly understood. The military-strategic level may provide additional guidelines. The concept should form the basis for any mission readiness training exercise.

TCC Guidelines. The successful sustaining of the deployed formed military units depends on the thorough understanding of this document and any additional guidelines that may be provided by the military-strategic level.

MOU. A thorough understanding of the responsibilities of both the AU/UN and South Africa is required to ensure that South Africa is able to execute the force commander's concept of operations and ensure optimal reimbursement. Guidelines with regard the reporting on serviceability of major equipment is to be developed in cooperation with the guidelines received from the military-strategic level to ensure that problems are identified and rectified at an early stage. The reporting procedure also serves as the South African source documents to verify reimbursement received from the AU/UN. It is recommended that these be tested during the mission readiness training exercise of formed military units.

National Caveats. As this may influence the participation of the South African contingent in the force commander's concept of operations it needs to be handled with the necessary sensitivity, but should be clearly understood by all. Any uncertainty should be cleared with the military-strategic level. These should also be included in the appointment directive of the South African National Senior in the mission area. Continued communication between the National Senior and this level is required to ensure that any amendments are done in good time.

Origin of the Conflict. Clear understanding of this will ensure that mission readiness exercises are done in the right context which should provide the personnel clear guidelines in respect of the belligerent groups win the mission area and their reason for participation as well how they are supported. Continuous updating of the situation is required to ensure that relevant personnel are informed of changes.

Gender. Continuous monitoring of the gender guidelines provided by the military-strategic level is required. The DVD "No Excuses" dealing with the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and distributed by Filmaid International should be showed to all personnel

In addition to the above personnel deploying as part of air and maritime units should receive briefings on letters of assist. All air and major maritime assets will deploy in accordance with a LOA which will contain all the guidelines with regard the deployment and operating of the aircraft and ship(s). It is very important that the commander's clearly understand the contents of the LOA. Personnel should receive thorough briefings on the LOA. Reporting procedure of hours should be confirmed and complied with.

Mission readiness preparedness for all Military Formed Units should include the following topics, as per Part 7 of the Training for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Manual :

Driving Training. While this may sound elementary, on the African continent it is certainly not. In South Africa the rule of the road is to keep left which means that all vehicles, inclusive of military vehicles, are right hand drive vehicles. Deploying with these vehicles to mission North of South Africa immediately poses a major challenge and reliance on co-drivers became very important to prevent accidents. The use of simulation training has been developed and should be further developed to cater for all mission areas.

Helicopter Training. The possibility that members of the South African Infantry Battalion will operate in a mission area with South African helicopters is very remote. It is therefore of paramount importance that members be briefed on the helicopter drills of the country with which they will be operating prior to deployment. Use of the military attaché in South Africa to provide this should be pursued. ***This should not replace the familiarisation training which should be conducted in the mission area.***

Staff Training. This should receive high priority during mission readiness training and should focus on personnel at the various headquarters.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) / Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOR). While specialist personnel should be deployed to handle this, every member of the Infantry Battalion should receive thorough introduction training on this topic. The events of 9/11³⁷ brought a new dimension to the use of explosive

³⁷ Attack on the Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2001.

devices and while no record exist of the use of road side explosives in the African theater it does not mean that it is not possible.

Media. The SANDF have very strict regulations with regard talking to the media, which is in direct contrast with what the UN/AU expect from all personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations. It is therefore very important that firstly this be clearly defined as to who speaks to the media and secondly personnel should receive proper training on how to handle this. This should be exercised during the mission readiness training.

Infantry Battalions

The force within each peacekeeping operation that is expected to bear the brunt of all the activities and therefore requires being properly prepared prior to deploying. A thorough mission readiness exercise based on the conditions that may be encountered within the mission area is non-negotiable. The exercise should include every possible scenario that may be encountered in the mission area including the various civilian organisations. The detail that will be included and exercised during the mission readiness training can never be underestimated and will contribute to a positive attitude in the mission area.

Engineer Squadrons

Mission readiness preparation of the Engineer Squadron will differ substantively from that of the Infantry Battalion. While Infantry Battalions will be exposed to conflict situations while Engineer Squadrons will not be exposed to such situations.

Air Units

Operating an aircraft, both fixed and rotary wing, in the skies over South Africa should be very similar to operating the aircraft in any mission area. The major challenges would be the limited or total absence of navigational aids in the mission area. Availability of navigational aids should be determined during reconnaissance and mission readiness preparation for the mission area should be determined.

In addition to the above it is recommended that other troop contributing countries with whom the South African air unit will be operating with be determined as well as the ground forces that may have to be transported on the South African air units. If the operating doctrine of these units is available it should be obtained for studying during mission readiness preparation. If this is not possible then use of the local military attaché or adviser should be approached for assistance.

Maritime Units

Operating warships in the oceans of the mission area should not be very different from operating along the South African coast. Lack of detail charts of the mission area may be the biggest challenge and every attempt should be made to obtain charts through the International Hydrographical Society. If this is not possible, the focus should be on operating in unchartered waters during the mission readiness training to ensure safe passage. Sustaining the deployed ship(s) should receive special attention during mission readiness due to the limited facilities that would be available in the mission area.

It is recommended that a maritime legal officer be embarked on all war ships deploying in support of peace missions. This is to assist the commander in the handling of refugees or internally displaced persons at sea. At the same time the ship(s) should be prepared to handle refugees and internally displaced persons by embarking additional stores that would be required in this type of support.

In addition to the above it is recommended that other troop contributing countries with whom the South African Maritime unit will be operating with be determined. If the operating doctrine of these units is available it should be obtained for studying during mission readiness preparation. If this is not possible then use of the local military attaché or adviser should be approached for assistance.

Should the boarding of ships in the mission area be authorised this should be rehearsed with all the local role players to ensure that it is conducted in accordance with International standards. If additional mission personnel have to be embarked during deployment it should be established during reconnaissance.

In the event of helicopters being deployed on the deployed ship(s) the utilisation of these are to be determined during reconnaissance and cleared prior to each patrol.

Medical Units

Mission readiness for Medical Units may be somewhat more difficult than that of other formed military units. Apart from preparing the unit (s) in respect of medical stores and equipment, preparing personnel to handle medical situations, with specific reference to incidents such as bullet wounds and wounds resulting from explosions, is a major challenge. Identified personnel could be deployed to hospitals in areas where violent incidents occur to obtain some exposure to this type of incident.

When personnel encounter severe injuries on the battlefield “the problem that you (the soldier on the battlefield) have when you see an injury like this is that the brain shuts down”³⁸. The article was written following an exercise during which members of 3 Parachute Regiment were exposed to severely injured fellow soldiers by utilising a specialist agency, Amputees in Action, who specialises in providing actors to play injured personnel in films and training exercises. This is a method that should be explored within the South African context, not just for the medical personnel, but also for all combat personnel deployed in mission areas.

Specialist Units

Specialist units will require special mission readiness preparation given the diversity that will be expected from them. Each of the sub-sections will require special attention during mission readiness preparations to ensure that they function optimally during the deployment. It is recommended that a member (or members) of the teams deployed during mission readiness preparedness assist with this.

Air Cargo Handling Teams. Should these teams be required to operate with unfamiliar aircraft, ie aircraft not used by South Africa, mock-ups should be constructed to enable operators of material handling equipment to gain experience in working with these aircraft. Procedures should be obtained during reconnaissance and, if required, additional

³⁸ Soldier, Magazine of the British Army, November 2007, Shock Tactics, p 30.

information can be obtained from local Military Attaches whose countries operate the specific aircraft.

Airfield Crash Rescue and Fire Fighting Teams. The teams will be required to render assistance to unfamiliar aircraft not used by South Africa. The danger of attacking an unfamiliar aircraft in distress could lead to exposing those being rescued to additional danger. It is therefore of paramount importance that the teams receive thorough briefings on the types of aircraft that they will encounter in the mission area. This information should be obtained during reconnaissance or by using local military attaches.

Aero Medical Evacuation Team. The team may be required to operate with unfamiliar aircraft and should receive thorough briefings on procedures of the identified aircraft during mission readiness preparation. It will also be advantageous to establish to which medical facilities patients will be evacuated to in an attempt to obtain operating procedures of these facilities.

Military Police Unit. This unit will be required to enforce mission laws and by-laws which require that the personnel be briefed on these prior to deploying to the mission area.

Command and Support Unit. A thorough understanding of the UN/AU sustainment systems will be required to ensure that those elements that are deployed away from the mother unit are suitably supported.

Support Elements

As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the success of the deployed FMU's in participation in peacekeeping missions is the ability of the support elements to sustain them. It is therefore of paramount importance for the support elements to exercise the support concept during mission readiness training under realistic as possible mission conditions.

ii. INDIVIDUALS

Preparing individuals for deployment in support of peace mission should never be seen as a low-level activity. Programs should be developed for each type of individual that suits the deployment for which he/she is destined for. This may require that commanders receive additional training outside of the training with their formed units.

All individuals destined for deployment in support of peace missions should have knowledge and skills as indicated for each category and should receive training in the following during mission readiness training :

Driving Training. While this may sound elementary, on the African continent it is certainly not. In South Africa the rule of the road is to keep left which means that all vehicles, inclusive of military vehicles, are right hand drive vehicles. Deploying with these vehicles to mission North of South Africa immediately poses a major challenge and reliance on co-drivers became very important to prevent accidents. The use of simulation training has been developed and should be further developed to cater for all mission areas.

Helicopter Training. The possibility that members will operate in a mission area with South African helicopters is very remote. It is therefore of paramount importance that members be briefed on the helicopter drills of the country with which they will be operating prior to deployment. Use of the military attaché in South Africa to provide this should be pursued. ***This should not replace the familiarisation training which should be conducted in the mission area.***

Staff Training. This should receive high priority during mission readiness training and should focus on personnel at the various headquarters. This is very important for commanders at all levels to ensure that the correct information is forwarded to the next higher headquarters.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) / Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance (EOR). While specialist personnel should be deployed to handle this, every member of the Infantry Battalion should receive thorough introduction training on

this topic. The events of 9/11³⁹ brought a new dimension to the use of explosive devices and while no record exist of the use of road side explosives in the African theater it does not mean that it is not possible.

Media. The SANDF have very strict regulations with regard talking to the media, which is in direct contrast with what the UN/AU expect from all personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations. It is therefore very important that firstly this be clearly defined as to who speaks to the media and secondly personnel should receive proper training on how to handle this. This should be exercised during the mission readiness training.

Commanders

Commanders at all levels and of all units and/or teams will be required to guide their subordinates during the deployments and should therefore have a thorough knowledge of the following topics :

Operational Instruction. There should be no misunderstanding in the interpretation of this instruction by all deployed. This should be made available to all commanders well in advance of their reporting for mission readiness preparation. Any uncertainties should be addressed during the mission readiness preparation.

UNSC Resolution. The core military tasks included in the resolution should be clearly understood at this level and it is recommended that a summary of the resolution by the military-strategic level be utilised for this. Any uncertainty should be cleared with the military-strategic level.

CONOPS. In all probability the most important document for this level as it will guide this level with regard the mission readiness of all personnel, specifically formed military units and should be clearly understood. The military-strategic level may provide additional guidelines. The concept should form the basis for any mission readiness training exercise.

³⁹ Attack on the Twin Towers in New York on 11 September 2001.

ROE. Commanders at all levels should have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the mission ROE which will allow them to issue supplementary rules to their subordinates which should be in line with the mission ROE. It will also assist them to advise subordinate commanders during challenging situations. Any uncertainty should be clarified with the respective higher headquarters.

TCC Guidelines. The successful sustaining of the deployed formed military units depends on the thorough understanding of this document and any additional guidelines that may be provided by the military-strategic level.

MOU. A thorough understanding of the responsibilities of both the AU/UN and South Africa is required to ensure that South Africa is able to execute the force commander's concept of operations and ensure optimal reimbursement. Guidelines with regard the reporting on serviceability of major equipment is to be developed in cooperation with the guidelines received from the military-strategic level to ensure that problems are identified and rectified at an early stage. The reporting procedure also serves as the South African source documents to verify reimbursement received from the AU/UN. It is recommended that these be tested during the mission readiness training exercise of formed military units.

National Caveats. As this may influence the participation of the South African contingent in the force commander's concept of operations it needs to be handled with the necessary sensitivity, but should be clearly understood by all. Any uncertainty should be cleared with the military-strategic level. These should also be included in the appointment directive of the South African National Senior in the mission area. Continued communication between the National Senior and this level is required to ensure that any amendments are done in good time.

Origin of the Conflict. Clear understanding of this will ensure that mission readiness exercises are done in the right context which should provide the personnel clear guidelines in respect of the belligerent groups in the mission area and their reason for participation as well how they are supported. Continuous updating of the situation is required to ensure that relevant personnel are informed of changes.

Gender. Continuous monitoring of the gender guidelines provided by the military-strategic level is required.

Military Observers.

Military Observers are the eyes and the ears of every mission and as they deploy unarmed proper mission readiness preparation will in most instances ensure their survival during deployment. At the same time their training and mission readiness preparedness will ensure that the suitable information reaches the next higher headquarters in the correct format and at the correct time. During mission readiness preparation military observers should be exposed to the following :

UNSC Resolution. The core military tasks included in the resolution should be clearly understood at this level and it is recommended that a summary of the resolution by the military-strategic level be utilised for this. Any uncertainty should be cleared with the military-strategic level.

CONOPS. In all probability the most important document for this level as it will guide this level with regard the mission readiness of all personnel, specifically formed military units and should be clearly understood. The military-strategic level may provide additional guidelines. The concept should form the basis for any mission readiness training exercise.

TCC Guidelines. The successful sustaining of the deployed formed military units depends on the thorough understanding of this document and any additional guidelines that may be provided by the military-strategic level.

MOU. A thorough understanding of the responsibilities of both the AU/UN and South Africa is required to ensure that South Africa is able to execute the force commander's concept of operations and ensure optimal reimbursement. Guidelines with regard the reporting on serviceability of major equipment is to be developed in cooperation with the guidelines received from the military-strategic level to ensure that problems are identified and rectified at an early stage. The reporting procedure also serves as the South African source documents to verify reimbursement

received from the AU/UN. It is recommended that these be tested during the mission readiness training exercise of formed military units.

National Caveats. As this may influence the participation of the South African contingent in the force commander's concept of operations it needs to be handled with the necessary sensitivity, but should be clearly understood by all. Any uncertainty should be cleared with the military-strategic level. These should also be included in the appointment directive of the South African National Senior in the mission area. Continued communication between the National Senior and this level is required to ensure that any amendments are done in good time.

Origin of the Conflict. Clear understanding of this will ensure that mission readiness exercises are done in the right context which should provide the personnel clear guidelines in respect of the belligerent groups in the mission area and their reason for participation as well how they are supported. Continuous updating of the situation is required to ensure that relevant personnel are informed of changes.

Gender. Continuous monitoring of the gender guidelines provided by the military-strategic level is required.

Military Staff Officers

South African military staff officers will find themselves functioning with fellow staff officers from various nations, diverse backgrounds and training. Preparing military staff officers is somewhat more difficult due to the nature of their tasks. However the following should be addressed :

UNSC Resolution. The core military tasks included in the resolution should be clearly understood at this level and it is recommended that a summary of the resolution by the military-strategic level be utilised for this. Any uncertainty should be cleared with the military-strategic level.

CONOPS. In all probability the most important document for this level as it will guide this level with regard the mission readiness of all personnel, specifically

formed military units and should be clearly understood. The military-strategic level may provide additional guidelines. The concept should form the basis for any mission readiness training exercise.

TCC Guidelines. The successful sustaining of the deployed formed military units depends on the thorough understanding of this document and any additional guidelines that may be provided by the military-strategic level.

MOU. A thorough understanding of the responsibilities of both the AU/UN and South Africa is required to ensure that South Africa is able to execute the force commander's concept of operations and ensure optimal reimbursement. Guidelines with regard to the reporting on serviceability of major equipment is to be developed in cooperation with the guidelines received from the military-strategic level to ensure that problems are identified and rectified at an early stage. The reporting procedure also serves as the South African source documents to verify reimbursement received from the AU/UN. It is recommended that these be tested during the mission readiness training exercise of formed military units.

National Caveats. For those serving in operational headquarters' it is of paramount importance that they establish the national caveats of each of the formed military units assigned to them. This will ensure that they do not task formed military units with tasks for which they have national caveats.

Origin of the Conflict. Clear understanding of this will ensure that mission readiness exercises are done in the right context which should provide the personnel clear guidelines in respect of the belligerent groups in the mission area and their reason for participation as well as how they are supported. Continuous updating of the situation is required to ensure that relevant personnel are informed of changes.

Gender. Continuous monitoring of the gender guidelines provided by the military-strategic level is required.

Delegates. South African General and/or Flag Officers are increasingly being assigned to political and/or diplomatic teams to mediate in conflict areas. This often happens at short notice which makes mission readiness preparation almost impossible, however the following should serve as a point of departure to make them mission ready :

Origin of the Conflict. Clear understanding of this will ensure that mission readiness exercises are done in the right context which should provide the personnel clear guidelines in respect of the belligerent groups in the mission area and their reason for participation as well how they are supported. Continuous updating of the situation is required to ensure that relevant personnel are informed of changes.

UNSC Resolution. The content of any previous resolutions by the UN and/or AU is very important and should be studied prior to deployment. .

iii. **GENERAL COMMENTS.**

Use of Terrain. While it is not always possible to duplicate the mission terrain within South Africa every attempt should be made to expose personnel to the anticipated terrain of the mission area. This may require that certain mission readiness training be conducted at a training facility away from the normal mission readiness training facility. Use of training facilities in neighbouring states should not be excluded. The latter may be costly and should be measured against the benefits of the training at such a facility. Utilisation of “virtual mission terrain” should also be considered.

Impact Projects. Personnel that deploy in peace missions will always find themselves living and operating amongst the local population who, in all probability, have suffered as a result of the conflict. How and where to get involved and to what extent needs to be determined prior to deployment. Cognizance should be taken of the quick impact projects (QIPS) that the mission headquarters are planning for the area of deployment. Should funding be required for these projects, it should be negotiated and obtained prior to deployment. This should include the procedures to be followed with regard to accounting.

CHAPTER 6 : DETERMINING THE GAPS BETWEEN COMBAT AND MISSION READINESS PREPAREDNESS

How does South Africa ensure that every contingent that deploy in support of a peacekeeping mission is prepared to a suitable level which will ensure that they add value to the concept of operations of the respective force commander? In addition how does South Africa ensure that the deployed contingents comply with the MOU in respect of serviceability of major equipment and self-sustainment? For the purpose of this paper these questions will form part of determining the gaps between combat and mission readiness preparedness.

A team comprising representatives from all the Services and/or Divisions that will be part of the contingent for the specific peace mission should be constituted to oversee both Combat and Mission Readiness preparations. The team should be led by the military-strategic level and should remain the same for the duration of all the phases, ie combat, mission readiness and deployment. The team should conduct own reconnaissance to the mission area.

COMBAT READINESS

The team should study the directive issued by the military-strategic level to establish what is required from each of the units and/or teams that are scheduled for deployment to the specific mission. In cooperation with the specific service and/or division the objectives that are to be met during combat readiness.

In cooperation with the service and/or division combat readiness inspection should be conducted at least 6 to 8 weeks prior to the unit and/or team commencing with mission readiness preparation. The latter is to ensure that sufficient time is available for corrective action which may include re-training or possible replacing of the sub-unit or sub-sub-unit.

MISSION READINESS

Following own reconnaissance, study of the military-strategic directive and the operational instruction the objectives for the mission readiness preparation are to be established. This

is to be followed by the compilation of the mission readiness exercises that are to be conducted by each of the units and/or teams destined for deployment. These should be made available to the units and/or teams prior to their reporting to the mission readiness preparations.

The mission readiness exercise should encompass every possible scenario that may be encountered in the mission area and should include civilian components such as UN agencies and NGO's and should also include live firing of weapons. While the current trend is to focus on the combat troops, all supporting troops should be evaluated as well to establish that they know and understand the mission requirements and the South African requirements. This should include exercising support required from South Africa.

This should take place at least 4 to 6 weeks prior to deployment to allow for corrective action to take place, should it be required. It is of paramount importance that ALL personnel participate in the mission readiness preparation.

DEPLOYMENT

Today's peacekeeping operations are conducted in a volatile and dynamic environment and the mission readiness preparedness should ensure that personnel arrive in the mission area ready for participation in the mission. This requires that the performances of deployed contingents are monitored continuously and amendments made where required.

The team that is responsible for the combat and mission readiness preparation should visit the mission area approximately 3 to 5 weeks after deploying to determine the performance of the contingent. A visit to the mission area some 4 weeks prior to the rotation will ensure that any changes to the concept of operations are included in the mission readiness preparation of the new contingent.

CHAPTER 7 : CONCLUSION

As referees are to remain neutral in every match and not become involved in the match, so peacekeepers are to remain neutral during their deployment, no matter what happens. Early peacekeepers were called upon to “referee a tennis match” where opponent played by the rules with very little “robust play” and the “spectators” accepted the decisions of the “referee”. This changed later when peacekeepers were called upon to “referee an ice hockey match” where players pushed the envelope with regard to the rules and robust play was the order of the day. Today’s peacekeepers find themselves in a position where they are called upon “to referee an ice hockey match” where players push the envelope with regard to the rules and the match is marred by “robust play by the players” and “bad behaviour by the spectators who do not accept the decisions by the referee”. How are these “referees” prepared for their task?

Given the complexity of the peacekeeping operations of today the peacekeeper deploying is faced with a huge variety of complex scenarios, atrocities, humanitarian crises and gross human rights violations. In addition the number of role players has increased dramatically in modern day peacekeeping. Given the tasks of early peacekeepers, of primarily being observers and /or inter-positioning forces, it can safely be assumed that in most of the early deployments these types of situations may not have been encountered. Obviously there are exceptions such as the mission in the Congo, ONUC over the period July 1960 to June 1964. With the UN DPKO only being established in 1996 it is uncertain what guidelines in respect of mission readiness were provided to the forces that deployed to ONUC. It is difficult to imagine how prepared they were for the task at hand.

As peacekeeping operations became more complex so preparation of personnel destined to deploy in support of these required being better prepared to execute their tasks and in doing so contribute to the overall success of the respective peace mission. This called for better guidelines to be provided to enable the respective troop contributing country to prepare its forces to a level that meet the expectation of the deploying authority, ie the AU or the UN.

In an attempt to assist troop contributing countries the UN established the training assistance teams’ concept and the best practices unit who provides assistance to troop

contributing countries. At the same time decentralised training centres were established in numerous countries, some for own training and others for regional training. All in attempt to improve the quality of the personnel that deploys in peace missions. Exchange of students at the various training centres contributed to improving the quality of training of individuals.

Preparation of South African personnel deploying or destined to deploy in peacekeeping operations has also come a long from the deployment of the first Military Staff Officer in support of MONUC in September 1999. On the deployment of individuals, ie Military Staff Officers and Military Observers a specialist course, which include practical training, has been developed which is as good as any presented elsewhere.

The establishing of the Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTTC) is a venue that should be utilised fully in assisting with the preparation of not just individuals but also with formed military units.

This paper has attempted to provide a process that will prepare today's "referee's" to execute their tasks professionally and diligently to ensure success of the specific peace mission.

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Captain Ross joined the Navy in 1983 as a logistic officer having spent the early part of his working career in the private sector. Capt Ross served in various logistics appointments in Simon's Town and did sea time on SAS FLEUR and SAS KIMBERLEY before being transferred to Naval Headquarters where he served as SSO Logistics for Operations. Capt Ross was transferred to Joint Operations Headquarters as SSO Logistics for Maritime Operations in 1999. With the increase in participation in peacekeeping operations Capt Ross was appointed as SSO Peace Support Operations and assumed responsibilities for deployments in the DRC, Eritrea and Ethiopia in October 2001. Currently Capt Ross is still responsible for all SANDF deployments in the DRC (Operations MISTRAL and TEUTONIC), Eritrea and Ethiopia (Operation ESPRESSO)

Capt Ross has completed various courses, which include the Naval Junior Command and Warfare Course, SA Army Senior Command and Staff Duties Course, and the British Defence Campaign Planning Course. In addition Capt Ross has completed numerous peacekeeping courses, which include a course on Internally Displaced Persons, Maritime Peacekeeping and a number of United Nations correspondence courses. Capt Ross is internationally acknowledged as a knowledgeable person on peacekeeping and has been invited to present a logistic lecture in Norway, as a member of the directing staff of the Lester Pearson Peacekeeping Canadian and International Peacekeeping Training Centre for the Maritime Peacekeeping Course, as an expert by the International Peace Academy to their conferences in Dar es Salaam and Vienna. Capt Ross is the co-author of the article "*10 Years of democracy – 5 Years of Peacekeeping*" that appeared in the SA Soldier. In addition Capt Ross has written an article on Maritime Peacekeeping for the Navy News, Dalhousie University in Canada and "*The Influence of International and Regional Development Programmes in Africa on Maritime Security in Sub-Sahara Africa*" for the 21st Edison of the Ocean Yearbook. Capt Ross was appointed as the co-chairperson of the Self-sustainment Sub-working group during the 2008 COE Manual Working Group at the UN.

Capt Ross holds a Certificate in Logistic Management from the Post Graduate School of the University of Pretoria, a Certificate in Purchasing Management from the University of Pretoria and a National Diploma (under graduate level) on Purchasing Management from the Technikon of Pretoria.

Capt Ross is married to Rina and has a son. Capt Ross is a keen reader of history and conflict resolutions while he is qualified provincial rugby referee.

GLOSSARY

AMET	Aero Medical Evacuation Team
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
ANC	Congolese Armed Forces
C-130	Hercules Transport Aircraft
C J Ops	Chief of Joint Operations
J Op HQ	Joint Operational Headquarters
COE Manual	Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions
C SANDF	Chief of the South African National Defence Force
CSU	Command and Support Unit
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFA	South African Department of Foreign Affairs
DOD	Department of Defence
EUFOR RD Congo	European Union Force in the DRC
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOR	Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance
FARDC	Armed Forces of the DRC
FC	Force Commander
FMU	Formed Military Unit
GCIS	Government Communication Information Services
GPS	Global Positioning System
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IEMF	Interim Emergency Multinational Force
Inf Bn	Infantry Battalion
IL	International Law
IO	International Organisations

MI 26	MI 26 Heavy Transport Helicopter
MILOBS	Military Observer
MONUC	United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MOT	Military Observer Team
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPU	Military Police Unit
MSO	Military Staff Officer
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group
OAU	Organisation for African Unity
OMIB	Observer Mission in Burundi
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
PMTC	Peace Mission Training Centre
POCI	Programme for Correspondence Induction
PVO	Private Volunteer Organisation
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SADC	Southern African Developing Community
SAMHS	South African Military Health Services
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SAPSD	South African Protection and Support Detachment
SOMA/SOFA	Status of Mission Agreement / Status of Forces Agreement
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
VR	Verification Inspection
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Mission in Rwanda
UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNGOC	United Nations Good Office Commission

UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNPOL	United Nations Police – Civilian Police
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance