Development of SHIRBRIG and Similar Units for Utilization in U.N. Peacekeeping Missions and the Eventual Demise of SHIRBRIG

By
Darl E. Cord II

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Goal of Paper: Review and compare the development of the SHIRBRIG, EU Battle Groups and NATO Rapid Deployment Forces as rapid deployment forces for utilization in UN peacekeeping missions. Discuss the stages of development, organization and as the EU Battle Groups and NATO Rapid Deployment Forces developed from concept to reality they also led to the elimination of the SHIRBRIG as a platform for utilization in UN peacekeeping missions. Discuss lessons learned when utilized for Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) and their intended and potential utilization in UN peacekeeping missions.

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I. Summary

The goal and purpose of this paper is to examine the development of the Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) as a rapid deployment force for UN peacekeeping missions, from its development and employment through its demise. In addition to reviewing the SHIRBRIG organizational structure and contributions to UN missions, a thorough analysis and comparison will be made pertaining to the development of EU Battle Groups, NATO Rapid Development Forces, and African Standby Forces as rapid deployment forces, which could be utilized in UN PKOs. Finally, this paper will show that the development and subsequent employment of each of these organizations indirectly assisted in the elimination of the SHIRBRIG as a platform to be utilized in UN peacekeeping missions.

II. Introduction

Over the last 20 plus years we have developed the means and measures to develop the capability to fully implement the concept of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in support of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (UNPO). The legislative measures within the United Nations and international efforts to make it happen began with the Friends of Rapid Deployment (FORD), Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) team which organized United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) and complemented it with the SHIRBRIG. The organization and development of SHIRBRIG were going fine, what happened? The SHIRBRIG had been utilized on numerous occasions and had assisted in the development of the African Standby Forces but was shut down after 12 years of operations. Why? Was it due financial constraints, world economic recessions, or was it due to the development of similar entities (EU Battle Groups and NATO Rapid response forces) which would have overlapping organizational structures and missions pulling requirements from the same financial and manpower infrastructure?

On 30 June 2009, a closing ceremony was held on the grounds of Hovelte Barracks near Copenhagen, Denmark. Pictures were taken, speeches made and handshakes given and the doors of Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) closed after nearly 12 years of operation. The termination and shutting down of SHIRBRIG had been decided at the organizations 33rd Steering Committee meeting 18-20 November 2008, eight months earlier. The termination was hastened by the fact that many of the countries participating in SHIRBRIG had pledged troop support directly to the United Nations vice through the SHIRBRIG construct. As result, the funding and troop support to SHIRBRIG were curtailed and added fuel to the fire to totally shut down the SHIRBRIG. It was during the November 2008 meeting that it was decided to close all SHIRBRIG activities and to disband the Planning Element (PLANELM) by 30 June 2009. Many friends and personnel associated with SHIRBRIG responded to the invitation to attend the closing ceremony and many thought that it was a pity to close it down. One of the key speeches was given by Ambassador Legwaila Joseph Legwaila who was the Secretary-Generals Special Representative for UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) during the time period when SHIRBRIG was deployed to the region. In his speech, he mentioned not only the accomplishments of SHIRBRIG but also the necessity of such organizations. Twelve years of good intentions in an attempt to create a rapid reaction force for peacekeeping ended as it had started; in the dreams and ideas of a few members states who tried to give it their all and faced resistance the entire way during its development. The countries who participated in SHIRBRIG truly attempted to make it happen and come to full realization as a rapid reaction force in support of peacekeeping operations. At the end of the day, the lowering of 16 national
flags and two UN flags by the Jutland Signal Regiment and the performance by the Tambour Korps of the Royal Life Guards signaled the end of SHIRBRIG. Ironically at the closing of the SHIRBRIG, the United Nations was in the process of creating a similar organization to that of SHIRBRIG within the United Nations Head Headquarters (UNHQ). 1 In order to get to answer these questions, it is necessary to briefly review the changing dynamics of conflicts, peacekeeping, and the background and conception of the Rapid Deployment Forces.

II.B. History and Background

Since the foundation of the United Nations there has been limited discussion and only a few attempts in the development of either a standalone UN force or development of a rapid response force capable of dealing with UN crisis’s. The result has been failure for a myriad of reasons ranging from high costs, lack of commitment by member states and lack of consensus over command and control issues. 2 One of the first attempts and supporters of establishing an international UN force (high-readiness force) to deal with international turmoil around the world was that of UN Secretary General Trygve Lie in 1948. Under his concept the UN force was “to consist of a permanent force of 300 personnel at the UN Headquarters in New York or another specified location, with a reserve cadre of another 500 members recruited multi-nationally and held equipped and ready in their own countries for service at the call of the UN.” 3 A strong supporter of this concept was Canada, with Lester B. Pearson, leading his leadership and support in creating a permanent armed force to serve the United Nations. “4 The Canadian Chiefs of Staff Planning Committee, proposed that the United Nation forgo the creation of a large standing army in favor of a “small and accredited UN force which would, by the moral force of its presence, exert an effect out of all proportions to actual members”, 5 Even with the Canadian support, questions and concerns arose regarding equipment sourcing, contravention of sovereignty, structure, training and funding for the planed Guard Force. As a result, the Guard force became a field service component consisting of 49 personnel. 6 This was just one example, with other proposals throughout the years being submitted by the Argentine and Italian government’s which proposed the creation of rapid-reaction forces for humanitarian purposes. The British and French governments offered initiatives aimed at enhancing peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy on a regional basis in Africa.

As the cold war ended, a revival and zeal within the United Nations Security Council developed with the goal of collectively addressing conflicts that could threaten international and regional peace and security. In addition, human rights violations were seen as a de-stabilizing factor and could threaten world peace and security. On another note, the post cold war conflicts became predominantly intra-state or civil wars and became more the exception than the rule. These intra-state wars can be described as internal struggles with the use of irregular forces involving warlords, factional leaders and paramilitary forces aimed at destroying or undermining the state apparatus, collapsing the rule of law within the country and undermining the countries institutions. During the course of these wars, civilians would increasingly become the targets of violence with the government unable to protect or provide for the citizens. This internal strife would lead to anarchy, and anarchic violence within the country would also lead to the undermining of state institutions. As a result, international law becomes meaningless and the conflicts would blur the lines between national and international law.

5 IBID, p. 27. See also: Canadian Directorate of History and heritage, File 193,009 (D53) (18 Aug 48) JPC, “United Nations Military Staff Committee,” Maloney, p32. (Wu, 2005)
6 IBID, p. 27.
The overall concept and dynamics of peacekeeping with the classical task of serving as a buffer between conflicting parties has changed since the end of the Cold War. It has evolved into a more complex activity with operations geared towards political, economic and social changes in response to intra-state conflicts. As a result, the nature of the state has become an issue and there would be the need to rebuild the entire infrastructure of the states institutions (administrative, legal, etc.) with the assistance of the international community and it has become an integral part of peace-building operations. The sheer increased number of intra-state conflicts verse that of the inter-state conflict has led to this change with the realization that the situation prior to an intra-state conflict is as non-desirable as the current situation. This raises the question of when is it necessary and appropriate to intervene in such a crisis. This was particularly true following the tragic events in Rwanda and Bosnia and the lack of international concern, reaction or response to the genocide which occurred.

The response of the international community had been to expand the scope of the peacekeeping to make it more multidimensional and complex in nature to be able to handle the type of missions that were to be encountered. Additionally, in the mid 1990s there was strong encouragement and support for the conceptual development of a rapid development force. The answer was to use rapid development forces affectively in situations where the United Nations has determined that peace enforcement should and needs to be utilized. This means that “Peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for member states under Article 2(4) of the charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.” Talk is cheap and actions speak louder than words and in the case of Rwanda when the United Nations Security Council decided to expand the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) during which not one of the 19 countries who had troops on standby arrangements agreed to provide troops. Member states need to provide sustained political support to the peacekeeping in order for it to complete and meet its mission. Good intentions cannot be a substitute for the ability to project credible force in an area of conflict. Therefore, it is crucial that member states summon the political resolve to support the UN politically, financially and operationally, this leads to the “key condition for success of future complex operations have political support, rapid deployment with a robust force posture and a sound peace-building strategy.”

The 2001 report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations stated that “the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge; and it can do no better today. Without significant institutional change, increased financial support, and renewed commitment on the part of the Member States, the United Nations would not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign it in the coming months and years”. This statement, reiterates that the United Nations falls back into its standard status quo in regards to peacekeeping procedures and operations every couple of years. This was particular true in regards to peacekeeping operations or situations where a difficult and hard choice of commitment needs to be determined and carried out. It always comes down to the same basic issues: principles of commitment, finances and capabilities, which also form the basic pillars of success with any given mission. UN deployments can be described as being slow, unorganized, uncoordinated with a lack of expertise and accountability which hamper the operation.

Nearly 50 years later, and following numerous speeches by various Secretary Generals to the Security Council, one Secretary-General in particular who made the concept of Rapid Deployment Forces key in his presentation. It was Secretary General Boutros-Ghali presented this concept in his “Agenda for Peace” presentation to the

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7 NATO, NATO Briefing, Crisis Management - “Building peace and stability in crisis regions” (2005) p. 3; http://www.nato.int
8 IBID, p. 3.
11 Ibid., p. 1.
Security Council in June 1992. Within this presentation he identified the need of “preventive action to ease tensions before the result in the conflict—or if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve it underlying causes”. He then proposed that member states earmark forces to be called upon for peace enforcement operations, placed under the control of the Security Council and the Secretary-General.  

Three years later, in January 1995, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali presented in his “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” which recommended that the UN consider the idea of a Rapid Deployment Force. It would consist of units from a number of member states, trained to the same standard, using the same operating procedures and inter-operable equipment, and taking part in combined exercise at regular intervals in order to make the forces available for deployment at short notice. The above mentioned recommendations proposed by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali formally recognized and acknowledged the standby arrangements that had been made in many forms over the decades since the founding of the UN in 1945. Because of his speech, a UN planning team was formulated in 1993 mandate to “develop a system of standby forces, able to be deployed as a whole or in parts anywhere in the world, within an agreed response time, for UN peace-keeping operations and missions”. The Security Council in Resolution 998 (1995), adopted 16 June 1995, welcomed the establishment of what was termed a Rapid Reaction Force to enable the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to carry out its mandated mission. These efforts were reinforced by a report “Military Components of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations” by United Nations Joint Inspection Unit in 1995. The Joint Inspection Unit was given the tasks of reviewing the various aspects of peacekeeping operations to include management of peacekeeping operations, troop and equipment availability, United Nations Secretariat. In addition, the Joint Inspection Unit attempted to solve two major problems: readiness of troops to participate in peacekeeping operations and the timely deployment of troops. In their report it was recommended that the General Assembly appoint a group of experts to prepare a report on peacekeeping operations and concentrate on two approaches: stand-by arrangements and rapid reaction forces.

II.C. Country Studies

In 1995 there was concerted effort by the Secretary General and various organizations to bring to the limelight the idea of the rapid deployment concept and capabilities. The lead came from three member states, (the Netherlands, Canada, and Denmark) all of whom conducted studies on the concept of developing a U.N. rapid reaction force. There were two major lines of thinking and perspectives being considered in the area of rapid deployment with one line of thinking directed towards strengthening current arrangements with incremental reforms while the other aimed at developing a dedicated UN standing force. These studies were conducted during a two year period (1994-1995), with each country attempting to pull together the best plan possible.

II.C.1. The Netherlands

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12 IBID, p28; See Also Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, United Nations, 1992
13 IBID, p. 28.
14 IBID, p. 29; See Also: Responding to a Crisis:Standby Arrangements at the United Nations available at (http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/un/unstand.html)
In 1994, the government of Netherlands gathered a team of experts to conduct a study to explore the potential of creating a rapid deployable brigade for utilization by the United Nations Security Council. The results of their research was reviewed at an international conference and resulted in the release of the Netherlands study, “A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: A Preliminary Study”. It explored the void in UN peacekeeping system in relation to its capacity and capabilities and the possibility of creating a permanent Rapid Deployable Brigade. This study promoted the concept of permanent Rapid Deployable Brigade that would be available immediately upon short notification for action into a crisis area for a limited time and replaced by an international peacekeeping force. It would be utilized as a “stop-gap” measure and complement existing peacekeeping and crisis management components in the field as well as being utilized for humanitarian emergency situations. 18 The brigade would utilize the model of first ones in and first one out of an area of operations with simultaneous preparations being made for the replacement of the brigade by stand-by units.

This plan would have the unit structured around a light infantry brigade, equipped with armored personnel carriers with approximately 5,000 personnel. The brigade would have enhanced with engineering, transportation and medical capabilities to be able to contend with the mission objectives. The initial cost to equip and field the brigade would be $500-550 million with annual cost of $300 million to maintain. 19 The brigade would still have limitations and would remain dependant on the capabilities of member states (US and Russia) for support in the areas of air and sea lift capabilities. 20

The tasks of the brigade included preventative action and peacekeeping actions “during the interval between a Security Council decision and the arrival of an international peacekeeping force, and deployment in emergency humanitarian situations.” 21 In the end it would be the Security Council who would determine the tasks based on the mandate for the operation.

II.C.2. Canadian Study

Canada had always been a strong supporter of establishing a permanent UN armed force and in 1995, the government of Canada developed and prepared an in-depth study titled “Toward a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations” which reviewed the concept of rapid reaction capability. The study covered a spectrum of topics in conjunction with rapid reaction capability, along with identifying a number of problems at the political, strategic, operational and tactical levels. The study examined a number of principles (reliability, cost-effectiveness, quality) and elements (early warning system, transportation infrastructure, logistical and financial support, trained and equipped personnel) that would be necessary for an effective rapid reaction force and evaluated the existing UN system in respect to these requirements. 22.

The report stressed the case of building on existing arrangements in order to improve peacekeeping activities. For instance, the study reported that the operational level within the UN was lacking in capabilities and stressed several concepts to overcome these shortfalls. This included the establishment of a permanent operational-level rapid reaction headquarters. This headquarters would consist of 30-50 personnel who would be responsible for conducting contingency planning and the capability of rapid deployment at the request of the UN Security

19 Ibid., p. 18.
22 Ibid., p. 4.
While at the strategic level, the report recommended the refining the early-warning capabilities of the Secretariat and the strengthening of the DPKO with additional staff, developing standing contractual arrangements of suppliers and transportation assets and generic equipment packages to meet the requirements needed for an effective rapid deployment peacekeeping capability.  

The report provided a total of twenty-one recommendations that were developed to close the gap of disparity between actual and necessary capabilities within the DPKO. It also offered additional five long term recommendations that were aimed at addressing and stimulating additional research and development in the area of rapid reaction capabilities. The report also promoted the vanguard concept which was “based on the principle of linking all of the levels of the UN system, especially an operational headquarters and mission groups provided by member states at the tactical level, for the purpose of deploying a force as rapidly as possible for a brief period, either to meet an immediate crisis or to anticipate the arrival of follow-on forces or a more traditionally-organized peacekeeping operation”. The forces being committed to this concept would remain within their respective countries under national control until their governments were notified by the Secretary-General and authorized to deploy by their governments for the UN mandated mission. The Canadian study recommendations were refined to appeal to a broad range of supportive member states. It was a middle of the road proposal that recommended pragmatic and realist changes with the intent of being all inclusive in a cooperative building process with the objective of developing unity of purpose and cause for improvement of the UN peacekeeping capabilities.

II.C.3. Danish Study

In January 1995, the Danish government led a multinational study by approaching countries with experience in peacekeeping to establish a working group to develop a UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG). A total of 13 member states (Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, and Sweden) participated in exploring the option of developing a rapid deployment force within the already established UN Stand-by Arrangement System. It was similar to the other studies developed by Denmark and Canada in that it stressed the concept of a brigade size element being available at a short notice, solely for peacekeeping operations as well as humanitarian tasks as well. A major guiding assumption of the study was that “by forming an affiliation between appropriate contributions to the UNSAS, make a pre-established, multinational UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade available to the United Nations, thus providing a rapid deployment capability for deployments of a limited duration.” This study also attempted to address the concerns that contributing nations had in regards to operating conditions and participation in certain types of missions. The participants of the study agreed that in order for the brigade to be successful there needed to be standardized training and operating procedures, and equipment. In addition, the establishment of a large collection of units that overlapped capabilities from a large pool of contributing nations, complemented by joint exercises were necessary as well. This would speed up the national decision-making process of countries in approving the dedicated troops and equipment to a mission and

24 Ibid., p. 43-46.
25 Ibid., p. 52.
allow the brigade to be activated and deployed in rapid manner. It went further by stressing the concept of “first-in” and “first-out” and would assure the limited duration of the deployment. Overall, this proposal overcame the impediment to rapid reaction and would provide the Security Council immediate access to versatile and balanced force capable of peacekeeping operations. 28

The Danish study and concept of the SHIRBRIG was able to attract support not only from within the UN Secretariat but from regular troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations to include Canada and the Netherlands. As a result, the basic foundation for the establishment of a Multinational Standby Force (MSF) and that of the SHIRBRIG was set into motion by the recommendation by Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, the UN planning team and the initiative of a few countries whom conducted studies on the topic.

By 1996, the United Nations Planning Team had reached a point where they addressed key considerations and formulated an overall outlined concept for the development of a Multinational Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade. The brigade’s capacities were to include peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and the ability to protect itself and associated UN agencies, NGOs, and personnel. The brigade would also have to maneuver in limited environments independently with little to no host nation support. 29

Refer to Section III. SHIRBRIG Structure and Mission for an in-depth review and discussion of the SHIRBRIG.

As the concept of the SHIRBRIG was continuing to develop there were corresponding developments within the international community being considered that had implications which affected the rapid deployment concept. They range from efforts being forwarded by the Friends of Rapid Deployment (FORD), United Nations development in the areas of United Nations Standby Arrangements (UNSAS), Rapid Deployment Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ) to that of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) considering legislation on rapid deployment capabilities EU Battle Groups (BG), NATO Rapid Development Forces (NRF) within their own organizations.

II.D. Friends of Rapid Deployment (FORD)

In 1995, as the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations celebration was underway, the Foreign Ministers of Canada (Andre Ouellet) and Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (Hans Van Mierlo) organized a meeting of Ministers to discuss and generate political support on enhancing the United Nations deployment capabilities. As an indirect method of gaining support as well as promoting the initiative, they announced the creation of an informal group called the “Friends of Rapid Reaction” chaired by the permanent representatives of Canada and Netherlands in New York, USA. 30

The Friends of Rapid Deployment used the Canadian study as the baseline for their dialogue and at the outset concentrated on the areas of standby arrangements, operational-level headquarters to build a base of support. The group expanded to make it truly a multinational effort and by 1996 there were 26 members (Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Senegal, South Korea,

Sweden, Ukraine, and Zambia) as well as officials from the DPKO and UN Secretariat. The group by this time had also started to support the Danish study and initiative which included many of the vanguard concepts and proposed the establishment of SHIRBRIG. The Friend’s efforts also established a number of working groups to review and refine plans and strategy in the areas of logistics, procurement, financing, administration, and transportation capabilities that were flexible enough to meet the challenges and requirements of diversified missions.

By the end of 1996, six members of FORD were also founding nations of SHIRBRIG and signed letter of intent to establish SHIRBRIG.

II.E. United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS)

In 1993, the UN Secretariat Boutros-Ghali identified the necessity for the establishment of a Standby Arrangements system to identify equipment and to secure personnel required for peacekeeping operations. The UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) was introduced as a method to increase the speed at which troops could be deployed by the United Nations.

The system consisted of arrangements negotiated between the United Nations and individual member states for resources agreed upon to remain on “standby” in their respective home countries. These “standby” resources would make necessary preparations and training in accordance with specified UN guidelines. The system provided the UN with a database containing member states troop contributions for current and future operations and would possible be made available on short notice to the UN Security Council as well. The resources would range from military units, specialized military and civilian personnel along with equipment, material and other capabilities. The availability of the units were conditional and remain subject to the national decision-making approval for utilization in a mandated operation.

The UNSAS provided a database consisting of U.N member states troop contribution to UN peacekeeping operation in the future. It details equipment and troop strengths and response times for mobilization and deployment. The database system was operated by a team of professionals who formed the Standby Arrangements Team (SAT).

The system would be cross-referenced so that data could be retrieved by country, type of equipment, response time. The data would be updated for accuracy by comparing it to the quarterly status reports provided by contributing countries. It essentially provides the UN with a detailed and precise measurement of the forces and capabilities each member state would have on standby at an agreed upon state of readiness. UNSAS provided 4 key elements to assist the UN with its peacekeeping missions.

32 United Nations, ‘Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their Aspects
General Assembly Resolution A/52/287 (1997)
33 Joachiam Koops (2008) Ten Years of SHIRBRIG: Lessons Learned, Development Prospects and Strategic Opportunities for Germany, Global Public Policy Institute, p. 10.
1: Provided a detailed and precise database of forces and capabilities,  
2: Facilitated training, planning and preparation for UN staff and contributing member states,  
3: Ability to provide options based on total resources and ability adapt if member states opted out of a mission,  
4: Conditional arrangements verse no arrangements.

This information would be used by planners and members states as guidelines and means of developing contingency and backup strategies to support to mandated operations.

By 1995, two years following the announcement by UN Secretariat Boutros-Ghali on UNSAS, 41 countries had expressed their willingness to participate in the standby arrangements with 31 countries confirming their participation with 72,000 personnel. 35 These numbers were doubled by 1999, when eighty-eight members confirmed their participation in the program with 147,500 personnel of which 50,000 personnel had been conditionally committed on “Stand-by” that could be called upon for a mandated mission. 36 As member states became more familiar with the system, their willingness to contribute and participate within the system continued to expand. UNSAS was a mechanism which could assist the UN in its goal of obtaining the capacity of rapid deployment but it would not confront the issues and shortages in the areas of headquarters support, communication and transportation assets and the ability for member states to provide their own support functions. 37 It must be noted that the UNSAS was replaced in 2015 with the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) do to many of these issues.

**II.F. Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ)**

A Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations urged the UN Secretary-General to develop a Rapidly Deployable Headquarters (RDMHQ) in their 1995 spring report. This proposal was also at the forefront of the Friends of Rapid Deployment whom also stressed that the establishments of the headquarters and having the capabilities of being able to deploy at short notice, ability to deploy for up to six months, provide the nucleus of a PKO HQ, and be integrated into the DPKO as a core function. 38 The proposal was supported by the passing of UN General Assembly Resolution 50/30 (1995) that requested the development of the RDMHQ headquarters. The creation of the RDMHQ was established as a means to complement the UNSAS and its efforts. It was a means to have a viable cohesive team of essential military and civilian personnel placed into a mission area to provide management and capabilities guidance in the initial phases of a peacekeeping operation. 39 The Secretary General in his progress Report on Standby Arrangements for Peacekeeping (S/1996/1067) of 24 December 1996, stated that a shell of a RDMQ would be established in the Secretariat. The RDMHQ would consist of civilian and military personnel tasked to ensure the development and started up phases of a peacekeeping operation. 40 The goal was to have the mission headquarters fully functional and manned by 1997 but until budgetary constraints and other issues resolved it would consist of a bare minimum

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40 Ibid., p. 4.
staff of 8 personnel. The staff would consist of specialists in the areas of operations, logistics, engineering, civilian police, along with a Chief of Staff and based in New York, USA. A further twenty-nine personnel within the Secretariat would also be tasked and assigned to the RDMHQ, but would continue within their regular assignments until needed. In addition, 24 personnel would be selected to man the RDMHQ but remain in their home countries until required.

These 61 personnel would make up the initial HQ and would be responsible for the coordinate the rapid deployment and management of an operational-level headquarters and would be deployed in the crisis area for three to six months pending the selection, arrival and transition of a fully staffed mission headquarters. Major-General Frank Van Kappen, military advisor to the Secretary General detailed 5 major tasks of the RDMHQ in his presentation on the RDMHQ of 24 October 1996. The RDMHQ would have five major tasks:

- Translating the concept of operations prepared by the mission planning service into tactical sub-plans;
- Developing and implementing RDMHQ preparedness and training activities; providing advice to the Head of Mission for decision making and co-ordination purposes;
- Establishing an administrative infrastructure for the mission;
- Providing essential liaison with the parties during the early stages of the operation,
- Working with incoming mission headquarters personnel to ensure that, as the operation grows to its full size and complexity, unity of effort to implement the Security Council mandate is maintained.

These primary tasks would provide the framework for which the RDMHQ manage and operate the mission affectively.

II.G. EU Governmental Policies and Declarations

During this same time, separate efforts were being discussed by European Community for the development of a EU Battle Group and NATO was developing the NATO Rapid Reaction Force. Following World War II, the nations of Europe started contemplating the establishment of European Economic Union which initially concentrated primarily on civilian issues and allowing the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO to deal with European Defense and Security. With the end of the cold war, European took more of an interest in its own defense and security policy along with the establishment of decision-making mechanisms to deal with these policies and the establishment of a European Union (EU). From 1991-2000 the European Community held numerous summits/meetings and created four key treaties (Maastricht Treaty-1992, Treaty of Amsterdam-1997, St. Malo Declaration-1998, Treaty of Nice-2000) to establish a common ground, cohesive framework and institutions for an effective defense and security policy. These are all reflected in the below timeline.

The creation of each additional treaty strengthened the policies and procedures of the European Defense Policy towards collective defense as well as means to respond to international crisis with resolve and determination. It also established the capacity for the EU to react with autonomous action with military force and lead to the creation of various military capabilities (EU Battle Groups, EURFOR, etc.) as a rapid reaction force to be utilized for humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking operations as well as EU defensive measures.

41 Ibid., p. 4. See Also Langille, Peter, “Renewing Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Options to Enhance Rapid Deployment and Initiate A UN Standing Emergency Capability, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development., p. 16.
42 Major-General Frank Van Kappen, Military Advisor to the Secretary-General, “Presentation on the Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMHQ)”, Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 24 October 1996. p. 4-5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Line</th>
<th>Treaty/Summit</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Creation of EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Treaty of Amsterdam</td>
<td>1. Petersberg Tasks incorporated into treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>St. Malo Declaration</td>
<td>1. EU needs to have autonomous action capability with military force to respond to international crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Helsinki Summit</td>
<td>1. EU leaders produce “Headline Goals”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1991, the European Community held a summit in Maastricht, where European leaders decided to create the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) out of the European foreign policy coordination. It was also decided by these leaders that the WEU become more of an integral part in the development of the EU and its role would be to implement EU decisions into actions that would have defense implications. 43 The ultimate result of this summit was the adoption of the Treaty of Europe Union (also referred to as the Maastricht Treaty) and creation of the European Union and its institutional structures established. WEU member stated in the declaration in Maastricht on 10 December 1991, to expand the WEU as a defense component of the European Union to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. WEU member states would examine and define the appropriate missions for the military units and the approved missions would be in compliance and in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty. 44 The majority of the European Multinational Forces would supplement those already within the NATO framework but would possess political and operational autonomy due the WEU association. The Foreign and Defense Ministers of the WEU adopted a declaration on 19 June 1992, in Petersberg, Germany. The declaration defined the principles and tasks units could be assigned and became known as the “Petersberg Task” and Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU). The WEU played an important part in the development of European multinational forces (EUROCORP, EUROMARFOR, and EUROFOR) which were categorized as “forces answerable to WEU” (FAWEU). 45 There were a total of 8 multinational formations recognized as FAWEUs. These military units, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for:

- humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- peacekeeping tasks;
- tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping” 46

Six years later in Amsterdam, European leaders discussed and supported the concept of the EU developing closer ties with the WEU with the ultimate goal of integrating it into the EU with the European Council.

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45 Ibid., p.4
approval. The European leaders also provided the EU with access to operational capabilities and the Petersburg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping task, crisis management and peacemaking) were incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam.

European leaders continued to strengthen the development of the European Union defense capabilities. In June 1999 European Council meeting in Cologne, Germany, EU heads of state and government outlined the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This development aimed at giving the European Union (EU) the necessary means to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defense, and the ability to make decisions on the conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), with emphasis on the Petersburg tasks. To assist in this effort the WEU Council decided to transfer its crisis management functions to include the FAWEU to the European Union from 1999-2000. This transfer of FAWEU capabilities to the European Union became known as “Euro forces” and contributed to the EU military capabilities. 47

That same year, the European Council meet in Helsinki where it was decided to establish a European Rapid Reaction Force which would have the ability rapidly deploy and be able to execute the full range of Petersburg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty. The goal was to have a force established and operational by 2003. The forces to be utilized needed to be self-sustaining with sufficient logistical and combat support services and appropriate command and control (C2), intelligence capabilities to conduct mission effectively. These forces had to be able to deploy at full readiness within 60 days of notification as well be able to provide a smaller robust rapid response element available and in deployable status with short notice capability. In addition, they would have to be able to sustain a deployment for at least one year in duration which would raise the reserve requirement to have an additional pool of deployable units at a lower level of readiness available to provide replacements for the initial forces. These operational requirements were specifically discussed within the Helsinki Headline Goal Catalogue as part of the ESDP and when member states voluntarily pledged numbers at the Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels in 2000. As a result, a pool of more than 100,000 personnel, 400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels were constituted for this effort.

The EU declared the ESDP operational at the European Council meeting in Laeken, Belgium from 14-15 December 2001 by that stating that the EU was capable of conducting some crisis-management operations with known shortfalls. This position was confirmed in May 2003 by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), which declared that "the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersburg tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls" in the military sphere.48 The EU's next development phase was the creation of the EU Battle Groups of which were endorsed within the Headline Goal 2010. Refer to Section VI-European Union Battle Group for detailed information.

The Headline Goal 2010 builds upon the original Helsinki Headline Goal and repeats the EU's commitment to respond to the full range of Petersburg operations with rapid and decisive action. The overarching element of the Headline Goal was the creation of rapidly deployable Battle Groups, each consisting of 1500 troops and deployable to international hotspots and to be operational by 2007. The Battle Group would be organized around a combined-arms, battalion sized force and reinforces with combat support elements. In November 2004, 20 EU member states made an initial commitment to establish 13 Battle Groups. The Battle Groups would be formed as follows:

- France,
- Italy,
- Spain,

- United Kingdom,
- France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and potentially Spain,
- France and Belgium,
- Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland,
- Germany, Austria, and the Czech Republic,
- Italy, Hungary, and Slovenia,
- Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal,
- Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Latvia, and Lithuania,
- Sweden, Finland, and Norway (as non-EU state),
- United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

The Headline Goal 2010 also called upon the EU to coordinate strategic lift equipment by 2005, and to be fully air, land sea strategic capable by 2010. The EUs aim was to improve its ability to deploy forces with emphasis on strategic capabilities and its ability to coordinate all strategic lift assets, mechanisms and initiatives as required. According to the timeframe adopted by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in May 2005, these Battle Groups would be ready to respond to a UN request anywhere in the world within 10 days after the decision of the EU to launch an operation, and would be able to secure an area for up to four months. These Battle Groups would be developed in coordination with the NATO Rapid Response Force (NRF) in a mutually reinforcing way. After reaching full operability in 2007, the EU intended to be able to launch and control two Battle Group-sized operations in a 6,000 kilometer sphere (from Brussels) of operations almost simultaneously.

During this same time period, twenty five (25) EU defense ministers in September 2004, and the representatives of France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and the Netherlands launched an initiative to create a European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), to be placed at the disposal of the EU. The initiative was endorsed by the GAERC in November 2004. The EGF was to become operational in 2005 and was to provide the EU with paramilitary capabilities in order to conduct the more demanding police missions in crisis management operations within the framework of the Petersberg tasks. The EGF would be capable of deploying rapidly (within 30 days) an interoperable and expeditionary police mission, with up to 800 staff, and may also be put at the disposal of the UN, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and NATO in the area of crisis management.

II.H. NATO Policies and Declarations

In the mid 1990s, NATO conducted various summits (Rome 1991, Brussels 1994, Madrid 1997) in order to adapt its policies and strategies in order to face new challenges and threats from around the world. As a result of these summits, NATO developed a new Strategic Concept which emphasized the special importance of Crisis Management by identifying Crisis Management as one of the five fundamental security tasks (security, consultation, crisis management, deterrence and defense, partnership) of the Alliance. In fact by 1999, the strategic concept had developed to the point that it declared the resolve and the determination of NATO to actively engage in Crisis Management efforts in a wider international spectrum, either in the lead or supporting role to include Crisis Response Operations. In this context NATO was offering support to support peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN or the responsibility of the OSCE, including by making

49 Ibid. n.pag.
50 Ibid., n.pag.
51 Ibid, n.pag.
52 Ibid., n.pag.
available Alliance resources and expertise. In 1999, NATO (Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and the EU (European Security Defense Initiative (ESDI) were simultaneously introduced to improve and transform the military capabilities within Europe. Given the complexity of the contemporary security environment, most policy makers consider harmonious NATO-EU relations as essential for effectively providing security in the post-Cold War world. Even with this being stated, several European governments proposed that the European security measure be developed within the framework of the EU. This subsequently, developed into the EU creating the European Security Defense Program (ESDP), which allowed it pursue their objective of establishing autonomous European military capacity independent of NATO. NATO was not one of competition and duplication but of complementarily. For example, while ESDP would enable the EU to take independent action in low and medium intensity conflicts, ESDP would not compromise NATO's capacity to undertake missions at the high end of the conflict spectrum.

II.H.1. **NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS)**

The ability for NATO to react to a crisis within the new framework meant that it also would have to change its capabilities and tools used to handle a crisis. It had to restructure its tools away from those utilized during the Cold war to means and methods that could respond to Crisis Response Operations.

The ability for NATO to react to a crisis within the new framework meant that it would have to change its capabilities and tools used to handle a crisis. It had to restructure its tools away from those utilized during the Cold war to have the ability to respond to either “a standalone force for Article 5 (collective defense) or non Article 5 crisis response operations in support of a wide range of tasks ranging from “preservation of territorial integrity, peace support operations, disaster relief, protection of critical infrastructure, security operations, etc. and Crisis Response Operations. As a result, NATO had to develop its NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS) comprising of four (4) major components (Preventive Options, Crisis Response Measures, Counter Surprise and Counter Aggression) as means to prepare and support Crisis management operations. These four components are described as follows:

- **Preventive Options** were designed to prevent the escalation of a crisis and consist of diplomatic, economic and military options that could be considered by senior NATO committees. These options were to be utilized to facilitate the decision making process during situations where time was of the essence to resolve the crisis.

- **Crisis Response Measures** could be detailed pre-identified actions, immediately available to be approved by the Council and implemented by the Nations and/or NATO Commands at all levels (strategic, operational or tactical levels) in order to enhance NATO's deterrent posture, improve Alliance preparedness, increase protection, and/or initiate actions. These include: Force Protection measures, force readiness measures, logistics, communications, public information etc.

- **Counter Surprise** would be defensive measures in response to an act of aggression that occurred with limited warning.

- **Counter Aggression** was the authorization and utilization of NATO forces in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty against states, non-state actors, or military forces that conducted an aggressive act or

55 Ibid., n. pag.
support aggression against a NATO member/territory or its forces. It was intended for use in correlation with approved plans and corresponding rules of engagement.

II.H.2. NATO Operational Planning Process (OPP)

In order to assist in developing operational plans, NATO has an Operational Planning Process (OPP) which can be categorized into two categories (Advanced Planning and Crisis Response Planning) to meet contingency situations. These two categories are specific in nature, with Advance planning aimed at developing plans for future tasks with emphasis on initiating and developing scenario-based plans for possible future contingencies. Crisis response planning consists of developing plans in response to developing and actual crisis currently being engaged. The military part of the response was essentially translated into an operation plan through the OPP in order to be executed by the assigned military forces. In addition, NATO established its Crisis Management Process that was comprised of five phases: Indications and Warning of a Potential or Actual Crisis, Assessment of the Developing Crisis Situation, Development of Response Options, Planning and Execution of North Atlantic Council (NAC) Decisions and Return to Stability to assist in contingency operations.56

In 2002, during the Prague Summit, NATO had to scale back on some of the ambitions for the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) and develop a more modest and scaled down version of the DCI. The result was the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) being presented and agreed upon by the members. Another important step was taken towards a formalized relationship between the two NATO and EU institutions in December 2002 with the adoption of the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP. The consensus by both institutions was that “unnecessary duplications” should be avoided and a general agreement that the EU should be able to use NATO assets and capabilities for EU peace support operations. The arrangements were called Berlin Plus, in reference to the 1996 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Berlin, where the ministers agreed to create the European Security and Defense Identity and to make NATO assets available to the Western European Union (WEU). The Berlin Plus arrangements establish the basic principles for collaboration between the EU and NATO in the event that the EU seeks NATO planning support and relevant assets and capabilities for carrying out military operations. 57 The four major components of the arrangements were:

- Assured EU access to NATO operational planning;
- Presumption of availability to the EU of NATO capabilities and common assets;
- Availability of NATO European command options for EU-led crisis management operations, including the position of NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (DSACEUR);
- Adaptation of the NATO defense planning system to facilitate the availability of forces for EU operations.

The arrangements also pointed to the need for the EU to have the ability and means to possess an autonomous military capability to launch an independent EU led military operation without NATO assistance. It was during this summit, that NATO ministers presented the initial proposal for the creation a NATO Response Force. Refer to Section VII. NATO Response Forces (NRF) for details on the development and structure of NRF.

The concept for its formation was approved by NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels in June 2003. The NRF mission was to provide a visible means of NATO solidarity and a commitment to deterrence and collective defense in support of a wide range of tasks ranging from “preservation of territorial integrity, peace support operations, disaster relief, and protection of critical infrastructure and security operations. In 2004, during an

56 Ibid., n. pag.
57 Ibid, n. pag.
informal meeting of NATO Defense ministers in Romania, the operational capabilities of the NRF were discussed and it was stated that the NRF would be operational by 2006.\textsuperscript{58}

The initiatives by the EU and NATO showed their intent and efforts to being one step closer to the developing its own rapid deployment military capability both operational and in support of the Petersburg tasks and crisis operations. It also showed that the EU and NATO actions were another milestone in the gradual elimination of the SHIRBRIG and its own military capabilities and necessity.

III. SHIRBRIG

This section provides a comprehensive overview of the structure, mission, and capabilities of the SHIRBRIG. In addition, this section will also review military operations SHIRBRIG was actively involved within and lessons learned from the involvement in support of United Nations operations.

III.A. SHIRBRIG Background

As mentioned in a previous section of this paper there were studies conducted by Canada and the Netherlands on the concept of the rapid deployment forces. While a working group was established by Denmark to explore the option of the rapid deployment force within the framework of UNSAS. In addition to these studies, the UN

\footnote{\textsuperscript{58}Ibid., p. 3-6}
Secretary General statement in “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” recommended that the UN should consider the idea of a rapid deployment force, consisting of units from a number of member states, trained to the same standard, using the same operating procedures and inter-operable equipment, and taking part in combined exercises at regular intervals.” 59 This statement worked well in paving the path for the establishment of a rapid deployment force. As a result, in December 1996, seven countries (Austria, Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden) signed a letter of intent of co-operation for the establishment of the framework of the SHIRBIRG.

These initial countries signed four key documents in order for the SHIRBRIG to come into existence:

A. Letter of intent for SHIRBRIG
B. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU/SC) for the steering committee
C. Memorandum of Understanding for the contribution of units to the SHIRBRIG Force Pool (MOU/SB)
D. Memorandum of Understanding for the Permanent Planning Element (MOU/PLANELM) 60

The framework consisted of four principal elements: the Steering Committee, the Planning Element, the Brigade Pool of multi-national units, and a contact group. These elements will be discussed and explained in the structure and membership section below.

III.B. **SHIRBRIG Purpose and Mission**

The overall objective and basis for the co-operation, was to provide the United Nations with a well equipped, trained and cohesive multinational force available to rapidly deploy at the request of the Security Council. The SHIRBRIG instituted a mandate that provided the United Nations with a non-standing multinational brigade at high readiness base on the UNSAS. The Brigade would be available for peacekeeping operations mandated under the UN Charter, Chapter VI and including humanitarian tasks. The concept of the SHIRBRIG can be summarized as follows:

- Member states had the ability to decide on case-by-case basis whether or not they would participate in any given mission.
- National decision making processes (Sovereignty) would not be affected by membership in SHIRBRIG.
- Mission would be terminated or replaced by non-SHIRBRIG forces after 6 months.
- Brigade reaction time would be 15-30 days following member states making forces available for deployment
- Availability of forces would be based on brigade pool of resources that have capability to carry out peace support operations
- Brigade Pool would have redundancies of capabilities and ability to be self-sufficient for 60 days. 61

The SHIRBRIGs capabilities and mandate provides the United Nations with a well prepared, rapid deployable capability available for UN Security Council approved peacekeeping operations.

III.C. **Membership and Organizational Structure**

By June 2007, 16 nations (Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden) had signed at least one of the

60 Ibid., n.pag.
61 Ibid., n. pag.
SHIRBRIG documents, while 8 more nations (Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Jordan, Latvia and Senegal) participating as observers to the organization as reflected in Table 1- SHIRBRIG Membership.

### SHIRBRIG Membership

#### Four Key Documents
- LOI - Letter of Intent
- MOU/SC - Memorandum of Understanding of Steering Committee
- MOU/SB - Memorandum of Understanding on SHIRBRIG (Troop Commitments)
- MOU/PE - Memorandum of Understanding on Planning Element (PLANELM)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Membership Status</th>
<th>LOI</th>
<th>MOU/SC</th>
<th>MOU/SB</th>
<th>MOU/PE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Full Member (Founding)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Full Member (Founding)</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>Full Member</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Full Member (Founding)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Members without Officers on the Planning Element
- Finland: Member (Incl. Troop Pledge) | X | X | X | N
- Lithuania: Member (Incl. Troop Pledge) | X | X | X | N
- Slovenia: Member (Incl. Troop Pledge) | X | X | X | N

#### Steering Committee Member Only
- Ireland: Steering Committee | X | X | N | N

#### Letter of Intent Only
- Portugal: Letter of Intent Signatory | X | N | N | N

#### Observer Status
- Chile: Observer | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A
- Croatia: Observer | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A
- Czech Rep: Observer | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A
- Egypt: Observer | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A
- Jordan: Observer | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A
- Latvia: Observer | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A
- Senegal: Observer | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1- SHIRBRIG Membership</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The organizational framework consisted of four primary elements: the Steering Committee, the Planning Element, the Brigade Pool of multi-national units, and a contact group. In the following sections, each of the primary elements are described and major purpose given.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

#### III.C.1. Steering Committee

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62 Ibid., n.pag.
The Steering Committee (SC) was a political-military entity and the executive decision-making body of the SHIRBRIG. It provides the overall strategic direction and supervision of SHIRBRIG in regards to policymaking and guiding principles and practices for issues related to force generation. The Steering Committee was composed of Defense and Foreign Affairs representatives of fully participating nations who have signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the Steering Committee (MOU/SC). The Committee would be chaired by the President which was a rotational position among the MOU/SC signatories annually and convenes on an average of three times a year. Policies and decisions were based on consensus vote of the membership. 63

III.C.2. Planning Elements

The Planning Element (PLANELM) serves as the nucleus of the Brigade Headquarters and was responsible for the planning the common Standing operation procedures (SOPs) and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) during non/pre-deployment periods. Overall, the PLANELM was responsible for ensuring the coordination and synchronization of the multinational units with the goal of establishing and facilitating common standards within the Brigade. 64

The Permanent Planning Element was located in Hovelse Barracks, north of Copenhagen, Denmark. It comprised of the Commander and the permanent staff of officers from the ten (10) member countries that have signed all the SHIRBRIG documents and make up the permanent multinational core of the Brigade. The core of the primary staff consists of the SHIRBRIG Commander, Chief of Staff and 15 senior staff officers positioned within the various staff sections: G-1 (Administrative), G-2 (Military Information), G-3 (Operations), G-4 (Logistics), G-5 (Civil-Military Cooperation, G-6 (Communications) that make up the organization.65 The officers would be assigned to these positions for a period of 2-3 years and rotations were staggered so as to maintain a high degree of continuity within the PLANELM. The Commander and the Chief of Staff positions rotate by nation every two years. In addition to the above mentioned capabilities the PLANELM carry out country studies, operational preparation, as well mission planning and analyzing logistical capability and challenges. It was also responsible for organizing training events that would improve the coordination and cooperation among the military units, thereby promoting their rapid deployment capabilities during pre-deployment operations.

During deployment operations, the PLANELM served as the primary nucleus of the SHIRBRIG HQ staff were augmented by pre-assigned non-permanent staff officers and non-commission officers (NCOs) consisting of 132 personnel from all participating nations. These non-permanent staff members would remain in their own country but participate in annual training with the Planning Elements permanent staff as means to maintain proficient skill set for deployment contingencies.66

The PLANELM and the HQ were the real strength and nucleus of the SHIRBRIG organization. It was an organization that was well structured, cohesive and team oriented based on common processes and procedures. It had a flexible organization that had had an excellent Command and Control nucleus very capable of peace support operations. In addition, the planning element was involved in adding capacity-building process to other standby brigades who utilize the SHIRBRIG as the model for building their own standby brigades. This will be discussed in the lessons learned section of this paper.

66 Ibid. n.pag.
III.C.3. Brigade Pool

The Brigade Pool was comprised of military units with various types of capabilities that have been selected by the member nations that had signed the Memorandum of Understanding on SHIRBRIG (MOU/SB). The Brigade Pool consisted of 4000-5000 personnel which exceeded the force requirements. This force requirement would maintain an overlapping capability in case one or more of the member nations decided not to provide troops for a particular mission. A total of 13 nations (Austria, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Finland, Lithuania, and Slovenia) provided or earmarked units to the Brigade Pool and many of the member nations provided more than one type of unit to the pool of forces. These units would remain under national command and control and maintain a high level of training and equipment when not deployed on a SHIRBRIG mission. In addition, unit commanders would be required to attend various planning conferences and training exercises organized by the SHIRBRIG Planning Element. This would ensure units maintained Brigade cohesion and the maintaining of current UN peacekeeping procedures, principles, and training capabilities and standards.67

The Brigade structure could be tailored for specific missions and consist of up to 5000 personnel if fully deployed and utilized. When fully deployed, the Brigade would comprise of the following types of units: Headquarter, communications, infantry, reconnaissance, medical, engineering, logistical, aviation (helicopters) military police. Even though the full deployment of the Brigade in its entirety was the ultimate goal, forces may have to be tailored to meet the specific requirements of a mission.68 The SHIRBRIG forces could be used in a varied of configurations and mission capabilities; to include:

- A complete Brigade contingency
- A tailored force smaller than a Brigade
- Observer or monitoring mission
- SHIRBRIG HQ to serve as the nucleus of a UN Force Level Headquarters
- Planning Element could be used to assist UN HQ with startup of new PKO mission 69

In fact, SHIRBRIG had also developed a rapidly deployable “SHIRBRIG Headquarters Package” which consisted of the Planning Element, Defense and Security Company, Headquarters Company, staff officers and the SHIRBRIG commander as a means to reflect the tailored capability.

III.C.4. Contact Group

The Contact Group consisted of the ambassadors and military advisors of the SHIRBRIG member nations Permanent Missions to the United Nations. The group was based in New York, USA and would be chaired by the Ambassador of the member nation holding the Steering Committee Presidency. The mission and goal of the Contact Group was to be the liaison and the means providing coordinating efforts between the SHIRBRIG and UN organizations, in particular DPKO. 70

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IV. SHIRBRIG Military Operations and Lessons Learned

The following section provides an overview of SHIRBRIGs participation in activities and missions the organization was involved in from its operational declaration in 2000 thru 2009. The operations that SHIRBRIG was involved in and conducted will show the attempt to validate the original concept of deploying large rapid deployment forces to the concept of provided a team of tailored personnel (particularly form the Planning Element) to form the nucleus of a UN Force HQ. Furthermore, it will also show the development of SHIRBRIG personnel being utilized in the planning element training development and assistance in the development and establishment of Rapid Deployment Brigades in Africa.


In May 1998, fighting erupted between the countries of Eritrea and Ethiopia due to a border dispute. The Secretary-General immediately contacted the leaders of both countries, and offered assistance to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner. Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria), Special Envoy in Africa was requested by the Secretary-General to assist in mediation efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The peace agreement mediated by the OAU envisaged a United Nations Force to monitor and secure the disputed territory between both parties. This kept the peace for a few years but in May 2000, fighting resumed between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The situation in the region became even more critical when it was estimated that over 370,000 Eritreans and approximately 350,000 Ethiopians were being affected by the war. The humanitarian situation in parts of Ethiopia was exacerbated by the severe drought, which led to the emergence of a major food crisis with almost 8 million people being affected. As a result, proximity talks between Ethiopia and Eritrea were initiated and conducted by Chairman of OAU (President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria). These talks culminated in the signing of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia by the Foreign Ministers of both countries on 18 June 2000. The agreement committed the parties to an immediate cessation of hostilities and reaffirmed their acceptance of the OAU Framework Agreement and its Modalities. The agreement, also called upon the parties to request United Nations assistance, in cooperation with OAU, to establish a peacekeeping operation to assist in the implementation of the agreement.

On 30 June 2000, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council his intention to dispatch liaison officers and military observers to Eritrea and Ethiopia. It was envisaged that up to a total of 100 United Nations military observers would gradually be deployed to each country over a two month period pending the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The Security Council, the very next day, 31 June 2000, approved resolution 1312, establishing UNMEE. The mission would consist of up to 100 military observers and the necessary civilian support staff in anticipation of a peacekeeping operation subject to future authorization. The mandate of the Mission's would be to undertake the following tasks: “establish and maintain liaison with the parties; visit the parties' military headquarters and other units in all areas of operation of the mission deemed necessary by the Secretary-General; establish and put into operation the mechanism for verifying the cessation of hostilities; prepare for the establishment of the Military Coordination Commission provided for in the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement; and assist in planning for a future peacekeeping operation.”

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72 Ibid. n.pag.
73 Ibid., n.pag.
The UN Secretary-General was asked to continue planning and taking administrative measures in the development of a peacekeeping mission. The DPKO, indicated its interest in utilizing SHIRBRIG for the mission, and members of the SHIRBRIG Planning Element conducted a fact finding mission to assess the situation. By 9 August 2000, the Secretary General’s report to the Security Council outlined and recommended a total of 4,200 military personnel, including 220 military observers, three infantry battalions and support units, to monitor the ceasefire and border delineation between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Security Council accepted the Secretary-General’s report and approved resolution 1320 on 15 September 2000 which authorized the framework and the deployment of troops within UNMEE.74

Following the approval of resolution 1320, SHIRBRIG agreed to the formal DPKO request and members from the Planning element joined the staff in Asmara, Eritrea to assist in establishing the UN Force Headquarters. In addition, members of the Canadian-Dutch infantry Battalion and Danish HQ Company were also merged into the UN/HQ structure with the UN appointing Dutch Brigadier-General Patrick Cammaert the UNMEE Force Commander who was also the SHIRBRIG Commander at the time. The force composition highlighted the strong interest of three of the founding members (Canada, Netherlands, Denmark) of SHIRBRIG in making the first UN involved operation a successful test case.75

The SHIRBRIG component of UNMEE deployed for a six month period and withdrew in May 2001, adhering to the original stipulation within its own mandate of only deploying for six months period of time.

IV.A.1. **UNMEE Lessons Learned:**

In April 2002, a seminar in New York was convened by the International Peace Academy that discussed the first use of the SHIRBRIG to establish the UNMEE. Over 100 participants ranging from diplomats, expert practitioners, senior UN staff, academics and representatives of non-governmental organizations, discussed the operational lessons of this mission. Overall the first mission for SHIRBRIG was considered a success for the organization by proving that in conceptualization it was achievable and during its first utilization and that the concept withstood the acid test of reality. Even though it was a success there were problems ranging from preparation, deployment, staff training inadequacies, logistical support limitations. Many of the lessons learned could be applicable to virtually all peace operations past and present. These include the need for agreed standing operating procedures (SOPs), clear policy on the size and composition of national reconnaissance parties, a policy for National Support elements (NSEs), staff orientation and training, policies on staff accommodations, and the need for secure communications and current maps of the mission area.76 The prominent lessons learned could be divided into three major areas (National Decision Making, Staff training, logistics and planning) and are discussed as follows:

**IV.A.1.a. National Decision Making Effects on SHIRBRIG Doctrine**

This was the first commitment of SHIRBRIG and its forces and there was a degree of caution on the part of national governments as well as hesitation due to trouble UN missions in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia to commit troop assets. There was also hesitation on the part of national governments to commit forces due to the

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74 Ibid., n.pag.
prospect that control of SHIRBRIG units would shift to United Nations control as soon as they became part of UNMEE. These delays resulted in other affects on the operation and timelines the Security Council had in place. The Security Council resolution had the UNMEE deployment mandated for 15 September 2000 but lead elements of SHIRBRIG did not arrive into area of operation unit 16 November 2000. In fact, it took double the time envisaged by SHIRBRIG doctrine (within 30 days of national approval) to deploy into theater but not all HQ staff were made available by the member states and in fact only 55 of the possible 85 were deployed and three governments committed troops.\footnote{Ibid. p. 2.} Accept from the contributions of Canada, Denmark and the Netherlands, SHIRBRIG faced reluctance of its participating members who had originally agreed to pledge to the SHIRBRIG brigade force pool. It should be noted that most SHIRBRIG members provided troops to UNMEE directly through UNSAS.

The concept of SHIRBRIG and rapid deployment would be judged on its ability to deploy effectively in a timely manner following the adoption of a Security Council mandate. The key to success would be to arrange for close and maintained coordination between National, SHIRBRIG and UN agencies.

Member state representatives had recommended that an increased coordinated effort between the UN agencies, SHIRBRIG staffs and DPKO, troop contributing nations for future operations. In addition, regularly scheduled briefings of national political authorities and adequate force preparation through joint SHIRBRIG training and readiness planning were emphasized and recommended as well.\footnote{Koops, Joachim. (2008) “Ten Years of SHIRBRIG-Lessons Learned, Development Prospects and Strategic Opportunities for Germany”. Global Public Policy Institute, 2008. 10 September 12. p. 18.}

**IV.A.1.b. Staff Training**

The training afforded to SHIRBRIG personnel was based and executed on a common established standard that ensured a high level of interoperability amongst SHIRBRIG elements. This training did not alleviate the severe gap between SHIRBRIG units and those from non-SHIRBRIG providers. It was mentioned that not all of the staff members from non-SHIRBRIG countries were trained to work efficiently together nor were they proficient in the mission language, computer literacy and training for specific positions within the UNMEE operation.\footnote{International Peace Institute, Policy Paper-“ SHIRBRIG Deployment in UNMEE: Lessons Learned” (2002) Retrieved 28 February 2013. http://www.ipacademy.org/publications/policy-papers., p. 2.}

A particular concern that developed was the handling of the handover from SHIRBRIG to a more traditional UN force. While the SHIRBRIG had established standing operating procedures (SOPs) and the strong political and logistics support from its member States, the successor UN force, drawn from the more heterogeneous UN membership, had neither. Matters were not helped by the lack of UN mission equipment to replace SHIRBRIG assets such as computers and communications equipment and redeployed with departing staff. There was also a lack of left seat/right seat training and hand over procedures conducted between the outgoing SHIRBRIG personnel and the inbound UN forces.\footnote{Ibid., p. 2.}

**IV.A.1.c. Logistics and Planning**

Logistical support and Administrative arrangements had proved too rigid and not tailored for the mission and common elements such as transportation and movement control lacked having a common set of SOPs to
operative affectively. SHIRBRIG had a significant advantage in having National Support Elements (NSEs) that would deploy with force package over the replacement force both financially and logistically. The contributing nation states of the replacement forces could not match the scale of support and as a result additional problems arose. These logistics problems in UNMEE were exacerbated by the misunderstanding of SHIRBRIGs mission conditions and the withdrawal of its own equipment and the need transfer control after 6 months due to SHIRBRIGs limitations on deployment timeframes. It also played a factor in the transfer from a relatively cohesive entity (SHIRBRIG) to a less-cohesive set of new players. As a result, it was recommended that SHIRBRIG member states consider a more robust NSE as means to get a mission operational more expediently. This would also allow for additional flexibility in the event of unexpected problems or a significant shift in the operational situation or concept. A further suggestion was that the UN should establish a set of standards and guidelines regarding National Support Elements (NSE) to assist all member nations.81

Another key recommendation from the seminar was that SHIRBRIGs Planning Element should be allowed to have direct involvement with UN strategic planning teams. This was seen as essential, in view of the critical importance of sequencing SHIRBRIG deployment in conjunction with other deploying elements that would follow its deployment. It was also recognized that “SHIRBRIG needs to work more closely not only with the UN and observers on the ground, but with the whole civilian community engaged in the peace operation and related peace-building and development efforts” to more affective in the mission and population it was trying to assist. 82 It was also acknowledged that SHIRBRIG’s standard 6-month commitment could, in close consultation and cooperation with UN DPKO and troop contributing countries, be made more flexible.

IV.B. United Nations Mission in Cote d’ Ivoire (UNOCI), February - March 2003

In February 2003, the DPKO made a formal request to SHIRBRIG to assist the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) by providing a planning element to assist the organization in preparation of its mission in Cote d’Ivoire. The current Military Advisor to the DPKO, Dutch Brigadier-General Patrick Cammaert initiated the utilization of SHIRBRIG for this mission. Within three weeks of formal notification, a SHIRBRIG planning team was in Abuja to assist ECOWAS headquarters. SHIRBRIG officers completed their mission within ten days and provided detailed planning documents to ECOWAS. 83

IV.B.1. UNOCI Lessons Learned:

The SHIRBRIG Planning Element assigned to assist ECOWAS was given a direct opportunity and ability to gain experience on developing the requirements and capabilities associated with mission planning. It also served as an important platform in developing key contacts within the ECOWAS organization and providing a positive impression, experience and foundation for an organizational relationship between the two entities. This first impression would yield an important foundation again with ECOWAS six month later with their working relationship in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and coordinated efforts for a successful mission.

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82 Ibid., p. 3.
In August 2003, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a peacekeeping force (ECOMIL) to Liberia to assist in quelling the country’s civil war. At the same time, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1493 on 1 August 2003 which authorized the establishment of a multinational force in Liberia. On 18 August 2003, the Liberian parties signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra which had both parties requesting the United Nations deploy a military force to Liberia. The agreement requested a force under Chapter VII of the UN charter to support the National Transitional Government of Liberia and assist in the implementation of the Agreement. One month later, on 19 September 2003, the Security Council adopted resolution 1509, establishing UNMIL. The mission was designed as a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation, with a mandate ranging from observation and monitoring of the ceasefire and support for the peace process, to Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) of former combatants and the restructuring of the police force of Liberia. The resolution called for a force of 15,000 troops, including military observers and staff officers, and up to 1,115 civilian police officers, and the mission’s civilian staffing table had 607 international posts.

With the adoption of the resolution, the United Nations DPKO requested SHIRBRIG assistance in establishing and developing the core of an interim headquarters in Monrovia, Liberia for UNMIL. Within three weeks of notification and request for assistance, SHIRBRIG deployed 17 officers and seven support personnel to assist ECOWAS non-standing military force, ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in setting up of the Headquarters.

The deployment for the SHIRBRIG personnel lasted six weeks and ended with the successful establishment and execution of a functioning interim headquarters. This mission expanded the SHIRBRIG capabilities by giving it the ability to set-up rapidly an Interim Force Headquarters giving incoming peacekeeping troops an operational initial headquarters for their mission. This mission also strengthened the collaboration efforts with ECOWAS troops in the field and formed the basis for a more structured and long-term cooperation between SHIRBRIG and what would later be known as ECOBRIG.

**IV.C.1 UNMIL Lessons Learned:**

Many of the lessons learned during this operation were similar in nature to the issues learned during SHIRBRIG participation in UNMEE, November 2000 - June 2001. These include the need for additional time during the transition phase with a lack of left seat/right seat training and hand over procedures conducted between the outgoing SHIRBRIG personnel and the inbound UN forces. In addition, the incoming forces needed a better understanding and knowledge of the people, culture and terrain of the country prior to deployment. As with other missions, issues also arose in regards to logistics with several misunderstandings between the DPKO and SHIRBRIG being noted. Overall the SHIRBRIG involvement in UNMIL was considered a success.

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85 Ibid., n.pag.
87 Ibid. p.6.

For more than two decades (1983-2003), the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the main rebel movement in the south, fought over resources, power, the role of religion in the state, and self-determination. During this time, there were multiple attempts by neighboring countries, concerned donors, other States and the parties themselves to bring peace to the region. One such effort, begun in 1993, under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) started a regional peace initiative as attempt to end the conflict. It was not until 2002, when the Sudan peace process under the auspices of IGAD made significant progress and the United Nations Secretary-General visited the country from 10-12 July 2002 as a means of providing a forward motion to peace efforts. 89

On 20 July 2002, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) the major parties of the conflict signed the Machakos Protocol. This protocol established an agreement within a broad framework, setting forth the principles of governance, the transitional process and the structures of government, as well as on the right to self-determination for the people of South Sudan, and on state and religion. They agreed to continue talks on the outstanding issues of power sharing, wealth sharing, human rights and a ceasefire to end hostilities.90

The IGAD continued to assist with negotiations between the parties and to build upon the momentum and continued process which lead to the signing of the Agreement on Wealth Sharing on 7 January 2004 and the Protocol on Power Sharing on 26 May 2004. As a result of these efforts and the recommendation of the Secretary-General, the Security Council adopted resolution 1547 on 11 June 2004 which established the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS).91

This special political mission was mandated to facilitate contacts with the parties concerned and to prepare for the introduction of an envisaged UN peace support operation. The Secretary-General appointed Jan Pronk as his Special Representative for the Sudan and head of UNAMIS, who led UN peacemaking support to the IGAD-mediated talks on the North-South conflict, as well as to the African Union-mediated talks on the conflict in Darfur, a region in the western part of the Sudan. 92

At the request of the United Nations and in support of Security Council Resolution 1547, SHIRBRIG participated in this special political mission by deploying 17 members to Sudan from July 2004 to February 2005. The SHIRBRIG delegation was part of a larger 27 member multidisciplinary team who was responsible for developing and refining operational plans and assisting in preparing military and civilian personnel for their

90 Ibid.n.pag.
envisaged UNMIS mission. The lessons learned and the mission should be seen in the context of the following mission.

IV.E. United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), April - December 2005

The above mentioned UN Mission (UNAMIS) was the precursor to United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) where SHIRBRIG had been requested by the DPKO to assist in the planning of a deployment of a UN mission since 2004.

In 2005, events took place that marked the turning point for Sudan, with the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005, in Nairobi, Kenya. The CPA covered issues remaining a point of contention following the Machakos Protocol but were negotiated to both parties satisfaction in this agreement. Agreements were reached on security arrangements, power-sharing in the capital of Khartoum, some autonomy for the south, and more equitable distribution of economic resources, including oil. The unity of the country was also a priority and both sides agreed to a six and a half year interim period during which interim institutions would govern the country and international monitoring system would be put into place. 93

The Secretary General in his report to the Security Council on 31 January 2005 recommended the deployment of a multinational peace support operation. This multidimensional operation would consist of up to 10,000 military personnel to include 700 police officers and a civilian component. The UN Mission in the Sudan would be headed by his Special Representative and would include components focusing on the following four broad areas of engagement: good offices and political support for the peace process; security; governance; humanitarian and development assistance.94

On 24 March 2005, the Security Council adopted resolution 1590 which established the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). The mandate and tasks of the mission were to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), to assist in the facilitation and coordination of the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons and promote human rights in Sudan. In order to carry this mission out the Security Council decided that UNMIS would consist of consist of up to 10,000 military personnel to include 715 police officers and a civilian component. Following this Security Council authorization for the deployment of the mission, SHIRBRIG deployed as part of the mission from April to December 2005. 95

The organization was asked again to provide the nucleus of the Missions Force headquarters, as well provide for the Joint Military Coordination Office and the Integrated Support Services. In addition, a SHIRBRIG Headquarters and Security Unit were also deployed. Brigadier-General Mitchell the SHIRBRIG Commander at the time served as the UNMIS Deputy Force Commander and SHIRBRIG Chief of Staff Colonel Lund was appointed the UNMIS Chief of Staff. 96 With the added requirements, the mission was a more demanding and

93 Ibid., n.pag.
94 Ibid., n.pag.
95 Ibid., n.pag.
complex assignment for the SHIRBRIG with a new set of issues and problems arising as a result. Even so the mission was a success and its extensive contribution was recognized in the text of Security Council Resolution 1590. 97

IV.E.1. **UNMIS Lesson Learned:**

The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) proved to be challenging to SHIRBRIG in numerous ways. It was not included in the DPKOs early planning process, and was not utilized as coherent nucleus Force Headquarters. Instead the SHIRBRIG staff was split up and distributed piecemeal to fill vacant slots which severely limited the effectiveness of the organization. These two actions added to the steady build-up of frictions and misunderstanding between the two staffs. SHIRBRIG also learned that it needed to emphasize in a more precise manner the purpose and advantages of the nucleus headquarter concept. 98 In addition, SHIRBRIG encountered problems with the legal status of the military personnel who participated in the mission. The legal status was not clarified prior execution of the mission and created subsequent problems connected to leave, payments, immunities, etc. 99

V. SHIRBRIG African Capacity Building

During the course of its involvement in the missions in Africa, the SHIRBRIG planning team became involved and put its focus on the capacity-building in the region as well as becoming an active participant in the development of the African Standby Force (ASF).

Over the years, the need for a common African defense and security policy was heavily stressed by countries and various organizations such as the African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU). Both of organizations attempted to address the problems of intra-and inter-state conflicts and develop a common thread to deal with the common security threats that undermined the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent. In July 2002 at the Inaugural Summit of the AU was held in Durban, South Africa, at which the organization adopted the “Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council”. The Protocol allowed for the establishment of a military staff committee to assist the Peace and Security Council on all matters relating to military and security issues as well the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF would be utilized and deployed for peacekeeping missions and ability to intervene pursuant to the provisions of the AU Constitutive Act. The AU also envisaged that the ASF would be comprised of standby brigades in each the five regions of Africa. To support these efforts the AU adopted the “Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee” in May 2003 and contacted the SHIRBRIG to explore the possibilities of cooperation in the process of building of the ASF. The ASF structure would be divided into a total of five regions of Africa (East, West, South, Central and North), with the five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) - the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), serving as the ASF foundation.

V.A. Framework African Capabilities

The framework document called for the establishment of the ASF in two phases:

“Phase One (up thru 30 June 2005): The AU’s objective would be to establish a strategic level management capacity for the management of Scenarios 1-2 missions, while Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regions would complement the African Union (AU) by establishing regional standby forces up to a brigade size to achieve up to Scenario 4.

Phase Two (1 July 2005 - 30 June 2010): It was envisaged that, by the year 2010, the AU would have developed the capacity to manage complex peacekeeping operations, while the RECs/Regions would continue to develop the capacity to develop a mission Headquarters (HQs) for Scenario 4, involving AU/Regional peacekeeping forces. “

The African Chiefs of Defense and Security (ACDS) had established long-term deployment target goals of full ASF implementation by 2010. The goal was to have a brigade force (5000 troops) established within each of

Africa’s five regions supported by civilian police. The African Unions Peace and Security Council and Commission would establish command and control over the five ASB Brigades and civilian components to include communications and intelligence. The Sub-regional ASF leadership would establish C2, communications, intelligence capabilities and planning element over each of the five standby brigades. The ACDs established six scenarios for the ASF to be able to accomplish by 2010 and would coincide with UN timelines of operational capabilities.

The most challenging of the scenarios included: the ability of the AU to deploy a traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of a mandate; a multidimensional peacekeeping and preventative deployment within 30 days of a mandate; a multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation, including the possibility of enforcement, with the military component deploying in 30 days, complex peacekeeping operation within 90 days; deployment within 14 days of a robust military presence in situation of genocide.

At the 19th SHIRBRIG Steering Committee Meeting (23 - 24 June 2003), the Presidency summarized the AU plan to develop an African Standby Force and how SHIRBRIG could assist the AU with their undertaking. The Presidency contacted the AU following this meeting and maintained communications with the G8 and UN officials as a means to develop a solid implementation plan that could be approved by the UN Security Council. As a result of this meeting, representatives of AU and ECOWAS were invited to the SHIRBRIG 20th SCM, 20-23 October 2003. It was during this meeting that the SCM approved a surplus to the budget to support the development of the African Capabilities Building (ACB) with four support options:

1. Assistance and advice in process of the establishment of the EASBRIG
2. Amendments to the PLANEMLM
3. Participation in some SHIRBRIG training activities
4. Planning assistance and in General terms the willingness of SHIRBRIG to help as possible.

Following this meeting the SHIRBRIG presidency visited the AU and informed them of the results the visit and the potential assistance that could be provided.

In February 2004, the Intergovernmental Authority of Development (IGAD) of the African Union conducted a meeting in Jinja, Uganda on the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). It was at this meeting, in conjunction with the Eastern African Chiefs of Defense Staff (EACDS) that the SHIRBRIG was invited to send representatives which included PLANEMLM members to participate in ACB activities.

SHIRBRIG representations continued to provide expert contribution in assisting in drafting a roadmap for the development of the African Standby Forces from 13 - 17 April 2004. It was during this project development that that concept of the developing 5 SHIRBRIG type brigades was suggested. The PLANEMLM continued to provide planning assistance, input and advice to AU, ECOWAS, and EASBRIG to the South Africa’s Defense Institute for Strategic Studies as needed. The United Nations DPKO was supportive of SHIRBRIG role and encouraged it to continue in applying its expertise and experience to assisting the AU.

SHIRBRIG continued to engage with representatives by inviting representatives from the AU, ECOWAS, and Ghana to attend the upcoming SCM and inviting African officers to attend some of SHIRBRIG training.

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105 Ibid., p. 5.
activities including its Command Post Exercise (CPX). In addition, Canada and SHIRBRIG sponsored two nominees to undergo training with the PLANELM for three consecutive months.

Following the Presidency presentation at the 23rd SCM, it was decided to create a “Standing Working Group” within the SHIRBRIGs Steering Committee to address the question and issues of the ACB. The aim and goals of this working group “was to provide a comprehensive, tailor-made SHIRBRIG approach consistent over the longer term, effective in meeting the needs of the African peacekeeping community, and achievable within SHIRBRIG’s unique capabilities and available resources.”108 The membership consisted of interested representatives from the SHIRBRIG membership and convened its initial meeting in Copenhagen, 22 February 2005.

V.B. Regional Standby Brigades in Africa

By 2005, the Africa’s five regions were in the process of taking the necessary steps in setting up their regional brigades based on the Policy Frame work for the Establishment of the African Standby Force document. The five regions (Eastern Africa, Western Africa, Southern Africa, Central Africa, and Northern Africa) as reflected in Table 2 “Regional Standby Brigades in Africa” were at various stages of development. 109

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<th>East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG)</th>
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<th>Force Multinationale de l’Afrique Centrale (FOMAC)</th>
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### V.B.1. Eastern Africa – The East African Brigade (EASBRIG)

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was mandated to coordinate the efforts of establishing the Eastern African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). The Eastern African Chiefs of Defense Staff (EACDS) adopted the Policy and Legal Framework for the operational of EASBRIG in 16-17 July 2004 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This process led to the defense minister adopting funding, budget, and approving the location and staffing of the Planning Element (PLANELM) and the Brigade HQ. As a result, the EASBRIG has three major components with the Brigade HQ and logistical base located in Addis Ababa, the PLANELM established in Nairobi, Kenya.  

### V.B.2. Western Africa – The Economic Community of West African State Brigade (ECOBRIG)

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was mandated to coordinate the efforts of establishing the standby brigade for this region. The ECOWAS approved the Military vision and strategy, force structure, and the two approach depot concept and concept of development. In addition, the ECOBRIG was able to meet the requirements of having 5,000 troops on standby, C2 mechanism, and a planning element (PLANELM).

### V.B.3. Southern Africa – The Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG)

The Inter Defense and Security Sub-Committee (IDSC) took the initiative to meet the AU’s requirement to establish the ASF and Regional Standby Brigade by considering the base documents and establishing a ministerial defense subcommittee. The Ministerial Defense Sub-committee was mandated to establish a technical team to plan the establishment of the SADC brigade. The SADC was able to meet partially the requirement of having 5,000 troops on standby; a center of excellence and a planning element (PLANELM) have been established.

### V.B.4. Central Africa- The Central Africa Regional Standby Brigade (also known as FOMAC)

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was nominated as the primary organization responsible for establishing the regional standby brigade. The Defense Chiefs of Staff held six meetings from July 2003-December 2004 to discuss and adopt measures for the creation of a brigade element. It was during these meetings that three major items were adopted:

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111 Ibid., p.3.  
112 Ibid., p.3.
1. The structure of regional headquarters of ECCAS PLANELM
2. The structure and Table of Organization Equipment (TOE) for ECCAS Standby Brigade (including strength of the brigade of 2,177)
3. Action Plan for the establish of the ECCAS PLANELM and ECCAS Standby Brigade

The progress made by the ECCAS was based on French led peace and stability operations in Central Africa and who assisted in forming the Multinational Forces of Central Africa (FOMAC). The FOMAC functions as the sub-regional standby brigade and France sustains the organization with financial assistance and provides command and control.

V.B.5. Northern Africa – Northern Regional Standby Brigade (NASBRIG)

The Arab Maghreb Union was designated initially as the regional organization to assist in creating the northern regional brigade. The creation and establishment of the brigade was hampered by intra-regional differences for numerous years. Finally in May 2010, the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) Executive Secretary, Major-General Ahmed Abdallah Aoun, signed, on behalf of NARC, the Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the area of peace and security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, at the Headquarters of the African Union in Addis Ababa.

SHIRBRIG continued to assist the AU with development of the regional standby brigades as reflected in Table 3 – Regional Standby Brigades in Africa- Status and focused in collective training at the Force HQ and brigade levels since this was where the expertise of the SHIRBRIG was strongest. As a result, SHIRBRIG concentrated on the development of the PLANELM and the Brigades of EASBRIG and ECOBRIG.

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<td>Y</td>
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113 Ibid., p4.
The decision to focus on these two brigades were based on their actual development and feasibility out of the five proposed brigades. To break it down simply, the brigade in the north was for the most part non-existent. The Southern brigade was not willing to have SHIRBRIG involvement and the central brigade was predominately French speaking and supported by France. This left only the EASBRIG and the ECOBRIG as the only feasible options at the time and a pragmatic decision were taken to focus SHIRBRIGs support efforts on these two brigades. 116

V.B.6. African Capabilities Lessons Learned:

SHIRBRIG had to contend with African nations past historical experience of colonialism and reluctance of western influence. The organization was able to overcome this obstacle by emphasizing the fact that it had not other intention than supporting the AU without asking any type of benefit in return. As a result, many of the African nations viewed the organization has having no interest other than to improve African Security, permitting a very fluid and comfortable working relationship between the ASF and SHIRBRIG. 117

The experiences of cooperation and working together on frequent activities between SHIRBRIG, ECOWAS and EASBRIG built a network of relationships and friendships which were key in obtaining positive results within the ACB activities. At the time, SHIRBRIG was on the only standby and rapid reaction force serving the United Nations, the organization was in the right place at the right time when ACB activities were required because the ASF concept had to be developed. SHIRBRIG served as the a key role model for the ASF process and later established itself as a important point of contact and cooperation partner. It could also draw on valuable regional deployment experience when it came time to its ability to advise on operational capabilities and standard operation procedures of a Standby Rapid Reaction Force.

In 2008, during an 8 day event at the UN HQ in New York, the SHIRBRIG in conjunction with the East African Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) held briefings with UN staff members. The purpose of the briefings was to educate the UNHQ staff of the CIMIC start-up kits and to recommend the future use of the kits. Meetings were held with the representatives of the Standing Police Capacity, Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Section and UN Mine Action Service. Other meetings were set up with the African Union Mission.

One of the few negative experiences for SHIRBRIG involvement within the ASF was the slow reaction time by the Steering Committee to formulate a cohesive direction for ACB activities to be executed within the organization. The limited ACB activities that were executed were only possible due to the effort of a limited number of SHIRBRIG nations, most notably, Denmark.

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117 IBID., p. 31.
The other major difficulty for SHIRBRIG was the declining ACB budget program and lack of budget commitment by the majority of the SHIRBRIG membership. This was particularly true for the budgetary program years of 2008 and 2009 which were initially covered alone by Denmark with later assistance being provided by Ireland, Austria, Spain and Norway. SHIRBRIG promised considerable support to numerous projects in 2008/2009 but with no firm funding commitment from its member nations and no other options to finance its participation in these activities, the whole program was in jeopardy. 118

By this time, SHIRBRIG was losing its relevance and support of its membership and that of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Even Denmark’s support of assistance to SHIRBRIG, both financially and politically, started to disintegrate by 2008 as Denmark began to re-orient its priorities and focus. As the organization was dealing with its own crisis for support, and it diminishing support capabilities for ASF, it was also being replaced by to direct financial and political support from nations trying to assist ASF development.

118 IBID., p. 28.
VI. **European Union Battle Group (EU Battle Group)**

The EU Battle Group concept grew from the desire and need of the European Communities desire to have the ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis was an essential aspect of the European Security and Defense Policy and a key element of the EU’s military capabilities development and that of the 2010 Headline Goal. The Battle Group would allow the EU to have the capacity to undertake rapid response operations autonomously from NATO but its capacity was developed to fully to complement and reinforce NATO and its initiatives to include the NATO Response Force if necessary. 119 The key EU objectives for the Battle Groups concept was to be able to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval by the council, and respond to a crisis or urgent request by the UN, to undertake simultaneously two Battle Group-size operations sustainable for an 120 days. These forces would be on ground within 10 days after the EU decision to launch an operation. The EU Battle Group concept encompassed the full support of the EU nations and had become a significant component of the military strategy structure of the EU. Whereas, SHIRBRIG was developed by a few key European and non-European nations who had the desire to provide the United Nations with a viable cohesive multinational force option to rapidly deploy at the request of the Security Council.

VI.A. **EU Battle Group Background and Concept**

The EU Battle Group (BG) concept was discussed at various summits and proposed in numerous documents and summarized in Table 4- Key Events leading to EU Battle Group Development. 120 The concept was first introduced at the European Council Summit on 10 - 11 December 1999 in Helsinki as well as other summits and discussed in various documents. During this summit the European Council developed the Headline Goal 2003 which specified the need for a rapid response capability at short notice. In Feb 2003, discussion of the EU Battle Group was brought forth at the Franco-British summit in Le Touquet. This summit highlighted the need to improve European capabilities “in planning and deploying forces at short notice, including the initial deployment of land, sea and air forces within 5 - 10 days” 121 The rapid response capacity was considered an essential component as described in Headline Goal 2010 and considered a European priority. The development of the Battle Group was also tied to the Helsinki Headline Goal since it stressed strategic lift and combat support capabilities as a necessity for rapid mobility. Formal endorsement of the Franco-British-German concept occurred at the May Joint Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers Council as well as being part of the Headline Goal 2010. The EU envisioned the Battle Group as a “minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations” which was the standard formula utilized within EU documentation. This means that the EU Battle Group represents the smallest force package capable of stand-alone operations, including contributing to an initial entry force. 122

In 2003, the EU was able to put their concept to the test when the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, requested EU assistance in support of the United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) also know as “Operation Artemis”. As a result of the request, EU policymaker and planners were able to establish the political-strategic parameters, planning, preparation and deployment of an EU rapid reaction force within three weeks as part of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This operation was considered both

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an operational and planning success for the EU because of the condensed timeline and provided a template for future rapid response deployments. The success of MONUC “Operation Artemis” provided the European Community the stimulus and ammunition to expedite the Battle Group concept into reality. It represented the first successful example of an UN/EU cooperation and operation. Overall the EU went from a Crisis Management Concept to a Council decision to launching of the operation within three weeks and another 20 days for the EU deployment force to arrive in the theater of operation. The template utilized and developed by the EU policymakers and planners mirrored the UN operation in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) and provided them the model for future operations. The EU deployment comprised of approximately 2000 personnel provided the UN enough time to strengthen its numbers on the ground and ability to pass the Security Council Resolution establishing the United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). Additional detailed information on Operation Artemis is discussed in Section VI.E.1. United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) Also known as “Operation Artemis”.

Overall, the operation was a success and provided a successful template for discussion at the Franco-British summit held in London on 23 November 2003. The summit finalized a declaration that described ways to strengthen European cooperation in security and defense and emphasized that the EU “should be willing to deploy forces within 15 days in response to a UN request and called for Battle Group sized forces of around 1500 land forces offered by a single nation or through a multinational force package. This concept was reiterated at the Franco-British summit in Le Touquet on 4 February 2003 where it again stressed the need for a rapid response capability to include land, sea, and air forces during the initial deployment within 5-10 days.

Approximately three months later, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany prepared and released a joint paper outlining the “Battle-Group Concept” on 10 February 2004. The document was submitted to the EU Political and Security committee for review and comments. The premise of the document proposed the establishment of EU Battle Groups consisting of highly trained, battalion-size formations (1,500 soldiers) including all combat, support, deployable and sustainable assets be deployable within 15 days of notification. These Battle Groups would primarily be utilized in response to UN requests to conduct combat operations in hostile environments and be flexible enough to promptly undertake these missions. This paper also provided specific proposals regarding missions, deployability, sustainability, and C2 arrangements for an EU Battle Group. Overall the basic concept was positively received by the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) on 22 March 2004. The same month, the EU Military Committee tasked the EU Military Staff to develop the EU BG concept.

As 2004 rolled along the EU Battle Group concept gained momentum during key meetings which resulted in the adoption of key endorsements of support and means of development. For instance, the EU Battle Group received support from defense ministers at an informal meeting in Brussels on 6 April 2004 who declared their support for EU Battle Group and approving the establishment of several Battle Groups by 2007. The European Council endorsed the Headline Goal 2010 on 17 - 18 June 2004 and the EU Military Committee agreed to the EU Battle Group Concept on 14 June 2004. Finally, in November of 2004, EU member nations at the Military Capability Commitment Conference provided their initial pledges towards the establishment of the EU Battle Groups. By the end of the Conference, thirteen Battle Groups and associated niche capabilities were pledged. One of the goals of the EU was to have the capacity to undertake two concurrent Battle Group rapid response operations, including the ability to launch both operations simultaneously.\[126\]

\[123\] Ibid., p. 11.
### Table 4- Key Events leading to EU Battle Group Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Significance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Council (Helsinki)</td>
<td>Dec-99</td>
<td>Initial mention of rapid response elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco-British Summit (Le Touquet)</td>
<td>Feb-03</td>
<td>Notion of 5-10 day deployment raised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC – “Operation Artemis”</td>
<td>Jun-03</td>
<td>1st EU Autonomous military rapid response operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco British Summit</td>
<td>Nov-04</td>
<td>Call for battlegroup-sized force packages</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK, French, German Paper</td>
<td>Feb-04</td>
<td>Introduction of the EU BG Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>Mar-04</td>
<td>Welcomes the proposal of EU BG Concept at EU level</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>May-04</td>
<td>Approval of EU BG Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>Jun-04</td>
<td>Agreement on the EU BG Concept</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Council</td>
<td>Jun-04</td>
<td>Endorsement of the 2010 Headline Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Capability Commitment</td>
<td>Nov-04</td>
<td>Initial EU BG pledges made</td>
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The EU decision making capability for Battle Groups and ability to launch a force package was based on their goal of being able to launch an operation within five days of the EU Councils approval of the crisis management concept. It also has the goal of have forces on the ground within ten days following the EU decision to launch an operation, and have Battle Group force packages held at a readiness level of between 5-10 days.

The basic Battle Group would be organized and based around a military unit and the concept was based on EU member states contributions with each Battle Group consisting of battalion size element (1500 troops) reinforced with combat support elements. The Battle Group could be formed by a single nation or composed of up to four member states contributions. Each one would be associated with a Force HQ with pre-identified transport and logistics elements and each group would have a “lead nation” or a framework nation that would be tasked with the operational command of the Battle Group. Participation within the Battle Groups was not totally limited to EU member states and as a result non-EU European NATO countries who were candidates for

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accession into the EU could participate within the Battle Groups. Member nations would make pledges for contribution to a Battle Group twice a year at the Battle Group Co-ordination Conference (BGCC). The BGCCs utilize a five year horizon as part of its planning factor with evolving details depending on the timelines of contributions and duration of standby periods of contributing nations. During the BGCC, the EU member states specify their potential force contributions and composition as well as determining and indicating when the forces could be placed on standby. The pledging EU member nation within the Battle Group would be responsible for generating the entire package which includes generating the forces and the operational and strategic enablers. The development process was conducted with the various Battle Group partners at the multinational level basis. 128

By January 2005, the EU Battle Groups reached Initial Operational Capability (IOC) with two Battle Groups being contributed for the first half of the year by the United Kingdom and France and one Battle Group being provided by Italy for the second part of the year. Full Operations Capability (FOC) was obtained by January 2007 with the level of Battle Groups being kept at the capacity to undertake two concurrent single Battle Group sized rapid response operations, to include the ability to launch both simultaneously.129 In addition, the EU was very attune to developing its military equipment and capabilities that would be mutually reinforcing to NATO initiatives ie: NATO Response Forces and the necessity for interoperability between forces developed by EU member states and NATO nations.

VI.B. EU Battle Group Mission

As mentioned previously the Battle Group concept was established as a rapid reaction force for the European Union. As such it was expected to be capable of responding with rapid and decisive action in support of all tasks listed in Article 17(2) of the Treaty on European Union as was well as those specified in the European Security Strategy as reflected in Table-5 ESDP Tasks and Missions. 130 Both of these documents established a wide arching spectrum of tasks and mission the EU Battle Group would be exposed to and be able to execute. The Battle Groups would have functionality across the full range of tasks but their potential “should be best realized in tasks that were of limited duration and intensity”.131 These tasks were considerably varied in nature and could require variations in force packages of personnel and equipment depending on the type of mission. In addition, the EU Battle Group execution timeline as determined by the EU has the Battle Group sustainable for a period of 30 days with the possibility of up to 120 days if an extension was approved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Petersberg Tasks</th>
<th>European Security Strategy Tasks</th>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian and Rescue Tasks</td>
<td>Joint Disarmament Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Support for 3rd countries in combating terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crisis Management and Peacemaking</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform (SSR) operations as part of broader institution building</td>
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Note: European Security Tasks were also introduced in the Draft

129 Ibid., p.14
130 Ibid., p.17
131 Ibid., p. 17
The EU Battle Group can be deployed anywhere within Europe and it has no limits to its capability of being deployed outside of Europe. As a guide, 6,000 km from Brussels has been utilized as a planning baseline for EU Battle Groups. This baseline was consistent with information that was provided within the 2003 Touquet Declaration which focuses on the African Continent and reinforces the 6,000 km planning factor for rapid deployment forces range from Europe. Based on the guidance on the type of potential EU Battle Group missions there were 3 overarching types of mission categories (Bridging Operation, Initial entry rapid response operations, stand-alone operations) that the EU Battle Groups could potentially be utilized. These categories stem from the Petersberg and European Security Tasks and cover the entire range of the Headline Goal. Bridging Operations would utilize a force in support of forces already on the ground provided that it was deployed as part of an EU operation. MONUC- “Operation Artemis” was an example of this type of deployment by the EU. Initial Entry Rapid Response Operation would utilize the EU Battle Group as an initial entry force in advance of a larger force based on their rapid response capability. The utilization of the EU Battle Group for operations of limited scale requiring a rapid response in a stand-alone operation.

VI.C. EU Battle Group Organization Structure and Force Composition

In order to keep the EU Battle Group flexibility the overall structure and composition was kept generic in nature and made up of approximately 1,500 troop strength. It was based on a battalion-sized force package with appropriate combat support and combat support components. The “standard” EU Battle Group would include:

- Headquarters Company
- (3) Infantry Companies
- Corresponding Support Personnel
- Specific units – May include
  - mechanized infantry,
  - combat support (i.e.: fire support unit),
  - combat service support elements (i.e.: medical facility)

The combination of the various types of personnel allows the EU Battle Group to have the flexibility to react to each situation separately and to adjust the force structure to the mission as needed. The phrase: one-force fits all truly does not fit to the EU Battle Group-rapid deployment force structure. It was dependent on the primary Battle Group lead nation to decide the exact composition both in terms of personnel and equipment. This was particularly true since there were no fixed Battle Group structure. It was also the responsibility of the EU Battle Group primary framework nation to ensure that all contributing nations meet and fulfill the Battle Group standards and criteria that lead to a successful certification. For the most part, EU planners recommend “that EUBattle Group contributors rely on already existing NATO standards and criteria to encourage interoperability and avoid duplication; wherever possible and applicable, standards, practical methods and procedures should be analogous to those defined within NATO (NRF)” This was extremely useful when the EU Battle Group consists of numerous participating nations, whom all have variations of training capabilities and requirements.

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133 Ibid., p. 25
Individual contributing countries would still be responsible for certifying their contributions at the unit level with oversight by the primary framework nation. The EU military Committee verifies the Battle Group certification process with the assistance of the EU Military Staff at the EU level.

This was also true for the EUs Chain of Command (C2) concept which was also generic in nature. The EUs military chain of command concept contains three levels of headquarters: (Operational HQ, Force HQ, and Component HQ) to be operated at the various levels.

VI.C.1. **Operational Headquarters (OHQ) - Strategic Level**

The Operational Headquarters (OHQ) operates at the strategic level and oversees the execution of the ESDP operation. They would be activated on a case-by-case basis by the decision of the EU Council and received strategic guidance from the Political and Security Committee. A majority of the EU Battle Groups have a pre-identified OHQ which can be operational within five days of notification. Currently there are five national operational headquarters available to the EU within the context of the EU Force Catalogue and the Headline Goal Process that could be utilized at this level of a command HQ. 134

VI.C.2. **Force Headquarters (FHQ) – Operational Level**

The Force HQ (FHQ) operates at the operational level. It functions as a base of operations and provides command and control over troops on the ground in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). The actual size of the FHO would vary in accordance to the needs of the EU Battle Group but in most cases be composed of nearly 100 personnel. The main FHQ would deploy into the mission AOR and provide key coordination with the EU Battle Groups key operational and strategic enablers.

VI.C.3. **Component Headquarters (CC HQ) – Tactical Level**

The Component Headquarters (CC HQ) operates at the tactical level and would be used to accommodate EU component commanders deployed in the area of operations. In many cases it maybe the EU Battle Group Headquarters at the tactical level. There could also be situations were additional CC HQ representing (Air, Special Forces, maritime) or other specific functions commanders co-located and or merged into one primary command structure.

VI.D. **EU Decision Making Process**

Prior to the deployment of an EU Battle Group, the crisis management operations decision-making process has to be initiated. This process involves three phases that assist in the development of concept of support, force projection platform, military options, operational planning to determine the best course of action for the specific mission being discussed. 135

VI.D.1. **Phase I: Crisis Management Concept (CMC)**

The Crisis Management Concept (CMC) process begins with the European Council General Secretariat preparing and providing the CMC input from the Secretary General/High Representative and EU Presidency.

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134 Ibid., p. 23
135 Ibid., p. 20.
The process was coordinated with the European Commission with the Political and Security Committee (PSC) evaluating the CMC. The Political and Security Committee receives advice from the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management before it was forwarded to the European Council for approval. Upon approval the CMC explains the overall EU objectives for the execution of the operation and forms the foundation for the EU Joint Action. 136

VI.D.2. Phase II: Military Strategic Option (MSO)

This phase establishes and develops a set of military options to be considered by the EU Council. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) would initially request the EU Military Committee (EUMC) to task the EU Military Staff to develop the military options. The Military Staff would develop numerous Military Strategic Options (MSO) which outline different military options (risks, force requirements, C2 structure) associated with each phase. The military planners would also suggest potential military candidates for the HQ, Operational and Force Commander positions. Upon completion, the PSC would evaluate all strategic options and make its recommendation and preferred course of action to the council.


Following the approval of specific MSO by the EU Council, the Political and Security Committee would take their recommendation and request the EU Military Committee to formulate specific military guidelines for Operational Commanders to utilize during the course of the mission. The EU Military Committee would task the EU Military Staff to draft the Initiating Military Directives (IMD) for the PSC to approve. Once the Initiating Military Directives would be approved by the PSC, the operational planning phase and process could be determined for the selected mission. 137

The operational planning phase consists of two primary steps: Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operation Plan (OPLAN) with multiple steps within each to be developed and fine tuned for a successful operation to be initiated. Once the Council approves the Operational Plan and authorizes the Rules of Engagement (ROE), the mission operations can be initiated.

VI.E. EU Battle Group Military Operations and Lesson Learned

The following section provides an overview of EU Battle Group participation in activities and missions the organization was involved in outside of Europe. In June 2003, the European Union sent an International Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was code named “Artemis” and was the first military mission outside of Europe and independent of NATO by the EU.

VI.E.1. United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) Also known as “Operation Artemis”

During the period between 1999 and 2003, the region of Ituri in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was severely unstable and was at war within itself. The region was prone to ethnic conflicts over land, natural

136 Ibid., p. 19.
137 Ibid., p. 21
resources and local government positions. It developed into a proxy war with rival factions being sponsored by the governments of Rwanda and Uganda to name a few. The consequences of the regional fighting were horrible with over 50,000 people killed and an additional 500,000 people fleeing the conflict as refugees.

In September 2002, the governments of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo agreed to the Luanda Agreement. Under the framework of this agreement, the Ugandan Army would agree to withdraw following the establishing of a peace building strategy for the war torn region and allowing for the involvement of the Ituri Pacification Commission (IPC). The IPC was to provide a peace building and reconciliation roadmap for Ituri and would be administered by the Ituri Interim Administration (ITA). The IPC was held from 1 - 14 April 2003, with all the primary players involved to include the Iturians, the governments of Uganda, DRC and the support and participation of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). In May of 2003, the Ugandan Peoples Defense Force (IPDF) withdrew from Bunia and Ituri but as they withdrew another crisis unfolded. The militias of Lendu and the Hema Union of Congolese (UPC) attempted to take control of the area following the withdrawal of Ugandan Forces. Tension and fighting mounted in Ituri and escalated and unfolded into two weeks of total chaos and destruction in Bunia. This led to fear and risk of genocide in the region and questioned the lack of UN reaction by MONUC in the area.

The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) was mandated to protect civilians under imminent threat under UN Chapter VI but the 700 strong Uruguayan Battalion relinquished their responsibilities. Only a few peacekeepers and some dedicated humanitarian workers succeeded in protecting the nearly 8,000 civilians who sought protection at the UN compound in Bunia from a deadly end.

The Secretary-General “Kofi Annan” was aware and concerned about the surmounting situation in Ituri. He spoke to French President Jacques Chirac during the weekend of 10 - 11 May 2003, who indicated that France would be willing to deploy forces into Bunia. This fact assisted the Secretary-General when he presented his letter to the Security Council on 15 May 2003. In his letter, Kofi Annan called for the “rapid deployment to Bunia of a highly trained and well-equipped multinational force, under the lead of a Member State, to provide security at the airport as well as to other vital installations in the town and to protect the civilian population.”

Additional discussions continued between France and the United Nations with certain conditions being agreed to prior to its acceptance as the Framework nation and taking the lead for the operation. The conditions in which France required were:

- Granted a UN Chapter VII mandate
- Countries in the region (DRC, Uganda and Rwanda) officially supported the intervention
- Operation was limited in time and scope

On 28 May 2003, France officially announced its intention to serve as the Framework Nation for the operation into Bunia as well as taking the lead with the support of other contributing nations. As a result, the UN Security Council on 30 May 2003, authorized the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in Bunia. The mission of the IEMF was “to contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation required it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian

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population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town. 141 The IEMF would be deployed until 1 September 2003 when a reinforced UN mission in the Congo (MONUC) could be deployed.

The IEMF forward elements deployed to Bunia on 6 June 2003 followed shortly by engineers to maintain and secure the airfields for the receipt of strategic airlift of personnel and equipment. The entire force consisted of 1400 personnel of which the majority consisted of French troops and command structure. The force included smaller contributions from a number of other EU and non-EU countries to include (Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) to support the operation. The force was commanded by French General Jean-Paul Thonier who had the Force HQ and 50% of the mission force located on Entebbe Uganda. The mission was supported by French Air assets based in N’Djamena, Chad and Entebbe, Uganda for close air support, reconnaissance and surveillance missions. In addition, the mission had the use of 150 French and 80 Swedish Special Forces which provided the command the ability to engage and neutralize armed threats beyond the area of operation.

The IEMF re-established security in Bunia and disrupted the military capabilities of the various militias by securing and eliminating military supplies from abroad and securing and monitoring of airfields. The mission was also able to utilize the local population for the collection of intelligence and information more efficiently since both the population and the majority of the forces spoke French. This ability enabled cooperation and increased the mission capability of tracking forces and obtaining needed information as well providing the civilian population with correct information. As a result of the increased security, the political process, economic and social activities in Ituri were allowed to resume which brought stability back to the local population.

The Security Council was monitoring the situation and on 28 July 2003, approved the expansion of the mandate and capabilities of the UN mission in the Congo (MONUC). The UN forces for MONUC were increased to 10,800 personnel, of which included a brigade element composed of 4 battalions of troops and support element of (4,800 military personnel) to replace the IEMF in Ituri. Under Security Council Resolution 1493 (2003), MONUC was given the authorization to use all necessary means to fulfill its mandate in Ituri. 142

This allowed the Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to hand over all remaining tasks and responsibilities in Bunia to UN mission in the Congo (MONUC) on 1 September 2003. The IEMF was able to withdraw completely by 7 September 2003.

**VI.E.2. MONUC Lessons Learned**

The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) “Operation Artemis” was a success for the European Union and it was the first attempt at an autonomous military operation the first military mission outside of Europe and independent of NATO. One of the first significant items to note was that the operation was limited in time, scope, location and number of forces utilized for the mission. The operation was a success for the EU in the sense that it was able to show that it could react relatively rapidly to a troubled area outside of Europe and it laid the foundation for the development of the EU Battle Group. Even with the success there are always lessons to be learned and areas to improve upon and this operation was no exception and the lessons identified suggested that there was room for improvement.

The operation was heavily influenced and controlled by France with a small contingency of personnel being provided by other EU and no-EU countries. This was understandable since the operational and force planning

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141 Ibid., p.4.
was already underway at the national level in France prior to the EU being heavily involved. This was not a negative towards France but merely pointing out that the operation was not as international as it could have been when it was being advocated as an EU operation.

One of the primary military miscalculations of the operation was the shortage of strategic air transport for the operation. The problem was solved by leasing an AN-124 from the Ukraine but it truly puts into perspective the fact that if you are trying to be a “Rapid Response Force”, strategic air support was essential to the capability and success of a mission. Additional military related shortcomings were in the areas of intelligence gathering and information sharing, communication network and interoperability of EU forces. There was a lack of secure communication between the operational and tactical commands leading to miscommunication between the two HQs. 143

In addition, the United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit identified some key lessons which are discussed below from the operation as well. All of these coupled together added to the difficulty of maintaining operational continuity.

Lack of Initial Contact – In May 2003 the French Reconnaissance Team established initial contact with the UN Staff in Kinshasa, but did not follow up with any additional communication. This lack of communication between the Operational HQ of Artemis and the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) hampered efforts during the pre-deployment phase. 144

Limited Deployment Timeline – The military forces associated with “Operation Artemis” adhered to a very strict deployment timeline of only 90 days. The insistence of a limited time period signaled to all parties, the transitory nature of the force. This type of action placed increased pressure on the follow-on MONUC deployment and according to the UN evaluation report, “Operation Artemis” risked failure by establishing such a strict exit date. 145

Reluctance to Double-Hat – It was noted by UN forces that none of the EU personnel were willing to re-hat with MONUC. UN forces were hoping that EU personnel might double-hat as a means to strengthen their credibility by providing access to some of the special capabilities brought by the EU Forces. These capabilities included Special Forces, intelligence, and over flight capabilities placed the mission credibility at risk since MONUC lacked any of these critical assets.146

In spite of some of these drawbacks there were several positive results that came about from the Artemis-MONUC cooperation. This included the fact that even though there were different mandates, strengths and competencies between the two forces they did not impact the relationship between the organizations. The cooperation between the IEMF and the UN mission was excellent once the IEMF was on the ground and had worked out its operating principles with MONUC. Effective liaison and development of working relationships were established on the ground in Bunia, Kinshasa and Entebbe. The political-military relationship and direction of the operation improved as the cooperation between the two forces increased, providing flexibility for the Operation Commander to operate affectively. The NGO and humanitarian assistance community also

mentioned that there was cooperation and reasonable liaison with the IEMF to include the exchange of information on a regular basis.

VI.3. EU Battle Group Employability

As of 2013, no EU Battle Group has been activated in support of an ESDP or Petersburg mission despite the availability of having two Battle Groups on Standby since 2007. The standard issues arise when considering the EU Battle Group for deployment which range from the international security situation and the political consideration and the perception of the risks on the ground.

The EU has other organizations that are similar in scope and nature to Battle Group but are more specific in nature but are part of the EU umbrella in regards to operations and mission. The organizations included:

**EUROCORPS** - The EUROCORP was a multinational European force established within the framework of the Western European Union. The overall purpose of EUROCORP was to serve as a model of close military cooperation between WEU members states. It would deploy on the authority of the WEU and at the request of multinational organizations such as the United Nations, NATO or the EU. The structure of the force was developed around five sponsorship nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain) with a total force of 60,000 troops pledged for deployment for EU and or NATO rapid response missions.

**EUROFOR** - The European Operational Rapid Force (EUROFOR) was a multinational rapid reaction force comprised of military forces from France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. EUROFOR was established and organized to perform peacemaking, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions as prescribed in the Petersburg Tasks. The organization under the framework of the WEU but would be under EU control.

**EUROMARFOR** - The European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) was a maritime multinational force comprised of naval forces from France, Italy, Portugal and Spain with the ability to carry out naval, air and amphibious operations and composition depends on the assigned missions. EUROMARFOR was established within the framework of the WEU but would be under EU control.

These were just few of the organizations that could provide Europe with the military means to participate in international initiative and ability to project military force. These could be deployed at the request of the multinational organization such as the UN, NATO and the EU as rapid reaction forces into initiatives that fall within the framework of the Petersberg Declaration and within the context of the European Union Treaty to include humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.
VII. NATO Response Forces (NRF)

VII.A. NRF Background

At the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was taking various steps to re-invent itself and improve its organizational structure. The organization realized that major internal reforms were needed to adapt from the traditional military structures and capabilities to new tasks that included crisis management, peacekeeping, and peace support operations. As the organization was taking on these new fundamental tasks, it realized that it also needed to build new security partnerships. This included the forging of closer relationships with international organizations (European Union, Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, United Nations) to build a secure environment and to focus on a partnership based on security rather than solely on alliance on collective defense.  

The organization received a wakeup call following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. It resulted in NATO embarking on a comprehensive review of its activities, working procedures and led to a collective set of reforms and new initiatives and programs. One of the initiatives was the development of the NATO Response Forces (NRF) which would provide a rapid military response as “a stand-alone force for Article 5 (collective defense) or non Article 5 crisis response operations such as evacuation operations, support disaster consequence management; humanitarian crisis situation and counter-terrorism operations”148 The NRF concept was discussed and endorsed at the NATO Prague Summit held on 22 November 2002. It was at this conference the Alliance’s heads of state made an official declaration endorsing the concept of the NRF. The concept of its formation was approved by NATO defense ministers in Brussels in June 2003. One year later, the defense ministers at an informal meeting in Romania declared operational capabilities of the NRF and would be fully operational by 2006.149

VII.B. NRF Purpose and Mission

The NATO Response Force (NRF) purpose was to provide NATO a robust and credible high readiness joint force, able to deploy rapidly and to participate in the full spectrum of the Alliance missions, either within or beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. It serves as a catalyst to promote improvements in both Alliance and national military capabilities and force structures.150 The NRF mission was to provide a visible means of NATO solidarity commitment to deterrence and collective defense as It is a means to respond rapidly by NATO as decided by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to various types of crisis around the globe and would deploy following a political decision and case by case basis by the NAC.

The NRF was also directed by the concept of “first force in, first force out” and was critical to the variety of missions they would respond to as determined by the NAC. The NRF could be deployed as an initial entry force as means to facilitate the arrival of follow-on forces from low threat environment to a hostile environment, with or without the support of the host nation. It could also be deployed as a quick response operation in the form of a demonstrative force package in support of diplomatic efforts to show the resolve of member nations. Each and every developing situation for which the NRF would be considered must be viewed as a unique mission when analyzing the potential for utilizing NRF forces.

The NRF would be limited in sized, composition and capability and due to the complexity of the situation the force may encounter, it could not a “one size fits all” force” but instead a force package that is tailored for an

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm  
149 Ibid. p. 3.
assigned mission and kept at high state of readiness. The NRF can deploy quickly and operate as a stand-alone for up to 30 days using its embedded logistical capabilities and longer when resupplied. The NRF was a force consisting of land, air and sea components and could be tailored to meet the specific needs of a specific mission and has the ability to deploy quickly to anywhere in the world within 5 days.  

VII.C. **NRF Organizational Structure and Force Composition**

The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a multinational Force consisting of land, air, maritime and special forces components. The NRF has at its disposal a total of 25,000 troops divided into three major components: command and control element (C2), Immediate Response force consisting of 13,000 high-readiness troops, and a response force Pool which can supplement the Immediate Response force when necessary. The NRF is also structured around a rotational system, where units prepare at a national level and followed by 6 month training program that leads to a certification, and six months on stand-by. The length of the rotational period is to be extended to 12 months starting in 2012. The operational command rotations are shared between 3 headquarters (JFC-Brunssum, Neatherlands, JFC-Naples, Italy, JFC- Lisbon, Portugal) that are under the overall command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). See the below Table 6 - NATO Command and Control Structure

![NATO Command Structure](image)

**Table 6 - NATO Command and Control Structure**

**VII.C.1. NRF Generation and Rotation**

The NRF is not a standing force and in such the generation of the NRF is based on operational and force planning. The force generation process is essential in identifying the forces necessary and tailoring it for specific operations. The process begins on an approved Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) which is followed by a process of identifying and committing forces to the NRF through a force activation

The Strategic Commander for Operations (SCO) would conduct an NRF Generation Conference which corresponds with the SC rotation plan and NRF responsibilities. The conference is held on a regular basis with the intent and aim to identify, nominate and commit forces, and capabilities/resources to the NRF based on the approved CJSOR. It is during the generation conference where NATO member states would offer forces and equipment to the NRF to match the readiness requirements and timelines established by the Strategic Commander for Operations. At the conclusion of the NRF Generation Conference, the Strategic Commander for operations would submit the results to the Military Committee (MC) for approval and to resolve any shortfalls that may have occurred. The MC would then in turn submit its findings and results in a report to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) for consideration. The NRF Force Planning is responsible for reviewing the current capabilities and addressing them against the future long term force capability requirements and adjusting the CJSOR as needed.

The NRF rotation process begins with each NRF being generated and developed at the NRF generation conference. This process occurs 12 months prior to the commencement of the required component and Joint Force Training and certification steps. This training is where units prepare at a national level and conduct a 6 month training program that leads to a joint exercise certification process. This is followed by the NRF being on stand-by phase and being on call for six months. The length of the rotational period is to be extended to 12 months starting in 2012.

Table 7 - NRF Generation and Rotation Process

VII.C.2. Training and Certification

The NATO forces designated for NRF rotation at the NRF Force Generation Conference would undergo a six month period of training and combat readiness certification process. This course of action is conducted prior to the forces being placed in a stand-by status. It is also the responsibility of the contributing nation to ensure that the HQ and forces nominated to participate in the NRF rotation cycle meet the standards set by the Strategic

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155 Ibid., p. 10.
Command and approved by the Military Committee. The aim of the training and certification process is to build a cohesive force that is a joint combat-ready for the various tasks and missions of the NRF.

The first step of the process involves the NATO contributing nation provide trained and deployable units that are available to train to the NRF standards. Each nation has the responsibility to ensure that unit level training has been conducted and meet the predetermined and prescribed NATO standards. This ensures that units are able to meet and perform their assigned functions prior to being assigned to the JFC/JHQ and conduct their component training under the guidance of the respective component commander. The component level training commences six months prior to the stand-by phase and is conducted to ensure proficiency at this level and interoperability prior to the initiation of joint level training. Upon completion, the units move onto the joint force level of training which has the aim of ensuring NRF interoperability and combat effectiveness. This includes extensive training of the complete C2 structure (JFC and component levels) prior to the conducting of a joint exercise. Many capabilities would require a high level of joint interoperability, training and exercising to ensure combat success, survivability and to eliminate fratricide. These areas require the full experience of the joint exercise and certification process. The joint force exercise is the certification process and gives the Strategic Commander for Operations the method to certify that the NRF is fully trained, combat ready and prepared to begin its stand-by period. 156

VII.C.3. Command and Control

The NRF command and control (C2) concepts are identified and developed around the high state of readiness theory. As a result, the C2 concept would not be templated in any set format or criteria to allow for flexibility and adaptability to meet the best options for mission requirements. The inherent strength of the NRF was built around its operational flexibility and adaptability.157 The NRF C2 was based on and embedded at the NATO’s three level C2 Structure of Strategic Command (SC) HQ, Joint HQ (JHQ)/Joint Forces Command (JFC) HQs and Component Commands HQs. The deployable land and maritime component command HQs would be pulled from the High Readiness Force (HRF) Land (L) and HRF Maritime (M) HQs. The Military Committee (MC) is responsible for the overall development of policies and concepts, doctrine associated with the NRF. It would also retain the ability of oversight of the force development process that is conducted at the Strategic Command level and would address and resolve any issues that arise as the process develops.

VII.C.4. Strategic Command

The Strategic Commander for Operations (SCO) is responsible for NRF standards and combat readiness certification procedures and program. The Strategic Commander is also responsible for conducting the NRF Generation Conferences and reporting to the Military Committee the results of the conferences and any other significant issues regarding the processes. The SCO would also develop a detailed rotation schedule which is tied to the NRF Generation Conferences and manages the flow of HQs and forces through the NRF. The Strategic Commander for Operations (SCO) when directed to prepare for deployment would tailor the NRF forces for a specific operation. The SCO would provide an in-depth force and equipment capabilities requirement of the NRF forces to be utilized. At this time the SOC would adapt the Common operation picture (COP) and plans to a specific situation in time of an emerging crisis. 158

VII.C.5. **Joint Forces Command**

The Joint Force Commander (JFC) is responsible for training and preparing the NRF for certification when delegated by the Strategic Commander for Operations. The JFC would control the NRF at the operational level from a static joint HQ or a deployed CJTF HQ depending on the mission and situation. The Joint Force Commander would also conduct operational planning exercises to prepare staff personnel on potential operations. The JFC requires that there are permanent staff elements within each of the three (Land, Maritime, Air) HQs which allows for a trained and prepared capability ready to deploy a forward command element within 5 days of notification. 159

If a mission is less than 30 days in length than a Deployable Joint Task Force (DJTF) would be utilized as the mission HQ and the personnel from the permanent staff element would be utilized. If the timeline is longer than 30 days than the capabilities for the CJTF HQ would be drawn from the JFC HQs/JHQ at the operational level currently on the rotation.

VII.C.6. **Component Command**

The Component Commands are selected from the NATO Command Structure NCS and NATO Force Structure (NFS). The deployable land and maritime component command HQs would be pulled from the High Readiness Force (HRF) Land (L) and HRF Maritime (M) HQs. The deployable Air Component Command (ACC) HQ would be drawn from the ACC HQs of the NCS. Each of the Component Commanders are responsible for the training and certification of their respective NRF elements and would exercise command and control of their respective component forces. 160

VII.C.7. **Air Component**

The NRF air component would capable of providing up to 200 combat sorties a day plus support sorties. In addition, the air component would provide functions in the areas of air defense, offensive counter air, air reconnaissance, close air support, electronic warfare, airborne early warning, tactical airlift to name a few.161

VII.C.8. **Land Component**

The NRF land component was to be structured to allow for the deployment of an appropriately tailored brigade sized formation. This element was be composed of maneuver and support forces with adequate equipment to allow it to conduct appropriate tasks in support of its mission and tasks. The mix of combat forces and combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) was to be structured to support the entire force and tailored for any type of mission. The CS and CSS elements would include aviation, transportation, PYSOPS, military police, medical, public affairs, logistics and maintenance capabilities as visualized in Table 8 – NRF Forces. 162

The Immediate Response Force consists of a brigade-sized land component based on three Battle Groups and support elements, a naval task force component, combat air and air support component, special forces, CBRN

159 Ibid., p. 3-53.
162 Ibid., p. 13-14.
defense task force and prior to being used the force would be tailored and adjusted to match the demands of the specific operations.163

The NRF could possible consist of a brigade-size land component with forced entry capability, a naval task force compound of one-carrier Battle Group, an amphibious task group and surface action group, and an air component capability.

NRF Forces

Table 8 – NRF Forces

VII.C.9. Maritime Component

The NRF Maritime Component was to be comprise of a force up to the equivalent of an NATO Task Force (NTF) which would include a carrier Battle Group and associated surface and submarine units, amphibious forces, and auxiliary support vessels. These naval forces would be able to conduct inter alia, naval escort, anti-submarine warfare, naval mine counter-measure warfare, naval air strike missions. 164

As mentioned previously, the NRF was not a standing force, but it would be occasionally be committed by nations as a means to meet the requirements of the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). It is during the pre stand-by phase that the forces would undergo training and certification, and prepare forces for the next rotational deployment.

VII.C.10. Logistics and Support

In order for the NRF to properly deploy, sustain and redeploy in support of the various types of operations and missions it is necessary for it to have a complete logistical support package. This requires that sufficient assets, equipment and supply stocks are held in ready reserve and made available during a crisis in a timely manner. This also requires logistical sustainability during an operation for all elements of an NRF operation. It would include an in depth logistics infrastructure, transportation and engineering support, equipment maintenance, supplies, and medical support. This means that a substantial quantity of resources be required to provide the necessary support to the NRF and must be able to cover the mission spectrum that the forces have been given but also the foreseeable contingencies. In order for the NRF to be effective it must have assured available strategic lift. The contributing nations must provide the necessary land, sea or air transportation assets to move


164 Ibid., p. 15-16.
the forces and their equipment into the missions Area of operation (AOR). This aspect is usually conducted at the NRF Generation Conference where transportation capabilities and capacities are identified and national and multinational arrangements are coordinated.

In order to increase the logistical effectiveness during a mission it would be necessary to establish a Multinational Joint Logistics Center (MJLC). To be operational it was important to provide the MJLC sufficient logistics C2 authority in the Joint Operational Area (JOA) to enable adequate and timely decisions, including for logistical elements of Reception, Staging, and Onward Movement (RSOM). This would ensure that effective logistics to support the operations can be planned for and executed in a timely manner. In addition, it was necessary that NATO nations provide NRF commanders with sufficient logistical C2 authority and capabilities to execute their respective responsibilities as effective and efficiently as possible. 165

The NRF would possible encounter a severely diminished logistical infrastructure and therefore would need to be prepared to establish and maintain its own logistical support base and infrastructure to meet mission requirements. The NRF support bases would need be able and capable of supporting the forces for up to 30 days and sufficient CSS enablers are deployed to support the operations.

VII.D. NRF Military Operations

The NRF forces have yet to be utilized for UN peacekeeping mission to date. This does not mean that the military assets of the NRF are not continually preparing and training for the potential time that they would be requested to participate in a UN peacekeeping/enforcing or humanitarian mission. Elements of the NRF have been used to assist in disaster relief in Pakistan following an earthquake in 2005 where they assisted in the delivery of needed supplies, medical personnel and engineers assisted the people of Pakistan. In addition, elements of the NRF have been deployed to assist in support of the Afghan presidential elections in 2004, and assisted protect the 2004 summer Olympics in Greece.

Within the NATO umbrella there are other organizations such as Multinational Amphibious Task Force (MNATF), Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), and Multinational Peace Force in South-Eastern Europe (MPFSEE), Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corp (ARRC) that are regionally based and aligned forces. These organizations were developed and designed to be used in operations and mission in support of humanitarian and UN peacekeeping operations. In addition could also participate in international initiatives and the ability to project military force and could be deployed at the request of a multinational organization.

http://jadl.act.nato.int/
VIII. Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to examine the Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) as a rapid development force in UN peacekeeping mission. The goal of this paper was to examine the development of the Standby Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) as a rapid deployment force for UN peacekeeping mission as well as it demise. In addition to reviewing the SHIRBRIG organization structure and contribution to UN missions, and analysis was made of the development of EU Battle Groups, NRF as possible contribution entities as well. A review of their development, purpose, structure, current and future capabilities was examined along with discussing lessons learned when utilized for Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) and their intended and potential utilization in UN peacekeeping missions. Finally, this paper attempted to show that as each these organizations developed from concept to reality, each indirectly led to the elimination of the SHIRBRIG as a platform to be utilized in UN peacekeeping missions.

The goal of all of these organizations was to provide multinational organizations, in particular the United Nations, the means to rapidly respond to a crisis area in an expedited manner to prevent the escalation of a humanitarian crisis and to prevent genocide. For a considerable amount of time the United Nations had been searching for a means to shorten the period of time between a decision by the Security Council to establish an operational mission and the arrival of troops and equipment into the mission area. The creation of the UNSAS and the development of RDMHQ were in theory, serious steps toward the creation of the UN rapid deployable force. The creation of SHIRBRIG in 1996 was a successful and logical step at the time which tried to fit into the UN requirements for units that could deploy as self-sufficient forces on short notice in support of United Nations peacekeeping missions.

When requested, SHIRBRIG was able to carry out its deployments within the allotted time established by the United Nations guidelines and timeframes. SHIRBRIG only had one deployment (UNMEE), its initial, where it was a brigade size element with the subsequent deployments (UNOCI, UNMIL, UNAMIS, UNMIS) being in the realm of interim Headquarters or planning assistance deployments of staff officers. These last deployments cannot give a true picture of the ability of SHIRBRIG to deploy according to its original brigade concept but it does show the change in mission and strengths. It must be mentioned that in the SHIRBRIG MOU it states that “the SHIRBRIG would operate as a multinational Brigade with a multinational staff and sub-units consisting of national and/or multinational personnel” and this was what the DPKO expected from this type of brigade and not just the multinational rapid deployment staff. 166 Even so, this is a low number of deployments for the organization and serves as a reminder that the organization operated well below its actual potential.

When reviewing the SHIRBRIG against the timeline of the development of the EUs Security Strategy and development of the Battle Groups it can determined that concept and continuation of the SHIRBRIG would be terminated at some point. This was partially due to the fact the Military Forces dedicated to the SHIRBRIG by various nations would also be the Forces dedicated to the EU Battle Groups. Both the SHIRBRIG and EU Battle Groups were developed as a means to support the UN by providing a rapid deployment capability within a short time. NATO has a broader overall organizational concept for its forces and with the development of the NRF it added the capacity to support the United Nations with a rapid deployment capability. All three of the organizations were very similar in regards to purpose and mission but there are some dissimilarities and problems that could have arisen as well between the organizations.

Areas of Differences

- EU and NATO have a larger pool of forces to draw upon than SHIRBRIG
- EU and NATO had larger budgets and stronger national support from its members than SHIRBRIG

Problem Areas

- All three organizations could have the same set of forces on call
- Limited number of forces and decision making process
- Issues with DPKO

Two major challenges hampered the SHIRBRIG relationship with the United Nations for the organization. The first being that the SHIRBRIG did not have the capacity to negotiate directly with DPKO for missions and all the negotiations had to be conducted through the national channels which negatively affected SHIRBRIG capacity for rapid deployment. The establishment of a permanent SHIRBRIG liaison officer assigned to the DPKO could have assisted in expediting communication and potential coordination between the two organizations. This lack of communications assisted in the growth of an inherent tension between the DPKO and SHIRBRIG.

The other challenge was that of logistics which also hampered the ability to deploy rapidly and ability to sustain the force. The “first in – first out” deployment concept meant that in-theater infrastructure, resources and UN logistical footprint was reduced because the SHIRBRIG relied on national support elements which could support themselves but those forces that relied on UN supply system had serious difficulties.

After 2006, SHIRBRIG contributing nations became reluctant to commit units, both maneuver and logistical support units following the trend by SHIRBRIG to a reduced deployment limited to a Brigade HQ and staff. This actually caused the DPKO to lose interest in SHIRBRIG and its limited capabilities and the start of its demise.

Between 2008 and 2009 SHIRBRIG had become an organization in crisis due to the lack of financial and budgetary support from its supporting membership, lack of support of SHIRBRIG initiatives towards the

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African Capabilities Building (ACB) and its adjustments to its concepts, status and tasks in order to keep relevant with its limited capabilities. By this time, SHIRBRIG was losing its relevance and support of its membership and that of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Even then Denmark’s supports for SHIRBRIG both financially and politically started to disintegrate by 2008 as it began to re-orient its priorities and focus. As the organization was dealing with its own crisis of support, and it diminishing support capabilities to ASF, it was also losing to larger organizations with increased financial and political support from nations trying to assist ASF development. As a result, by 2009 with no firm funding commitment from its member states and no option or capability to spend fund on its activities the whole program became in jeopardy.

Overall, SHIRBRIG earned a reputation for providing a cohesive force with the highest level of peacekeeping expertise and training standards and was praised by the DPKO numerous times, in particular UNMEE and UNMIL. SHIRBRIG concepts and its capability of establishing and performing as an interim headquarters at the start of United Nations missions prior to regular UN Forces arriving can be seen as a success for the organization. It proved to be extremely useful for the United Nations and provided an important niche for SHIRBRIG to fill and to be fully utilized. A testimony to its success is noted in the UN Secretary General’s Report in March 2008 where it is reported that the DPKOs Office of Military Affairs was restructuring to replicate the SHIRBRIG concept. This is also a negative for SHIRBRIG because with the UN replicating the concept the need to utilize SHIRBRIG for this capability became less necessary and a duplication of effort.

SHIRBRIG also recognized that it had problems in the areas of force generation and cumbersome decision making process both internal and external of which it attempted to overcome when possible. The organization was developed by the political motivation of a few nations but within a few years the political resolve and support started to unfold when it was realized that the original aim of providing a rapid reaction brigade capability was impossible. This was a significant problem for the organization because it was caught up with reform attempts that were half-hearted at best and it was halted from unfolding and tapping into its full potential. In regards to operational activities, SHIRBRIG was a success in fulfilling missions and providing training and well equipped personnel to conduct the mission. The SHIRBRIG planning element (PLANELM) provided high level permanent planning capabilities and successfully supported the African capacity building endeavor invoked throughout the region.

As with all organizations, the strength and capabilities of Multi-National coalitions comes from within and would only remain as strong as the support that they receive from contributing nations. This was true for SHIRBRIG, NATO NRF and EU Battle Groups, which all must receive the support of its membership in order to survive. While both the European Union Battle Group and the NATO NRF currently have the political, financial and military backing to succeed as rapid deployment forces in support of peacekeeping missions and humanitarian efforts, they have yet to be tested or fully utilized. The decline of any organization, starts when there is doubt and lack of political determination and financial backing to support the tasks and missions of the organization and ultimately leads to the elimination of the organization. SHIRBRIG was such a case as it ceased to exist on 30 June 2009 along with all its optimism and goals for a rapid response force for PKOs.
Bibliography


