

CAN ORGANIZED, INDIGENOUS TERRORISM IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS BE PREVENTED BY CREATING COMPREHENSIVE, OBJECTIVE POLICY?



BY

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A THESIS PRESENTED IN PARTIAL COMPLETION OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF
The Certificate-of-Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations



Peace Operations Training Institute®

Can Organized, Indigenous Terrorism in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations be
Prevented by Creating Comprehensive, Objective Policy?

A Comparative Analysis

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September 2004
The United Nations Institute For Training and Research
New York, New York
The United States of America

PREFACE

The evolution of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping since the late 1940's has encountered numerous challenges. Many such challenges have been as a result of exterior forces¹, while others have been internal². As the concept of peacekeeping evolved into an institution, respective missions undertaken in that institution encountered similar instances requiring clarification. The initial placement of UN forces between conflicting parties³ soon developed into involvement of armed troops in civil war engaging major powers⁴. Unlike other bodies of regional origin, or sovereign states, the UN has traditionally been looked upon as a truly international body possessing responsibility for conflicts which may emerge. The reality of this ideal is a topic worthy of its own thesis. Regardless of the debate prompted by such a claim, Chapter 1 of the UN Charter does enunciate the purpose of the body as "maintaining international peace and security" (United Nations Department of Public Information 2003, 3). Therefore, the UN is tasked with such an undertaking. It must, as a matter of responsibility, respond to environments and situations presented to it regardless of how well or ill-prepared it may be to deal effectively with them. One new dimension in this environment of "situations" recently thrust into world prominence⁵ is international terrorism.

Terrorism in any context is not a favorable means for settling conflict or achieving objectives. When utilized by parties who have consented to a cessation of

¹ Such as the Cold War.

² Such as the development of "peacekeeping" itself, as the action was not explicitly referenced in the UN Charter.

³ As a supervising force regarding the Israeli-Palestinian situation in 1948: UNTSO; i.e. United Nations Troop Supervision Organization.

⁴ As in Korea in 1950.

⁵ It must be acknowledged that terrorism is nothing new; specific events in specific circumstances have placed it as a major concern of the international community very recently.

hostilities via a UN mandated peacekeeping operation, it is particularly troubling. Mandated by international law⁶, peacekeeping missions have the highest of objectives: restoring and/or maintaining peace and security. Terrorism, it may be said in contrast, possesses the least desirable method for obtaining one's objectives. As terrorism as an act has benefited from technology, communication, and tactics, those in the peacekeeping community must make themselves more aware of the dichotomy presented by the combination of these three concepts. Weaponry of contemporary times has advanced into exceedingly more lethal devices. Propaganda has benefited by the possibility of its proliferation via modern instantaneous satellite communication. The expansion of tactics to civilian populations, economic institutions, and ethnic and religious conflicts presents an entirely new set of challenges. All of these factors have combined to present new challenges to UN peacekeeping missions.

This thesis will examine two contemporary UN peacekeeping missions which were constantly threatened by internal terrorism originating from the indigenous participants in the missions. Under examination will be the policies enunciated by the UN for these missions, and subsequent efforts to deal with terrorist actions being enacted against them. The raising of this issue and the data it will present will hopefully be an initial impetus for continued reforms in peacekeeping policy formation. If UN peacekeeping is to continue to respond as an effective force in maintaining international peace and security, it is vital that it prepare for indigenous terrorism as a negative force bent on preventing its objectives. Effective policies in UN peacekeeping must be developed to prepare for this increasing possibility

⁶ Through UN Security Council authority.

INTRODUCTION

Objective

It is the objective of this study to examine terrorism as enacted by indigenous parties involved in a UN peacekeeping mission. Once examined, it is the hope that such data will prompt further study, and eventually a comprehensive debate at the UN regarding the formulation of policy.

Importance of Study

The impact of terrorism on UN peacekeeping missions is one of the most challenging obstacles toward the realization of Charter mandates since the Cold War⁷. The UN possesses three available means under which peacekeeping operations may be authorized. These are Chapters VI⁸, VII⁹, and VIII¹⁰ of the UN Charter. The most utilized method of peacekeeping has traditionally been under a Chapter VI mandate. Chapter VIII mandates have displayed promise in several contemporary efforts¹¹, but require a great deal of diplomatic skill in coordination of parties, as well as the efficacy of the regional actors themselves. Chapter VII missions, while enacted more frequently, contain several points of contention yet to be fully explored¹². Chapter VI mandates, as

⁷ During which a bi-polar world created an arrangement of peacekeeping missions held hostage to great power interests.

⁸ Mandates authorized as a result of formal requests by conflicting parties conducted by a UN force acting in a neutral role only so long as permission from the parties is granted.

⁹ Actions mandated regardless of the consent of conflicting parties. May take the form of economic, political, humanitarian, or military means to achieve objectives.

¹⁰ Regional arrangements of collective organizations such as the EU (European Union), or NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) for example, mandated to perform peacekeeping.

¹¹ As with NATO in the Balkans for example.

¹² The major complaint being the discrepancy with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states; as well as the accusation that the UN should not resort to "forceful" means to settle conflicts, thereby becoming part of the problem instead of a solution.

they have evolved¹³, implicitly represent the UN traditionally as a mediating body called upon by states to enact diplomatic and peaceful means to resolve conflict between parties. Specifically, Chapter VI mandates are based upon "peaceful settlement of disputes" (United Nations Department of Public Information 2001, 24). Means mandated by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution are based on consent of the conflicting parties, with UN forces serving as a facilitating presence in theater. Obviously should the states (or parties) requesting UN mandated assistance, or elements associated with them, resort to terrorist means to achieve their objectives, the fundamental principle supporting the establishment of the peacekeeping mission becomes seriously compromised. The nature of this "compromise" extends deeper into the mission mandate, as the principle of consent upon which the UN became involved is seriously called into question. It, in effect, challenges the entire concept of the peacekeeping mission. Once states or parties violate UN forces by violent means there exists a serious question as to the sincerity of consent. When disavowed in such a manner, Chapter VI mandates technically lose their legal justification. If states or parties requesting UN assistance as a mediating impartial force fail to meet good faith agreements, there remains little the UN can effectively achieve. The logical assumption that requesting parties literally desire the restoration of peace and security is a fallacy from the outset if hidden agendas or purposes exist behind official agreements, or consent for UN action is not present. Peacekeeping missions require too many financial, logistic, and human demands to be wasted on those who do not intend to act in good faith. Effective response to the UN mandate in peacekeeping missions relies heavily upon good

¹³ It should be remembered that peacekeeping as we now know it did not exist in the UN Charter. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld referenced peacekeeping as "Chapter VI-1/2"; i.e. - implicit in the ideals referenced in the Charter.

faith agreements and understandings. The temptation of parties to resort to forceful means, given contemporary elements such as WMD and non-state financial and logistic support, is greater than ever before as the means to such ends become increasingly accessible.

Methodology

The structure of this study will be a comparative analysis of two Chapter VI mandated missions which occurred concurrently under similar indigenous circumstances, but with quite different UN structures and budgets. There will be four factors examined which will comprise the analysis. The first factor addresses the difficulty presented by one or more parties to the conflict being not resigned to reconciliation, a basic premise of Chapter VI missions. The second factor is the failure to address core issues in the conflict. The third factor is a lack of clearly defined means to achieve policy and mandate objectives. The final factor is a lack of UN policy regarding indigenous terrorism itself in peacekeeping operations. Each factor will present data to support an analysis. From these factors and their contained data will arise conclusions and recommendations.

Missions

The missions examined will be the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and the United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II). The selection of these missions emanated from several considerations. Both

missions were similar in original objective¹⁴, both involved two or more factions which had been militarily vying for national power and authority for decades, both were former colonial states, both had past involvements with Cold War client states, and both requested and agreed to UN assistance under Chapter VI mandates only to have one or more of the parties resort to terrorist acts after the UN missions were in place. The missions were also distinguished by stark differences in their UN mandated composition¹⁵. Therefore, to compare and contrast these specific missions is to draw upon collective actions with very similar qualities, but with very different resources assigned, and a common indigenous obstacle in regards to terrorism. The combination of these factors comprises an excellent basis for comparison. As the missions are not absolutely identical however, it is also possible to expand the conclusions drawn to other missions of equally varying composition. Similarly, as both missions possess many common factors, the comparison is extremely viable.

TERRORISM

Definition

The fundamental focus of this study revolves around terrorism as experienced in UN mandated Chapter VI Peacekeeping missions. Specifically, the terrorism referenced will be indigenous, which emanates from one of the consenting parties requesting UN assistance. The term "terrorism" is, however, largely undefined in geopolitical arenas.

For the purpose of this study terrorism may be defined as actions taken by parties individually or collectively with the objective of creating fear in a body of people in order

¹⁴ Restoring national unity through elections.

¹⁵ In terms of mission funding, size, and scope.

to achieve political goals (Wardlaw 1995, 9). Clearly terrorism can exist in many other forms; economic, social, humanitarian etc. None of these other manifestations should be assumed more or less important than political. All are very real. Political terrorism has been identified for a longer period, and in a more precise manner. Given the ability to define political terrorism with greater precision, and considering its predominant use in both UN peacekeeping missions used in this thesis, it will be the primary form addressed.

Evolution

Terrorism has existed for thousands of years. The ideal of a person or group frustrated in attempts to achieve their objectives turning to violence aimed at secondary targets is an ancient one. The use of force to achieve political objectives has been used many times throughout history. Political terrorism by contemporary definition has its origin in the French Revolution in the late 18th century (Wardlaw 1995, 15). The leaders of the French State during the period used the fear of death in attempts to achieve their political goals. Into the 19th century various movements such as the anarchists¹⁶, and states involved in colonialism, utilized different types of terrorist behavior in the realization of specific objectives. The 20th century spawned such movements as fascism, communism, and fundamentalism led by leaders bent upon genocide, territorial gain, and ethnic supremacy. All these movements utilized one or more forms of terrorism as a device in the pursuit of their goals. As the international community moves into the 21st century advances in technology, communication, and the proliferation of wealth has made terrorism a more viable option for many groups who would never have had access to such resources in the past. The knowledge, resources, and wealth needed to construct

¹⁶ Who believed in the violent overthrow of established governments, often by assassination.

a "dirty-bomb"¹⁷ are no longer out of the reach of states, groups, or even individuals who may decide to use such devices to achieve their objectives. Combined with structural changes in the international environment, the combination is a volatile one. This has been the historical evolution of terrorism.

Contemporary geopolitical realities of global connectivity combined with non-state actors possessing powerful weapons of destructive force have made terrorism into an increased threat. As UN peacekeeping efforts increasingly attempt to deal with ethnic, regional, and religious conflicts, terrorism has become a viable policy for forces possessing private agendas of power and control. The UN must, therefore, be aware of what terrorism is, how it evolved, and how it is being used as policy by those outside the realm of state control. The UN is a body comprised and founded upon the ideal of nation-states. Terrorism as an undefined ideal combined with the equally ambiguous existence of non-state actors is a potent mixture. If the UN is to continue to issue peacekeeping mandates dealing with these new non-state conflicts it is vital for the body to recognize the obstacles it will be facing in the process. Terrorism is, and will continue to be, a primary consideration in this regard.

The Changing International Structure

The end of the Cold War was a watershed in the structure of international geopolitical realities. Conflicts on the international scene increasingly became intrastate instead of interstate. As states began to break apart, ethnic, religious, and cultural hatreds

¹⁷ A crude explosive of significant destructive power constructed in an uncontrolled environment, often with ingredients of questionable quality.

began to surface¹⁸. In the past states had been too powerful for internal splinter groups to achieve their goals, but with the advent of technology, easy communication systems, and an international monetary system, groups of various origins are able to broadcast their messages to the world to evoke supportive responses. Today's technology includes discrete weaponry able to combat the defense forces of many under-developed states, and untraceable wealth acts as a resource to fund the endeavors. As an increasing number of actors, state or non-state, realize this lethal potential, conflict will continually increase unless corrective policy responses are developed.

United Nations Peacekeeping and Terrorism

What does this paradigm mean for UN peacekeeping missions? Logically, as more actors understand the ease of access to alternative means of political power, there will exist opportunities for an increasing amount of such conflicts. Chapter VI mandates may be seen as increasingly ineffective against participants who become impatient or frustrated upon failure to achieve their perceived goals. Resorting to Chapter VII attracts an increasing risk of escalation, in addition to the debate over whether or not such a move is warranted¹⁹.

United Nations peacekeeping missions have traditionally been required to deal with some acts of terror perpetrated against them²⁰. An equal reality has been a lack of consideration for these possibilities in mission mandates. Peacekeeping missions possess security components, but these elements are often not structured or given the resources

¹⁸ For example: the Balkans, Rwanda, and Chechnya.

¹⁹ Resorting in stalemate and unilateral non-mandated action as occurred in 2002-3 Iraq.

²⁰ Examples are numerous: the Congo in the 1960's; with Israel and the Palestinians; Somalia; and Rwanda to name a few.

and rules of engagement sufficient to deal with complex issues and methods utilized by terrorists. Peacekeeping missions frequently deal with complex conflicts possessing deep roots. By the time a situation is presented to the UN for action, it has often reached a crisis point. The possibility of terrorist type activity in a deployed mission should be an automatic consideration when shaping the mandate and mission operational policy. If the use of terror has already been evident, it would be illogical to believe that deployment of a UN mission will automatically cause it to disappear.

Terrorism is a reality which must be dealt with. It is at extreme variance with UN peacekeeping objectives and must be addressed by positive policy.

MISSIONS

Background

UNAVEM II

The contemporary state known as Angola derived its identity from a colonial tradition under Portuguese control. Identical to other African and Asian states emerging from colonial rule during the mid to latter twentieth century, Angola possessed numerous indigenous realities which had been suppressed by decades of primarily European control. As national control passed from Portugal to Angola in 1975, forces which had been kept in check throughout foreign domination began to surface (Jett 1999, 61-62). An unfortunate reality of many such transitions was an almost total lack of consideration for assistance in establishing structures, policies, and systems to enable self-rule. Reviewing such actions today, given current peacekeeping efforts supporting state

transitions²¹, it is evident that achieving stability was seriously compromised. An additional unfortunate situation was the reality of the Cold War. Angola immediately became a client state battle ground for ideological and political control.

As occurred in many identical or similar situations throughout the Cold War²², Angola quickly became a hegemonic challenge for both United States and Soviet Union interests. Indigenous Angolan military forces, instead of forming a national army as envisioned, began to splinter with political groupings. Originally three in number, the Angolan political and military scene reduced to two main factions: the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), and the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA). Originally Marxist in ideology, the MPLA became aligned indirectly with the Soviet Union, while UNITA received support from the United States. The "client" relationship became more apparent when Cuban military forces began actively supporting the MPLA, and South African forces acted similarly with UNITA²³.

The struggle for Angola immediately became international with the introduction of foreign troops, super-power support, and ideological differences. This arrangement, essentially a civil war with foreign support for both factions, continued until 1989. From the creation of UNAVEM I in January of 1989 until May 1991, Angola was affectively neutralized regarding foreign military intervention as both Cuban and South African troops were withdrawn under the auspices of the UN peacekeeping force. UNAVEM I was transformed into a second mandated peacekeeping operation, UNAVEM II, whose

²¹ Such as in East Timor for example.

²² Examples: Viet Nam, several Israeli-Arab conflicts, and several Central American states.

²³ Cuba being a major benefactor of the Soviet Union, and South Africa having a similar relationship with the United States.

mandate was to observe and verify elections with the objective of developing national unity.

UNTAC

Similar to Angola, Cambodia had been under the colonial control of France as one of five jurisdictions comprising Indochina²⁴. The Geneva Accords of 1954 outlined the withdrawal of France from Indochina, leaving Cambodia as fundamentally a sovereign state²⁵. Unlike Angola, Cambodia had several factors to its benefit supporting national unity. Cambodia was primarily ethnically homogenous²⁶, it possessed a tradition of national unity under a monarch, and it had previously been a powerful South East Asian empire providing an established sense of united nationalism. Upon its independence from French control Cambodia already had a king, Norodom Sihanouk, and due to this factor held little interest in international circles as a pawn in the great power struggles.

Although Cambodia seemed to have several factors to its advantage, traditional regional rivalries fueled by a neighboring client state conflict had serious affects upon the small nation. The internal conflict in Vietnam, the spread of communism as a radical ideology fueled by anti-colonial resentment, the changing nature of Cambodian urban awareness, and superpower involvement militarily, politically, and economically in Laos and Vietnam caused fundamental conflicts to erupt in Cambodia. This led to the

²⁴ Indochina under French colonial control consisted of Tonkin (northern Vietnam), Annam (central Vietnam), Cochinchina (southern Vietnam), modern day Laos, and modern day Cambodia.

²⁵ There remained special provisions with France as a type of protectorate; however Cambodia remained essentially free of French governing control.

²⁶ Khmers comprising a vast majority, with Vietnamese, a small Islamic minority, Chinese, and tribal groupings representing the rest.

overthrow of Sihanouk²⁷ in 1970. The succeeding government of Lon Nol proved to be less than effective, finally succumbing to the military and political momentum of the communist element in Cambodia, commonly known as the Khmer Rouge.

The genocidal reign of the Khmer Rouge is a period yet to be fully resolved in Cambodia. Driven from central power by a 1978-1979 invasion by Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge retreated to a sanctuary on the northwest border with Thailand. This occupation created a situation in which United States opposition to Vietnam perpetuated a United Nations recognition of the Khmer Rouge as a government in exile, combined with similar Chinese actions. Vietnam then turned to the Soviet Union for primary aid, and the Cambodian population, already decimated on all levels, became seriously neglected. Opposition splinter groups and movements proliferated the country with violence being the normal means of affecting "justice". Cambodia, by the late 1980's, had become an armed camp torn apart by domestic and international forces. It was aptly described as a "failed state", although one not entirely of its own doing (Brown & Zasloff 1998, 1).

In the late 1980's efforts began between rival Cambodian factions to establish a national unity once again. Negotiations were numerous, and the issues complex. In August of 1990 the UN Security Council's five permanent members²⁸ finally reached an agreement to act on the situation in Cambodia. With acceptance by all four primary Cambodian political factions, the Secretary General of the UN called for all parties to cease hostilities. This occurred in mid-1991. Talks leading to the creation of a mandated UN peacekeeping force, UNTAC, proved successful.

²⁷ Prime Minister at the time; having renounced royalty to take a more active role politically since the late 1950's.

²⁸ The Soviet Union, France, United Kingdom, Peoples Republic of China, and the United States.

Mandate and Composition

UNAVEM II

The United Nations Angola Verification Mission II came into being on May 30, 1991, as authorized by the UNSC. The expressed mandate of the mission was to verify agreements made by Angolan parties, to monitor the ceasefire, and to monitor the Angolan police during the ceasefire period (United Nations Department of Public Information 1994, 37). Ten months later the mandate was to be extended by the Security Council to include election observation and verification regarding presidential and legislative contests. Two additional adjustments were made in the period from January to June 1993 including facilitation of a method for completing a peace process, and assistance in local and/or national ceasefires; and finally in late 1994 UNAVEM II was authorized to verify initial stages of the peace settlement.

In terms of composition, UNAVEM II was a relatively small mission (United Nations Department of Public Information 1994, 38). Military *observers*,²⁹ never numbered above 350 personnel, in one period amounted to no more than 50. Civilian police (CIVPOL) underwent a similar evolution, comprising at top strength 126 personnel. Additional staff consisting of civilians, medical personnel, and locals varied, but were at combined best half the strength of the military observers. Only electoral observers during the initial deployment³⁰ existed in larger numbers³¹.

UNTAC

²⁹ It is important to note these forces as observers only. UNAVEM II, while understandably authorized under Chapter VI of the Charter, never possessed "military troops".

³⁰ May 1991-January 1993.

³¹ 400 personnel.

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia enjoyed a slightly different type of mandate than that which existed in Angola during UNAVEM II. UNTAC was established by the UNSC on February 28, 1992, by Resolution 745. Its primary objective was to ensure the implementation of agreements set forth in the comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in Cambodia³² (Curtis 1998, 8). The mechanism of this arrangement created a Supreme National Council of Cambodia (SNC) which was intended to perform as a repository of Cambodian political authority during the transitional period to elections. Additionally set forth in the resolution were the responsibilities³³ of human rights, civil administration, law and order, refugee and internally displaced persons activities, and the organization and execution of free and fair elections. The ultimate objective of UNTAC was to return Cambodia to a condition of a functioning sovereign state, unified and free of conflict.

The staffing and organization of UNTAC was substantially larger than UNAVEM II. At its maximum deployment UNTAC contained 15,547 troops, 893 military observers, 3,500 CIVPOL, 1,149 international civilian staff, 465 UN volunteers, and 4,830 employed locals. During the actual elections UNTAC contracted with several other independent organizations to specifically support this process. There were several unique and unusual aspects to UNTAC which are certainly worthy of mention. UNTAC was the first occasion in which the United Nations, by mandate, assumed functional control of a state. The SNC, as will be discussed later, contained ultimate Cambodian political authority, but did not govern during the transitional period (Curtis 1998, 8-9). The mission was also the first in which the CIVPOL contingent was given autonomy

³² Which had been promulgated throughout 1990-91 by all four primary political factions in Cambodia, and the UN Security Council's five permanent members.

³³ Of the UN, not the SNC.

from its previous designation as a portion of the military component. In this function CIVPOL was given the responsibility of arranging a security apparatus³⁴ throughout the country. Finally, in a general sense, UNTAC was structurally a new concept for the UN. It was a multidimensional mission predicated upon a cooperation of efforts heretofore implied, but never put forth in such a manner. Cambodia experienced the legacy of all past peacekeeping efforts culminated in one mission. Few would argue the necessity of such a major effort. Cambodia was in a literal sense a failed state stricken by internal and external conflict and virtually incapable of governing itself in a manner in which its inhabitants could live in any sense of peace and security. As will be explored in a later section, being the first effort at such a comprehensive approach, UNTAC displayed many deficiencies.

TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

Labeling Terrorism and Terrorists

Prior to beginning points of analysis there should be a few defining words regarding terrorist acts and actors. Terrorism, although rooted in both literal and implied reference throughout history, is a largely undefined term. Additionally, the act itself is extremely elusive in composition and motive, thereby remaining nebulous to precise definition.

The use of terror by individuals or groups cannot be applied to any one particular ethnic, religious, or cultural distinction. It is of utmost importance to recognize terrorism

³⁴ Security apparatus referring to the training and establishment of local police forces, a judiciary, and a penal system.

as an ideal,³⁵ not an actor. It is an action perpetrated by actors, commonly referred to as *terrorists*. Stereotypes regarding who or what may be labeled terrorist must be analyzed with extreme caution. Defining terrorism becomes blurred due to individual perspective. Many individuals and groups resort to acts of intimidation and violence, themselves aspects of terror, in pursuit of specific goals. These goals may or may not be inherently justified. With perspective, what may have once seemed defensible may no longer apply. Are persons or groups rebelling against religious or ethnic oppression, for example, practicing terrorism? In a truly objective sense, if they resort to violent or intimidating means, they are. Groups often feel themselves, justified or unjustified, helpless to resolve their grievances peacefully. The forces of political power, military might, or economic deprivation may in fact force such a response. If groups, no matter how real their oppression, resort to violent means to defend themselves, they are practicing terrorism. A sense of inherent justice and morality seems to support such actions. However, this does not relieve these actions from being defined as terrorism.

The Evolving Threat

The existence of terrorism as a method of achieving political objectives in Angola and Cambodia was a reality prior to the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions. It should be recognized that the respective mandates creating UNAVEM II and UNTAC possessed inherent notions of dealing with terrorism by the ideals of mediation, creating stable political environments, and disarmament. However, the mechanisms for achieving these mandate objectives did not recognize internal terrorism against UN peacekeepers as structured, organized movements. Terrorism was not considered as a major factor in the

³⁵ Albeit a malevolent one.

policy creation of both mission mandates. The events which occurred in these missions such as, insincere efforts of disarmament, the use of military force to achieve political leverage, and intimidation of the populace through fear, were realities in these missions. As intrastate conflicts have become increasingly prevalent, the use of terrorism as a means to achieve political objectives has simultaneously grown. Movements relying on traditional state functions of diplomacy, organized militaries, and economic pressures have given way to non-state actors utilizing popular fear based on predominately threats of violence in numerous forms. United Nations peacekeeping must incorporate this factor into future missions as the organization becomes increasingly involved with intrastate conflicts and non-state actors.

It is vital to state that this work will apply the act of terrorism to certain groups involved in both UNAVEM II and UNTAC. It is equally vital to state that many, if not all, of the groups the author will designate as terrorist would predictably argue that their cause was just. It is not the objective of this work to make such determinations. Terrorism, in this work, is therefore defined as acts of intimidation or violence perpetrated to cause fear among a group with the objective of affecting political change (Wardlaw 1995, 9). This is the context in which action will be analyzed.

THE ANALYSIS

Factor I

One or More Parties to the Conflict not resigned to Reconciliation

This factor may seem self-evident; however, it is an ideal from which all efforts in a UN peacekeeping mission depend. It is of primary importance to stress the nature of

both mission mandates as authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Chapter VI missions exist at the request and consent of the conflicting parties, and cannot therefore legally continue if such a request and consent no longer applies. Therefore, if UNITA, for example, officially expressed their rejection of the UN mandate at any time, then UNAVEM II technically must either cease its operations or the UNSC must fundamentally alter its mandate³⁶. Although this situation occasionally came close to reality, as in Cambodia for example given Khmer Rouge actions, it was never undertaken in either mission. Motive may be as elusive as the definition of terrorism. However, in both UNAVEM II and UNTAC it was often the case that parties involved frequently pursued actions contrary to fundamental comprehensive objectives.

In the case of UNAVEM II, it was agreed by both parties that national elections were to determine a unified government to rule the state of Angola (United Nations Department of Public Information 1995, 338). When such elections were held, however, neither party gained the required 50% in the presidential ballot as required in the agreed Bicesse Accords³⁷. Despite a provision requiring a second run-off in such an event, UNITA immediately declared the elections flawed and re-mobilized their militia. Such action does not demonstrate a good-faith effort to respect the process. It does demonstrate a determination to return to the use of force given a perceived lack of success at the ballot box. Both the MPLA and UNITA were, once again, quickly engaged in forceful means to gain political control of Angola.

³⁶ To a Chapter VII jurisdiction for example.

³⁷ The negotiated agreements which governed the mission mandate regarding details of implementation.

The speed and readiness with which this return to force was enacted³⁸ clearly demonstrated another point inherent in both parties good-faith agreements. Demobilization and disarmament was a primary factor in both the Bicesse Accords, and the UNAVEM II mandate (Crocker; Hampson; & Aall 1999, 590). It is clear from the actions returned to on the ground that neither side demonstrated good-faith in their initial agreements. Re-armament of large forces in such a short period of time demonstrates that total disarmament never took place, and that verification was fundamentally flawed. As events continued with both sides gaining and losing territory by armed means, the resumed negotiations ebbed and flowed with military dominance on either side determining political positions.

A similar turn of events in Cambodia by the Khmer Rouge led to precarious situations for UNTAC throughout the mission. By June 1992 the Khmer Rouge openly refused to implement phase two of the disarmament process called for in negotiated agreements. Only four months into the mission, one party was refusing to participate. The rationale given by the Khmer Rouge for these actions was their assertion that Vietnamese forces remained in the country and were unduly influencing the efforts of the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)³⁹ in the process. As negotiated settlements also called for the removal of all foreign forces from Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge justified their claim under this auspice. Although the claim was subsequently verified as incorrect by UNTAC, the Khmer Rouge maintained this position. As in Angola during UNAVEM II, the Khmer Rouge forces immediately began forceful means to hold and expand the territory under their control. Although disarmament was technically still an incomplete

³⁸ As noted by Security Council resolution 785, armed action resumed in a matter of one to two weeks.

³⁹ The successor to the Vietnamese backed government in existence from 1979-1989.

process in June of 1992, the vociferous nature of Khmer Rouge efforts immediately following their declaration should have been an instant indication that they were not sincere in their agreements. The literal difficulty from a comprehensive standpoint with Khmer Rouge actions was that the other Cambodian parties increasingly felt a need to protect themselves from aggression. What was agreed to as demobilization became a suspicious rejection of the original agreements. Although all parties increasingly displayed a loss of faith in fundamental agreements, no remedy was ever promulgated to regain that trust.

United Nations peacekeeping missions must never deviate from mandated agreements unless all parties agree to a modification process. There is sufficient evidence that in both UNTAC (Boutros-Ghali 1999, 81) and UNAVEM II (Crocker; Hampson; & Aall 1999, 594) senior participants regarded these infractions as very serious. Subsequent resolutions and appeals from the Secretary General proved ineffective in both missions. In Cambodia the mission went forward, largely ignoring Khmer Rouge actions. In Angola resumed negotiations became the essence of the mission, although never mandated as such. It is obvious in both cases that there was no mechanism for effectively dealing with terrorist actions against native populations, against UN mission personnel, or the non-compliance with the agreed upon principles for mandate fulfillment. If Chapter VI mandates are to have any meaning, their inherent principles for execution must be respected.

Factor II

Failure to Address Literal Issues in the Conflict

The principle upon which this factor rests may be found in the nature of conflict resolution. Conflict resolution, similar to terrorism, is a concept lacking absolute definition. It is most generally referenced as two or more parties attempting to reach settlement with divergent goals (Rubin; Pruitt; & Kim 1994, 5). Admittedly such a definition is intentionally broad and can apply to many principles such as social, political, economic, ethnic, and religious conflict for example. Therefore, what this section will address are the ultimate goals of involved parties in both UNAVEM II and UNTAC, with the objective of examining whether UN mandates served to resolve the inherent conflicts by restoring international peace and security. This should be the purpose in all peacekeeping missions, based upon the exact situations as buttressed by the ideals of the UN Charter. Disarmament, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and economic aid are all tools by which conflict is to be alleviated or avoided. None of these *actions* by themselves address the objectives of the parties in conflict. They are simply means by which those objectives may be achieved to the reasonable satisfaction of all.

The basic realities of UNAVEM II originally involved, ethnic groupings, international ideological forces contained in the Cold War, and political and economic control. The second factor in this list, Cold War ideologies, was partially remedied by UNAVEM I⁴⁰. While the MPLA continued their stated adherence to Marxism, as UNITA proclaimed to Democracy, the nature of these ideologies waned over time. Particularly with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the MPLA ceased, for all practical purposes, to practice Marxism as a doctrine. This left ethnic, political, and economic concerns as the important issues to be addressed in achieving long term solutions.

⁴⁰ By the withdrawal of foreign forces from Angola.

The nature of the UNITA claim of ethnic warfare against the Ovimbundu of Angola's central highland region has largely been identified as a politically motivated claim to centralize support for the faction (Heywood 1989, 56). Admittedly this practice has its origins in colonial occupation and domination, however, it transcended into post-colonial efforts for national control. Years of war in which MPLA forces, aided by Cuban military forces, gained substantial victories over Ovimbundu peoples only succeeded in driving more forces to UNITA. The UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, continued to play upon these actions after Cuban forces were withdrawn, polarizing the conflict through the years. As is often the case in such matters, events gain a life of their own. Peoples beliefs, while originally based upon one set of criteria, transcend into rationalization based upon completely different circumstances. Until his death many years later, Savimbi propagated the belief among his followers that the MPLA meant to deprive them of their livelihood. While elements of this claim may prove to have some justification, the passage of time has indicated that the need to engage in continuous armed conflict did not seem necessary.

Regarding UN actions, the ethnic nature of the Angolan civil conflict does not appear as a factor in the negotiations. Although ethnic conflict is seldom simple, in this instance it may have needed an airing of the issue in open debate. We will never know, as no recorded action ever references it being addressed as a principle factor in the struggle, as it clearly was.

The issue of economic control seems to have received similar treatment from UNAVEM II. It was never part of the mandate, and remained an unresolved, yet obvious point of contention throughout. While it should be stated that the UN has made

considerable advances regarding economic development as a factor in conflict resolution since UNAVEM II, at that time it was largely ignored. There seems to have been an underlying belief, which may have possibly been a reality, that whoever controls the political arena also controls the economic. In underdeveloped states this is often a reality. This issue also should have been factored into settlement negotiations. Given the substantial natural resources Angola possesses, concern over the issue should not have been ignored.

This leaves the political issue. This was in fact the only issue taken into consideration in negotiations. In retrospect, given what was at stake by political domination, and since the other issues were not addressed, it should not be surprising that both sides felt compelled to resort to armed force to gain control. Instead of addressing the other factors, the UN mandate left the emphasis on the political. The opportunity to explore other issues which arguably could have had a diffusing affect on the political aspect was lost.

In Cambodia the UN experienced a somewhat similar set of events, although they were not as well defined. Problems faced by UNTAC originated largely from a lack of understanding about Cambodian society and the parties involved. The first of these was the reality of Khmer⁴¹ politics. Cambodia had always been ruled by a monarch. This supreme figure may have taken on varying forms such as a king, an autocratic dictator⁴², or a political strongman⁴³. Khmer politics was based on rule by power, contained in a single national figure (Chandler 1991, 5-6). Prior to the mid-twentieth century the monarchy had purged any question of rightful ownership of national power. Although

⁴¹ The term "Khmer" denotes the ethnic designation for the largest group of peoples inhabiting Cambodia.

⁴² In the form of Pol Pot.

⁴³ As in Hun Sen.

there may have been feuds within royal circles, such battles were nevertheless contained by this restriction. The introduction of modern ideologies such as democracy, socialism, communism, and international hegemony vastly altered the equation. United Nations negotiations seemed to assume that the factions vying for control would forego traditional Khmer politics and adopt representative democracy, although they had no previous exposure to it.

UNTAC was also faced with a lack of real information regarding the Khmer Rouge. The ten year UN recognition of the Khmer Rouge as the de facto government of Cambodia was primarily a political decision based upon the larger Cold War battle between the Soviet Union, the United States, and China (Brown & Zasloff 1998, 15). Humiliated in Vietnam, America immediately opposed the Soviet backed Vietnamese in all international actions. The traditional conflicts between China and Vietnam, combined with American recognition of the Peoples Republic of China, added to the opposition. As China was the largest supporter of the Khmer Rouge during the latter's reign in Cambodia, the movement to continue recognition of the Pol Pot led government was made easier. The atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge over their nearly four year reign in Cambodia were relegated to secondary concerns. Instead of alleviating any political conflict in Cambodia resultant from the 1979-1989 Vietnamese invasion and occupation, the UN failed to address the issue. The terror inflicted on the people of Cambodia was never addressed. Equally ignored was the entrenched nature of the parties in their respective political circles. The Hun Sen faction, the former rulers under Vietnamese occupation, was entrenched politically throughout most of the countryside (Curtis 1998, 21). Could any election fundamentally alter this situation? As results

proved, ballots failed to accomplish any resolution of this inherent conflict. The Khmer Rouge was firmly entrenched in northwest Cambodia on the Thai border, militarily controlling their territory by smuggled arms and economic supply resulting from exploiting local natural resources. Thailand did little to prevent this situation, nor did the UN take actions through its organs to actively cut off supplies. Therefore, when the Khmer Rouge came to the negotiating table, they arrived as a self-sufficient force. Logically they had little to lose as they were not being forced to give up their territory or source of funding. They had everything to gain by being legitimized as a national political factor.

Finally, comprehensively the UNTAC mandate did not address what Cambodia had literally become over twenty years of civil war. This was a traumatized nation emerging from genocide, occupation, the destruction of its institutions and social fabric, and factionalism. None of these realities occurred in an instant. It was not rational to believe that any would be resolved by arranging an election.

As the Khmer Rouge returned to tactics of intimidation and terror, UNTAC struggled with the means to adjust. Possible solutions put forth were an alteration of the mandate to Chapter VII enforcement means, as well as an increased arming of all factions. Wisely both proposals were rejected. Unfortunately no other options were explored. The decision was to proceed forward, ignoring Khmer Rouge actions (Boutros-Ghali 1999, 81). Attacks upon civilians, UNTAC personnel, and the process continued.

The return to terrorism in both Angola and Cambodia during respective UN missions was not unavoidable. A greater understanding prior to mission deployment could have alleviated many situations which erupted. The real motivation of all parties in

the conflict was not considered. What resulted was a temporary cessation of hostilities while parties assessed their new positions vis-à-vis UN efforts. Once assessment had taken place, their original motivation, which had not been addressed, remained a dictating factor in the following events. When goals of conflicting parties are not known or addressed, resolution cannot be achieved. The goals seldom disappear by chance.

Factor III

Lack of Clearly Defined Means to Achieve Policy and Mandate Objectives

In the realm of international relations, diplomacy, and cross-cultural agreements it is a natural occurrence for negotiated settlements to be open to larger interpretation and compromise than might be the case in smaller endeavors. Agreements negotiated over cultural, ethnic, and national boundaries must encompass wide views in order to reach something close to universal acceptability. This point is amplified when the agreement being negotiated deals with power, influence, and money on a national level as mediated by a third party. Anyone accustomed to working with or in the UN knows this fundamental point and its applicability to the work of the organization.

Simultaneously, however, negotiated agreements must also contain fundamental points which may be effectively put into action to achieve stated objectives. This is the art and science of international diplomacy, to construct agreements amenable to all sides while simultaneously providing mechanisms for achieving literal goals. This principle is a basic tenet of UN Peacekeeping mandates. This section will address the functionality of UN mandates provided in the respective missions. Were UN mandates structured to provide real means for parties to carry out their responsibilities? Was the role of the UN

proper, sufficient, and necessary? Finally, did the mandate enable all parties to achieve their objectives, assuming objectives were enunciated and achievable? The answers are mixed.

As previously mentioned, the UN Security Council mandate authorizing UNAVEM II in Angola was created in light of the Bicesse Accords. The Bicesse Accords established a cease-fire, conditions for consolidating peace in the country, a demobilization of the two contending armies, creation of a new united military, expansion of a central administration to the country, establishment of a police force, and the holding of free elections (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall 1999, 590). The purpose of UNAVEM II was to observe and verify the agreements made in the Bicesse Accords (Crocker, Hampson & Aall 1999, 590). As situations deteriorated with UNITA and eventually the MPLA both abrogating much of the Accords, even the UN Secretary General was forced to admit that UNAVEM II could only serve a mediating role (United Nations Department of Public Information 1994, 247). This admission was not made in an atmosphere of apathy; it was a realization that the UNAVEM II mandate provided a restricted role. The reality of a mandate losing its relevancy was clear (United Nations Department of Public Information 1994, 247). Virtually powerless to attempt to persuade sides to return to the agreements stated in the Accords, the UN found itself possessing no official status regarding implementation. As the Secretary General's first Special Representative for UNAVEM II stated, the UN could only be invited to participate in negotiations if the parties saw fit as it possessed no official status in this regard (Crocker; Hampson; and Aall 1999, 592). Literally the UN mandate for UNAVEM II was wholly predicated upon the MPLA and UNITA enforcing their own agreements. As the parties

abrogated their responsibilities, no one was able to take any action. The UN mandate was eventually altered⁴⁴ and other actors intervened to attempt reconciliation and a return to an orderly productive process toward stability, but many lives were lost in the period during which adjustments were made.

To objectively assess the UNSC Resolution policy mandate which governed UNAVEM II it is necessary to identify real objectives in the conflict. From the perspective of the Angolan parties these consisted of political, military, and economic state control. The UN objective in the mission mandate was symptomatic, not comprehensive. The assumption of playing a role of verification rather than that of actively moving the parties to achievable settlement was somewhat naive given the situation on the ground. Although Chapter VI peacekeeping is to rely on the non-use of force to aid in the diffusion and resolution of conflict, authorizing a proportionally small mission cannot provide any measure of deterrent to parties abrogating their responsibilities. Regardless of any measurable deterrent, a more startling fact is the impossible nature of such a small force verifying two substantial established military groups achieving real disarmament. The quickness with which post-election violence erupted, and the reality of less than half of 200,000 soldiers being demobilized prior to balloting demonstrate these points (Pycroft 1994, 250). Arms stockpiling beyond the capability of UN personnel to effectively monitor, due to a lack of personnel, was obvious.

The UN mandate for UNTAC authorized a significantly larger effort than that designated for UNAVEM II. Despite the comparatively impressive investment, UNTAC possessed several logistical deficiencies that affected the realization of its mandated

⁴⁴ Leading to UNAVEM III.

objective⁴⁵. The time period consumed to reach the reality of deployed UN troops is another misleading point. It is true that a significant period of time⁴⁶ elapsed prior to the arrival of mission personnel. This was *diplomatic* time however, not *training* time for those to be deployed. The result was a mission which contained significant language barriers, a lack of education regarding the history of Cambodian politics and society, and a lack of preparation in dealing with inherent obstacles in the country⁴⁷. The issue of rapid deployment has since been raised at the UN, specifically by the August 2000 comprehensive report on peacekeeping chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi. Regarding the issue of rapid deployment, the report recognized the often inadequate time factors of personnel deployment, but remained fundamentally seized on the matter of positive measures to be taken for correction. Rapid deployment, the report determined, required a "reserve" UN force and supply contingent, both contrary to the traditional practice of requesting personnel and material only *after* a mission has been mandated by the UNSC (United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council 2000, 14-15). Finally, as the primary mission objective was the conducting of national elections toward the establishment of a new government, personnel were significantly handicapped to execute the necessary functions in achieving quality results. Realities such as, dealing with the enormous refugee and internally displaced person issue, the process of voter identification and education, and the significant trauma inflicted on the general populace for more than two decades required far more time to prepare for elections than was allotted. These situations equate to instability, a fertile condition for the execution of

⁴⁵ Which was to implement the Paris Agreements; culminating in elections of a new comprehensive government.

⁴⁶ Referencing the first meetings between then Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, and Norodom Sihanouk in 1987; it was four years before UN forces were deployed in the country.

⁴⁷ Such as the Khmer Rouge and general culture of violence which then existed.

terrorism. Issues were not categorically addressed prior to deployment. Therefore, when terrorist activities erupted, their rippling affect created further instability from an already unstable reality. Missions must begin with stability at fundamental levels so that issues which arise, always a reality in complex efforts, may be dealt with from a position of strength rather than weakness.

Finally, the reliance on parties to simply act on good faith was, in both missions, unrealistic. Although the stated objective of UNAVEM II was to observe and verify, the failure to address the objectives of the conflicting parties negated the UN effort. Unlike UNTAC in Cambodia, the UN had no real role in the establishment of any apparatus to enact the Bicesse Accords. It relied upon mainly the parties themselves to erect a structure for peace. There was fundamentally no effort to bring the parties to an alteration of their objectives. Negotiations always focused on building the machinations for peace and little effort took place regarding revealing and resolving party goals. Machinery without purpose has no impetus for action and becomes a meaningless exercise. In Cambodia the issue was one of preparation. Examining the structure and purposes of UNTAC as a mission itself, it is difficult to extract potential problems. The problem with UNTAC regarding achieving mission objectives rested in preparation. Insufficient time and a lack of pre-mission information on the conflict, the country, and its people created new difficulties for an already challenging mandate.

Factor IV

A Lack of UN Policy Regarding Indigenous Terrorism in Peacekeeping Operations

The fourth and final factor to be considered in the analysis pertains to structural planning of a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission. This is admittedly a difficult factor given the inherent nature of Chapter VI mandates, but it is also of vital importance considering the myriad of possibilities in such deployments. This is not to suggest that the officials involved with creating the respective resolutions had illusions of perfect missions being executed literally as per the agreed mandate. All experienced diplomats, military personnel, and civilians involved with complex missions know of the inevitability of unforeseen obstacles. The relevant factor in the recognition of unforeseen circumstances, in this case indigenous terrorism, is the inclusion of policies and actions included in mandates and the structure of missions to address reasonably foreseen obstacles. Admittedly, the drafting of such language into a resolution would need to be performed with the utmost care. However, to enter into a complex mission based entirely upon faith of the parties begs incredulity.

The missions under consideration present good examples of this point. The fundamental criticism of UNAVEM II is the reliance on good-faith from the parties⁴⁸ (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall 1999, 590). Regarding UNTAC, knowledge of Khmer Rouge doctrine had been documented by scholars for a decade. Genocide, murder, and the rejection of all existent forms of civil society were tenets of Khmer Rouge philosophy. Both missions were dealing with factions that had been attempting to settle their claims to authority by violence for thirty years. Entering into peacekeeping operations with the expectation that such groups would inherently alter their *modus operandi* without hesitation was assuming too much. It is true that the problem presented by Chapter VI missions regarding consent from the conflicting parties is a real one. It is

⁴⁸ The MPLA and UNITA.

not unreasonable to assume that such a request emanates from a realization of stalemate, the failure of past means, or exhaustion. However, it should be equally logical to expect some parties to occasionally request UN assistance while operating on less than sincere means. It is an unfortunate reality that when formulating UNSC policy with non-state actors it is often necessary to probe deeper than might have been the case in past instances with state actors. Non-state actors do not operate under identical principles and must therefore be treated differently than states.

The logic of a party's acquiescence to UN involvement is not an instant admission of reformation. It can just as easily be perceived as another method to gain one's objective without viewing involvement as a dominant resolution. In simple terms, the UN may be used as a political device instead of as a mechanism for ultimate resolution. It is not illogical to state Khmer Rouge involvement in UNTAC as a manipulative means to an end. It is true that the possibility of Khmer ascendancy to power via legitimate elections was not impossible. It was, however, highly unlikely given their past performance. The scenario of Khmer Rouge involvement as a plan to further destabilize Cambodia⁴⁹ while engineering another "coup" has been documented numerous times (Kiernan 1993, 233). Throughout UNTAC deployment there remained areas of Cambodia never relinquished by the Khmer Rouge. Ironically, the group actually increased their regional control during the UN presence (Kiernan 1993, 214-215). When Khmer Rouge terror was raised before the Security Council and the Secretary General, there seems to be an impasse in subsequent reactions. The UN as a body appeared to consider no alternative but to proceed forward without addressing Khmer Rouge actions.

⁴⁹ By disarmament of all parties, while the Khmer Rouge hid stockpiles of weapons; or by the use of terror to influence balloting in a land much more familiar to themselves than the UN.

In Angola the situations were of similar consequences. Neither UNITA or the MPLA was without blame regarding returns to violence. The effects of these violent recurrences were that the UN was used as a political device. When the MPLA had an advantage in territory held or achieved a military victory they expressed a desire for a cease-fire. UNITA behaved in similar fashion. As events turned in the opposite direction, both sides freely resorted to violent means. Strategically, the UN may have been in error by allowing MPLA representatives to present positions in an official capacity before the Security Council⁵⁰. Both MPLA and UNITA forces were equally engaged in violent acts creating great internal strife among the populace, but only one side was allowed an official voice. Representatives may have been conducting dialogue with UNITA in the field, but clearly there was a preference for a voice in the Security Council chamber. If conflict is the result of incompatible goals by two or more parties, it is logical to explore how the goals of each party to the conflict can be addressed. MPLA statements before the Security Council were identical in each meeting, stating that UNITA was the aggressor, and they must be dealt with immediately (United Nations Security Council 1994 {D}, 3). This may or may not have been true. As the nature of the conflict itself was never explored, MPLA statements did little to advance all parties to a solution.

The dilemma of mandating for the unknown is problematic at best. The UN must, by Chapter VI code, be impartial. However, it should not be impractical to include diplomatic language expressing consequences should agreements be violated. It should equally be the practice of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, advising the

⁵⁰ As occurred continuously throughout the post-election period.

Security Council, to *fully* explore the conflict prior to drafting resolutions⁵¹. The complaints of not knowing the state, parties, dynamics, and nature of conflict have been expressed numerous times in as many forums. This final point is a recommendation to enter into mandates with full and complete realization of the conflict to be addressed. The UN has made significant progress throughout its existence as these concepts have evolved. The objective of this criticism is to be constructive. The disappearance of politically motivated agendas is unlikely. Through more thorough planning, development of mandates, and execution, it is hoped that a greater amount of people may benefit from smaller more efficient efforts.

CONCLUSIONS

Comprehensive review of all aspects concerning UNTAC and UNAVEM II, and the experience of internal terrorism during the missions raises several fascinating paradoxes. These include very different responses in structure and resources as, mission budgetary allowances, an unrealistic assumption regarding the intentions of parties, a failure to address agreement abrogation by involved parties, and insufficiency regarding mandate language.

Mission Budgets

The most literal paradox to be examined in this study is the first, the respective budgets. Funding for UNTAC and the resultant comprehensive personnel provided dwarfed similar provisions for UNAVEM II. It is clear, however, that regardless of the

⁵¹ As has been pointed out in numerous forms in the "Brahimi report" of August 2000.

funds allocated to these respective missions, it provided no impact toward curtailing terrorist actions by one or more involved parties. The Khmer Rouge, the MPLA, and UNITA raised equivalent violent disruptions in respective missions. The UN in Cambodia proved no more able to curtail Khmer Rouge actions with a large budget than did UNAVEM II in Angola with a small one. Therefore, funding and personnel cannot be referenced as a combatant device for indigenous party terrorism in Chapter VI peacekeeping missions.

Unrealistic Assumptions Regarding Conflicting Parties

In structuring mandates for these missions it is surprising to review a seeming lack of historical reality as applied to policy assumptions. The UN cannot be faulted for parties abrogating their negotiated agreements; however, it should have been apparent that the agreeing parties had no experience in peaceful means to end conflicts. If the inherent objective of the UN is international conflict resolution toward the restoration of peace and security, as logically stems from the fundamental Charter principles, the construction of missions designed to deal with such situations should all begin from the premise of admission that the parties are in conflict for reasons. One pertinent reason is that they have been unable to reach peaceful settlement on their own. An equally logical assumption is that they do not know how to pursue this goal. It is, therefore, crucial that UN mandates and resulting structures for peacekeeping begin from a universal premise that the parties in conflict need to be guided toward resolution because they have no inherent means to do so. This does not mean that those means are absent in the parties. It simply means that the UN is needed to bring them to the surface of the negotiation; to

act as a guide in the reconciliation process. Peacekeeping has increasingly been seen as a process, not an action. There have been advances in defining this principle, but more needs to be done towards full realization. The findings and recommendations of the Brahimi report raised these and many other factors in the making of UN peacekeeping policy. Findings should develop into actions. It should never be assumed that conflicting parties have no other agendas. Politics and power are complex ideals, when formulating policy to combat their affects this must be factored into the equation.

Unrealistic assumptions during mandate policy formulation combined with the first analysis factor of a lack of complete commitment by the parties toward reconciliation create a foundation of instability. The former is a result of the latter, creating general instability. The process of creating mandate policy should not proceed prior to firm verification of party sincerity toward reconciliation. Both UNAVEM II and UNTAC operated under mandates which, despite best intentions, did not consider many issues of the conflict, or motivations of the parties.

Preparation for the Possibility of Terrorist Violence

It is obvious that more robust capacity and better preparation would help to alleviate surprising behavior by the parties. Mandates should also have provisions regarding what actions may be undertaken to deal with participant violence during missions. Parties who resort to violence, abrogating their peaceful settlements, always have reasons for doing so. Perhaps these reasons existed prior to mission deployment, perhaps they are new. Regardless, efforts must be undertaken to discover the root objectives for such actions. This is admittedly very difficult. Placing a peacekeeping

mission the size of UNTAC on hold is extremely expensive, and very complex. In the cases of UNTAC and UNAVEM II, the issues of the parties resorting to terrorism could have, I believe, been anticipated and dealt with prior to deployment. In cases where this is literally not the case, new issues must be assumed to have arisen. In either instance, the root causes must be explored. In Cambodia the problem of the Khmer Rouge caused a return to violence several years after mission completion⁵². In Angola, UNAVEM II acquiesced to failure, requiring a new mandate⁵³ to effectively deal with the situation. Finally, as with the Khmer Rouge, it was not until UNITA lost its functional leader⁵⁴ that the violence finally ended. The contemporary UN has initiated programs dealing with many of these problems⁵⁵, but efforts must continue to be expanded. Fundamentally, expenditures for preventive measures should outweigh formal missions, with the principle that monies expended in such a manner will greatly alleviate the need for massive missions. Address root causes, not symptoms. This is the essence of the second factor of analysis, the addressing of core issues in the conflict. Both examined missions included examples of insufficient strategies and logistics incorporated into the mandate. Incorporation of root causes of the conflicts would have required a totally different approach regarding both factors.

Structuring Mission Mandate Language

Finally, all these principles meet in mandate language. Security Council Resolution mandates should reflect realities. In diplomacy this is very difficult.

⁵² Reference the violence that erupted between Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh primarily caused by each side claiming the other was aligning with Khmer Rouge forces, thus upsetting the power balance.

⁵³ UNAVEM III.

⁵⁴ Jonas Savimbi.

⁵⁵ Such as preventive diplomacy and peace building.

However, one must ask if it is any more difficult than expending billions on ineffective missions? Diplomacy is a slow process. Professionals from all states must take a slow, yet efficient, approach to conflicts throughout the globe. Such conflicts are by nature complex, there is no reason to assume that their solutions will be any less. Implementing such a process, and it is in fact a *process*, will not occur immediately. It has been evolving. The only relevant point here is that it should continue along this path. A constant striving for more precise methods, information, policies, and outcomes should be the objective of UN peacekeeping. This is the only way to literally eradicate conflict in the increasingly complex decades to come.

The final statement regarding comprehensive measures to combat indigenous terrorism in peacekeeping missions must be founded in preparation, precise and clear mandates addressing the causes of the conflict itself, and allowances for flexibility if parties abrogate their agreements during UN deployment. This will require greater precision from the UNSC in general, and better advice from the UN Secretariat and DPKO specifically. Missions must be viewed comprehensively, not compartmentally. As apparent in the third and fourth factor of the analysis respectively, mandate language must incorporate clearly defined means to achieve policy objectives, emanating from and reinforcing a comprehensive UN policy stance regarding indigenous terrorism in peacekeeping operations. Complete awareness by all parties involved regarding the objectives and their roles in achievement must be a paramount principle. The ideals of civil-military interface combined with diplomatic, conflict resolution, logistic, and all other concerns must act cooperatively. This has begun to happen, but more remains to be done. The coordination of efforts within the DPKO has been raised logistically as a

severe impediment to effective mission operation (United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council 2000, 34-35). There is additional practical experience from the field that efforts in post-conflict environments have suffered from one or more involved parties not acting in coordination with others. It makes little sense for several elements on the ground to be participating in identical efforts irrespective of others. The International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, for example, may be involved in the distribution of humanitarian supplies such as medicine or food. Other non-governmental organizations may be involved in the same tasks. It additionally makes more sense for military components to contribute their best practices in the assistance to these relief efforts. Relief cannot exist in a zone of intense conflict. Military forces can supply an acceptable environment, while relief agencies can provide their services. The ideal is to cooperatively utilize each actor in their best capacity. Military troops, while often containing military "police" components, are not the same as civilian police. Their training and objectives are very dissimilar. The same applies to relief organizations, UN or private. Most operate as specialists in various areas such as, refugees, internally displaced persons, children or women specifically, or health matters. Coordination of a non-governmental organization (NGO) such as Feed the Children with the UN's World Food Program (WFP) makes sense. These concepts are new, as are many of the NGO's. The ideal of coordination is, however, a vital one if peacekeeping missions are to act in unison for the good of the conflicting parties toward resolution.

Conflicting parties will always possess the option of resorting to violence if their goals seem not to be realized by UN peacekeeping efforts. The UN must be prepared for this possibility. The answer is not contained only in physical anti-terrorism activities; but

principally in thorough planning and execution. Creating policy that is free of opportunities for terrorist activity is the best deterrent. United Nations initiatives in poverty alleviation, economic development, anti-trafficking in numerous respects, and democracy are all preventive diplomacy methods enacted to create stability. Stability is a major deterrent to terrorist activity. It removes many of the conditions⁵⁶ necessary for the execution of terrorism. United Nations peacekeeping missions are created to address specific instances where international peace and security have been compromised. It is logical to shape these efforts in a manner that will address all possible contingencies that may evolve.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Many of the points enunciated in this thesis have been raised by a wide variety of persons in equally diverse settings. Scholarly journals, opinion pieces, global commentary, and UN bodies have comprehensively addressed these topics since the beginning of the 21st century. In an international environment filled with many new challenges UN peacekeeping has become an increasingly vital instrument for maintaining global peace and security. The most comprehensive work to date regarding the reform of UN peacekeeping in this new international reality is the August, 2000 panel report to the General Assembly and Security Council commonly known as the "Brahimi"⁵⁷ Report".

The four points raised in this thesis, while specific unto themselves, focus on a fundamental point addressed in the Brahimi Report. The creation of policy mandates for

⁵⁶ Such as fear, desperation, poverty, and a sense of hopelessness.

⁵⁷ Named after its appointed chairman, Lakhdar Brahimi.

peacekeeping operations must be based upon clear, credible, and achievable mandates (United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council 2000, 10). Specific to this thesis is the point that ambiguous and ill-informed policy mandates may serve as encouragement to spoilers. The recommendation that minimum requirements be established and complied with prior to committing UN peacekeeping efforts is in accord with the points raised in this thesis regarding preparatory investigation. Policy makers must have a firm perception of the cause of a conflict, the relevant parties, and the environment in which peacekeepers will be asked to operate prior to drafting structured mandates. An environment of ill-defined factors and objectives combined with insufficient preparation for abrogation of agreements by parties is a breeding ground for terrorism. As terrorism is a method of achieving objectives based upon fear, uncertainty, and intimidation, uncertain policy direction creates ample opportunities for such behavior.

The achievement of more comprehensive mandates relies on the enhanced cooperation of departments within the UN Secretariat (United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Security Council 2000, 12). Information gathering in the creation of affective policy mandate must be a joint effort from all relevant sources. For example, the exclusion of primary objectives regarding conflicting parties from the mandate can lead to improperly directed mission strategy. If a primary party to a conflict is seeking strategic control of a territory containing rich natural resources, it is futile to direct UN peacekeeping efforts to a political reconciliation void of this issue. A party with this territorial objective will resist efforts at disarmament and political power-sharing if they do not contain provisions of geographic natural resource allocation. An oversight of this

type can lead to increased conflict, extended negotiations, and failure to reach any agreement. These situations translate into squandered funding, continued or increased loss of life, humanitarian concerns, and political malaise. It is easy to envision how the exclusion of one factor in a conflict can create multiple opportunities for increased terrorist action against a mission. Conflicting parties which may have originally entered into peace agreements with the UN can lose faith in the mandate, thereby resorting to alternative means in achieving their objectives. Being unprepared in these regards, the UN must share responsibility for these actions. If peacekeeping missions are to be effective, they must take *all* perceivable factors and eventualities into consideration. If they do not, they become complicit in the resumption of hostilities.

The core ideal behind these proposals is proper and efficient strategic planning. Foreseen in the Brahimi Report, the need to utilize all possible sources from inside and outside of the UN is vital to the effort. Compilation of information from all sources in a rapid and efficient manner addresses issues such as focused mandates, properly staffed and deployed personnel, and effective engagement of parties to reconciliation. While there are many additional sub-topics of concern in these broad ideals, such as rapid deployment capabilities, political considerations, and cultural sensitivity for example, the primary concern from a policy standpoint is preparation in the creation of mandates.

The final recommendation in consideration of these factors is the drafting of a clear policy framework which can be applied to situations which are raised in the UN for consideration of a peacekeeping mission. At present, policy is drafted based upon state interests, often those possessing the most power in the Security Council. This implies a policy creation apparatus based upon subjectivity. United Nations peacekeeping policy

should be created from an objective standard. It is probably impossible to totally remove state interests from this process, as the UN is a political body regardless of its collective enunciated ideals. However, there must be a framework that states with less political power can utilize to make their voice heard. Reviews such as the Brahimi Report are invaluable in raising and defining the key issues necessary for peacekeeping policy reform. If the response stalls at recommendations, however, it has failed. It must include the next step in the process which is to draft and implement objective policy that addresses *conflicts* rather than interest based agendas which miss vital points. A committee for this process must be comprised of individuals void of individual state interests, and the emerging policy should be submitted before the General Assembly, and verified by an independent commission charged with insuring objectivity. This is a difficult task. The UN is a pluralistic body comprised of states; the creation of such an approach would require an intellectual removal of participants from the interests of their respective states. While problematic, such an approach is in accordance with the UN Charter and the treatment of international conflict as a global dilemma. The realization of a literal international environment has been established in geo-strategic concerns. It is time to apply the principle to the addressing of conflict. If international concerns do transcend state interests in the contemporary setting, policy must comply accordingly. Humanitarian tragedies, genocide, refugee and internally displaced person issues, and political instabilities create ripples in the international fabric capable of affecting seemingly non-involved peoples and states. United Nations peacekeeping policy mandate creation must be created objectively in this new reality.

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