Military-enabled Quick Impact Projects
Improve Quality of Life of Local Populations

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Introduction/Rationale

In their seminal work, "From Conflict to Peacebuilding" analysts at the United Nations Environment Program observe the dominance of conflict in the last 60+ years.[1] These wars have ranged from traditional operations such as World Wars I & II, to asymmetric intra and interstate contingencies or insurgencies such as the Vietnam War, the British emergency in Malaysia, the French Campaign in Algeria or any number of United Nations Peacekeeping missions conducted from 1948 to the present. Addressing issues like water management, sanitation, and infrastructure improvements, among others, has proven to be pivotal in building trust and confidence with the local population in both conflict and post-conflict environments. Military forces working on projects that address these issues can contribute a great deal to achieving long term stability. Under U.N. auspices, Quick Impact Projects, coordinated by the military and supported by local people, are essential to building long term stability.

History is rife with those who recognized the critical importance of addressing issues like water quality and infrastructure improvement. For example, in the midst of the campaign to capture Sicily in 1943, one unknown officer wrote, , *"..... what a lot of headaches I found. Water supply damaged. No power. No food. No fuel, and corpses all over town to bury."[2]* He understood that fascism was not defeated until basic quality of life issues were addressed. Over two decades later, counterinsurgency strategists like Robert Komer and his allies came to similar conclusions as they sought a way to win the war in Vietnam. President Lyndon Johnson's decision in March 1967 to select Komer to serve as the head of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Program marked the recognition within the White House, Department of Defense, and the U.S. national security establishment of the critical value of efforts at improving infrastructure and raising the quality of life for the Vietnamese to winning the war.[3] Similar conclusions were reached during the U.S. and allied efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq at the dawn of the 21st century. Under the auspices of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, U.S. and allied forces built schools, clinics, and wells as a way to strengthen relationships with local Afghans and Iraqis. These examples show that infrastructure improvement projects coordinated within military activities have been a significant part of efforts to establish security and win wars for almost 75 years.

United Nations use of Quick Impact Projects in peacekeeping operations is of a similar spirit to the efforts during the Sicilian campaign, the CORDs Operation, and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq. Describing how Quick Impact Projects that improve water quality and infrastructure contribute to security will shed light on how these types of programs to win "hearts and minds" can help settle conflicts. Using case studies, this paper will address the research question of how peacekeeping missions can contribute to improved local natural resources management through conducting Quick Impact Projects (QIP), a type of project that involves supplying "basic services" such as energy, water, waste and sanitation to the population in a fairly short amount of time. The paper will further analyse past and present operations, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each campaign. How the military element of power works in each of these occupations matters as do efforts to gain and maintain the trust of local populations.

At first glance, infrastructure improvement projects seem an unlikely use of military power. On deeper analysis, though, reflections on the larger history of conflict and on 21st century security challenges show that military forces have an important role to play. No full history of any war can be called complete without discussion of post-conflict recovery. And in the history of most wars, the military has a pivotal role in assisting the defeated nation, and other nations affected by the war, rebuild their society. For example, it would be hard to imagine a broad history of World War II without a discussion of the occupations of Japan and Germany. Likewise, no study of U.N. peacekeeping operations in the 21st century would be complete without reference to the Quick Impact Project program.

The nature of threats to struggling governments in the developing world and elsewhere underscores the importance of programs like the United Nations Quick Impact Program. In the 21st century, sources of instability range far beyond state actors. In his 2005 report "In Larger Freedoms" Secretary General Kofi Annan made noted that, " one in six human beings – still live on less than a dollar a day, lacking the means to stay alive in the face of chronic hunger, disease and environmental hazards."[4] The same year that report was released, the HIV/AIDS epidemic has killed more than 20 million men, women and children while infecting over 40 million more.[5] Despite the efforts of the United States, the U.N., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and others the threat of terrorism remains high. In this context, many governments in the developing world find themselves besieged by the spread of poverty, disease, natural disasters, and violent extremists.

In such a precarious world, creative use of military power is important. The conduct of military operations and subsequent occupation is a key element to stabilizing and rebuilding a war torn nation or region. Additionally, while each operation has its own volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) characteristics, success is often influenced by the presence or lack of "Population Centric" strategies or "winning the hearts and minds" of the population mind set. This is particularly critical in "small scale contingencies."[6] The term "Population Centric," credited to U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd as part of his unpublished presentation entitled "Patterns of Conflict," refers to operations that establish and maintain the support of the population using kinetic and non-kinetic means as part of a coordinated plan. The "winning the hearts and minds" euphemism (first credited to the United Kingdom coined during the Emergency of Malaya 1948-60) made popular during the Vietnam War, is defined as "a less coercive approach to counterinsurgency which emphasises the use of minimum force in order to win the hearts and minds of the people".[7] Regardless of the term used, continued support of the local population and the host nation government is paramount to success whether in a large or smaller scale contingency. In theory, if the host nation government and local population is of the impression that an occupying force is there to lend assistance, military presence spent in returning the area to a semblance of order will garner support instead of resistance.[1]

In both categories of traditional and smaller scale contingencies a variety of occupation strategies have been used. Arguably, the most successful strategies were able to gain and maintain the support of the local population. Enlightened leaders (civilian and military) realized early on, particularly in the case of small scale contingencies, the enemy's main objective or his center of gravity, was to control the population. This section will focus on selected historical examples of both traditional operations and smaller scale contingencies to analyse and highlight successful strategies, and not to demonstrate expertise of each example.

In sum, when conflicts end, military forces have a huge role to play in helping a nation recover from war. If Quick Impact Projects address shared values between the host nation government and the populace, rather than being selected simply because they can be easily and rapidly accomplished; and if they are executed in close coordination among the military and the host nation including broad local population involvement, QIP may significantly contribute to building long term stability.

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[1] "In practice, some officers report they did not actually have this experience in Iraq or Afghanistan in spite of constant information campaigns which tried to portray the US military presence (BCT/PRT/SOF) in this manner."

Historical Case Studies (U.S.)

Wars in Mexico and the Philippines

The United States has been engaged in military missions that feature population centric policies since before the American Civil War. During the Mexican American War 1846-1848, U.S. commander Major General Winfield Scott executed policies that were sensitive to the opinions of occupied people throughout Southern Mexico. An avid student of history, Scott learned from Napoleon Bonaparte's disastrous Peninsular Campaign in Spain a generation before. Bonaparte's brutal tactics during the Spanish occupation sparked a robust insurgency that substantially contributed to his downfall, tying up troop strength that could have been used elsewhere. [8]

With a paltry force of 10,000 dependent on extended supply lines, Scott knew he could not afford to spark a resistance movement in Southern Mexico. He first instituted relative area security and an effective military government in each occupied area. Under his implementation of general Order 20, the laws and regulations applied to U.S. forces as well as the local population. Crime and corruption, particularly if perpetrated by U.S. troops, were severely dealt with. In addition, Scott used discipline to ensure his force respected private property and religious shrines and paid for goods and services to local vendors. He introduced sweeping changes in sanitation thereby providing essential services to the population. His was a "firm but fair" approach to occupation by using population centric measures to mitigate rear area distractions to his war fighting mission. While unable to entirely eliminate these disruptions, his strategy was successful at keeping order and completing his war time mission ending in the capture of Mexico City in 1848. [9]

For the next several generations of U.S. military officers the lessons learned by MG Scott would pay dividends in subsequent occupation strategies. One such example was the U.S. campaign in the Philippines from 1899- 1901. The Philippine Campaign is important for several reasons, not least of which included the central role played by QIP-type projects. U.S. forces planned to end the insurrection against American occupation by the capture of the revolutionary leader, Emilio Aguinaldo. Part of the U.S. focus was wresting the initiative away from Aguinaldo's guerrillas by focusing on programs that improved sanitation and expanded educational opportunities. [10]

Scott's campaign in Mexico in the 19th century and the U.S. war in the Philippines in the early 20th century testify to how successful strategies take the initiative away from the insurgents and deny them unrestricted access to the population. These policies featured projects to supply essential services such as clean water, improve sanitation

conditions, and efforts to reinvigorate local economies. The similarity of these early efforts to modern QIP projects suggests that the U.S. has been working on these kinds of projects with their military forces for a long while.[2] :

The Vietnam War

During the height of the Cold War, conflict between the anti-communist Republic of Vietnam and the Communist North reached a fever pitch in the middle 1960s.[11] U.S. observers feared that the South was about to be overrun. Several strategic level problems plagued early U.S. efforts in South Vietnam. Most important of all was a basic lack of security in the provinces, villages, and hamlets. Despite millions of dollars in U.S. aid and an advisory system dating back to the mid-1950s, the government of South Vietnam was unable to provide security. The North Vietnamese and Communist insurgents had nearly unfettered access to the population. At the same time, the overall U.S. strategy to pacify or gain control of the provinces by winning the hearts and minds of the population was a fragmented effort void of an overall command structure. Put simply, the U.S. military and civilian strategies were developed separately, uncoordinated, and lacked unity of effort.[12] The security situation became such that the U.S. committed major troop formations to South Vietnam by 1965 to stem the tide of Communism in South East Asia.

As with any successful counterinsurgency effort, the grand strategy required kinetic and non-kinetic operations. Unfortunately, from 1965 to mid to late 1967, the prime U.S. directive, known as "search and destroy" was to seek the enemy out and destroy him. [13] Just as important, but secondary to the war fighting effort, was the pacification of the South Vietnamese country side. Realizing the fragmented "stove piped" strategy was not working, President Lyndon Johnson took personal interest in solving the problem. Using expertise from his trusted advisor to the National Security Council, Robert Komer, President Johnson facilitated the creation of an innovative organization called the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support or CORDS with the passing of National Security Action Memorandum 362, "Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification."[14] With Komer as the head of CORDS with the rank equivalent of a Lieutenant General, he was the principle deputy of the commander of the war effort in South Vietnam, General William Westmoreland at the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) located in Saigon, then capital of South Vietnam.[15]

Komer, Westmoreland, and others working on CORDs innovated situating the program in a way so that it combined U.S. civilian and military efforts to solve

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[2] "Although not strictly categorizable as QIP-type programs, both Scott and US commanders in the Philippines also undertook to resolve land disputes and other intrapopulace structural conflicts. Both the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Taliban have used similar activities to obtain populace's support."]

infrastructure development issues similar to the ones tackled by QIPs. South Vietnam was divided into four Corps Areas. Each corps area mirrored MACV headquarters and thus had a civilian CORDS representative as the second in command. [16] At the next lower command level, the province the leadership structure mirrored the Corps command structure. In each of the 44 provinces the province chief, usually a South Vietnamese Army or Marine Colonel, reported directly to Corps headquarters on the status of all programs in their area. Setting up CORDS in this way combined the military with civilian organizations such as the United States Department of State the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), under one command to aid in the overall pacification effort by denying the enemy access to the South Vietnamese population.

A primary goal of CORDS was on development and assistance projects and programs in the rural provinces of South Vietnam. The program focused on the pacification effort or counterinsurgency, as it was commonly referred to in Vietnam at the time. It aimed to build capacity in the villages and hamlets so they could withstand the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese influence. [17] Examples of the programs consolidated under CORDS with the name of "new life development" included refugee disposition, assisting the National Police, the Chu Hoi program (focused on the defection of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers), the CIA run Rural Development Cadre, MACVs Civic Action and Civil Affairs programs and the U.S. Joint Public Affairs Office psychological operations.[18] USAID alone helped establish numerous schools, hospitals and health clinics, highways, hydroelectric plants and farming cooperatives.[19]

Some of the more prominent military programs included building security sector capacity in the South Vietnamese militia or local units such as the Regional Forces and Popular Forces. These units, similar to the U.S. National Guard were designed to deny the enemy access to the population through self-defense.[20] Another military program was the controversial Phoenix Program. This program was designed to eliminate the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) which would infiltrate into South Vietnamese villages and set up a shadow government at the local level. In addition, they offered essential services to the villages and hamlets in exchange for joining their insurgency movement. The Phoenix program was essentially an intelligence gathering organization that identified VCI and removed them from the area either by capture, conversion, or elimination. The key to the success of Phoenix and other pacification programs for that matter was its continued presence in the rural provinces.[21]

Even though victory eluded the U.S., their coalition partners, and the South Vietnamese, by all accounts the CORDS concept proved its worth as an integrated, interagency means to assist the population by building capacity in a number of areas. Through CORDS, QIP-type programs provided essential services such as sanitation,

access to clean water and medical treatment. The CORDS program also assisted farming practices, road improvements and security sector reform, which greatly improved the quality of life for the people it touched, at least for a while.

Recent Case Studies:

Afghanistan

Soon after the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the United States and coalition partners invaded Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. With a combination of conventional and special operations forces coupled with local Afghan militia backing (The Northern Alliance) and strategic bombing, the Taliban was driven from power after two months of fighting.[22] Driving the Taliban from the center of power would not be enough to claim real victory in the war. U.S. and allied forces believed that it was necessary to help rebuild parts of Kabul's infrastructure. Knowing that this would be an economy of force mission, the United States initiated a mixed military and civilian personnel reconstruction mission called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). PRTs would undertake limited missions to improve the quality of life of the newly liberated Afghans.[23]

The mandate setting up the PRT testified to the many different participants in the international reconstruction of Afghanistan. Two commands implemented the concept: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The ISAF, a NATO command, sanctioned by the United Nations, was based in Kabul. It initially focused on the security in and around the city. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386 of December 20, 2001, as related to Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, provided legal direction under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to establish an International Security Assistance Force. The focus of ISAF was "to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding area, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the United Nations can operate in a safe environment."[24] Conversely, the OEF military command, called Combined Forces Command, Afghanistan (CFC-A), was the U.S. led coalition focused on the destruction of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Their PRTs operated under no international mandate but at the invitation of the Afghan government.[25] Recognizing these mandates matters because it shows how the different participants related to the Afghan government and United Nations.

Initially called Joint Regional Teams in November 2002, PRTs started out as small six person reconstruction teams, charged with "winning the hearts and minds" of the Afghan population by executing projects specifically focused on essential services.

By 2003, at the request of the Afghan government, the name was changed to PRT. Their numbers were expanded to routinely number between 50-100 people, with the German PRTs in the Kunduz and Badakhshan provinces as the largest numbering 300-400 people each.[26] U. S. PRTs were commanded by a military officer and staffed by 90% or more military personnel. PRTs incorporated civilian representatives from organizations such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Department of Agriculture, and U.S. Department of State, and their NATO coalition equivalents.[27] Although military personnel are contained in the PRTs, they are routinely equipped for defensive and not offensive operations.[28]

The focus of PRTs was originally in the three areas: enhancing security through security sector reform, reconstruction, and extending the central government influence into the provinces. However, in 2002 their charter extended to include strengthening local governance and community development.[29] Projects and programs credited to the PRTs were many and varied. Many implemented Quick Impact Projects (QIP) such as providing access to potable water, sanitation, medical assistance, repair of roads and schools, assistance to local government, agricultural advising, veterinary services and security sector reform.[30] With the approval of higher headquarters and Afghan government counterparts, some PRTs decided to take on larger development or infrastructure projects, such as building a road, a school or a hospital. The execution of the PRT program intended to put Afghans at the center. After initial coordination problems, several oversight groups were established with the Afghan government being quite proactive in planning PRT activities. The strategic level group established overall coordination with the PRT Executive Working Group. Meeting once a month, this group of senior level decision makers was chaired by the Afghan Minister of Interior, with other representation from the Afghan Ministers of Finance and Reconstruction and Rural Development, the commanders of ISAF and CFC-A, the United Nations Special Representative to the Secretary General, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, to name a few. Two other feeder groups were established to coordinate at the operational level and include the PRT Working Group and the NGO Civil-Military Working Group. The 2005 Danish Institute For International Studies report states that the PRT Working Group met on a weekly basis and acted as a coordination committee responsible for keeping the Executive Working Group apprised of all operational level issues. The NGO Civil Military Working Group met monthly and was responsible for facilitating coordination and cooperation among the NGO/IO community.[31] Making the Afghans such a critical part of the leadership of the PRT program meant that PRT commanders would be more sensitive to local needs and conditions. While some might argue this arrangement allowed corrupt individuals to steer lucrative projects towards family contractors, or created divisive fissures amongst local leaders, it also gave local

Afghans and the Afghan government a direct stake in the project's outcome.

Funding for the PRT program came from both military and civilian sources. The funding mechanism directly available to PRT commanders was the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), financed by the U.S. Department of Defense.[32] According to the GAO-09-86R Provincial Reconstruction Teams report of October 1, 2008 examples of projects and programs routinely funded by CERP monies ranged from provision of day labor jobs and essential services such as water and sanitation, to rule of law and the repair of coalition damage to an area. Other resources available to the PRTs included USAID programs and activities, such as the Local Governance and Community Development Program (LGCD), Alternative Development Program (ADP) and Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA), though the PRT did not have control over the implementation of these programs. These USAID programs were implemented in areas that PRTs also operated in to provide additional support to the Afghan government as they built the capacity of local government to meet the essential service needs of the population.[33]

The different models of the PRTs offered several examples of how coalition military and civilian personnel could work together on reconstruction missions in the context of various degrees of security. In the 2005 Danish Institute for International Studies report in Afghanistan PRTs varied in size and mission and were led by multiple NATO countries under NATO/ISAF control. While other PRT models existed by 2008 three examples stood out: the U.S. Model, the British Model, and the German Model. While there were many characteristics that made each model unique, only a few will be mentioned here.

The U.S. model was commanded by a military officer, numbered approximately 80 people in strength with all but three to five members being in the military and their focus was on QIPs [Quick Impact Projects]. The British Model was slightly larger, about 100 people, but had an increased number of civilians, approximately 30. The lead in the British model was a civilian and their focus was on local capacity building. The German Model, the largest of the three, could contain upwards of 400-500 people, of which approximately 20 were civilians. They had dual leadership (one civilian, one military), and their focus was on long term sustainable development.[34]

According to the CIMIC and PRT Operations in ISAF publication of 8 April, 2008, on October 5, 2006 all PRTs came under the operational control of COMISAF. By late January 2007 there were 25 PRTs operating in Afghanistan, led by 13 different nations operating in 31 of the 34 provinces.[35] That said, each sponsoring nation led their respective PRT(s) and determined its size and structure.[36] The specific

town/city/province locations of these PRTs are listed below. PRTs were grouped by regional command, which were each led by a distinct coalition member. [37] (See Map 1)

Map 1

Iraq:

At the time the PRT concept in Afghanistan was considered successful so the United States established a similar program in Iraq on October 25, 2005, through Joint Cable 4045, issued jointly by the multi-National Force-Iraq and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. By mid-December of 2007 there were a total of 28 PRTs active in all 18 Iraqi provinces, 15 being embedded with military units, (called ePRTs). These smaller versions of PRTs were organized as a result of escalating violence in Iraq, and in answer to President Bush's *"New Way Forward Strategy"* announced in January 2007.[38]   The smaller ePRTs focused on projects and programs at the municipal and community level thereby supporting the military surge with increased civil capacity capability at several levels of Iraqi society. In 2011, the last PRT closed with the withdrawal of U.S. troops.[39]

The Iraqi PRT program functioned differently than its Afghanistan cousin in important ways. To start, the Iraqi version of PRTs were led by a representative from the U.S. Department of state, with a military person, normally a Major or Lieutenant Colonel as the Deputy Commander.[40] As for missions, the Iraqi PRTs differed from the Afghan

version in that PRTs in Iraq only did QIP as-needed. The main focus focused on building Iraqi capacity in the following Essential Tasks or Lines of Activities (LOAs): governance, economic development, rule of law, national unity, and public diplomacy.[41]

In other ways, the Iraqi PRT echoed the Afghanistan PRTs. Iraqi PRT's focused on helping Afghan governments. Their mission set forth by Joint Cable 4045 was, "to assist Iraq's provincial governments in developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern, to promote increased security and rule of law, to promote political and economic development, and to provide the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population."[42] Iraqi PRTs, like Afghan ones, were supposed to support the Iraqi government allied with the U.S. coalition.

Iraqi PRTs also mirrored their colleagues in Afghanistan in their emphasis on civilian expertise. Like Afghan PRTS, Iraqi PRTS drew on a wide variety of experts from a variety of U.S. Government departments and organizations such as the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture and subject matter experts from other nations.

To tighten the use of civilian expertise to the PRT mission in Iraq, the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), located in the Embassy in Baghdad, provided oversight on PRT projects and programs. The 40 person staff that made up the OPA measured whether or not PRT programs were hitting the key Lines of Activity goals. One of the measurement tools used to focus PRT projects and programs was the PRT Work Plan, which was completed on a quarterly basis. The plan was developed by the PRT and coordinated with the local military commander to mitigate redundant activities. Once coordinated, the plan was then sent to OPA to determine if any issues or problems exist with the PRT proposals. This bottoms-up approach was to ensure the PRT Work Plans were in keeping with the intent of all higher headquarters orders as they related to the five LOAs.[43]

PRT work plan was not the only way the OPA measured progress. The OPA developed a performance monitoring tool that included clearly stated objectives and milestones. In November 2007, OPA implemented a maturity model based on an assessment of PRT projects and programs relative to the five LOAs. The Maturity Model process was an internationally recognized method for assessing the progress of major change management programs. The PRT Team Leader, with the input from PRT Team members and ePRTs, if assigned, completed the assessment by reviewing the metrics in context with the state of the province. They compared the progress in each province with generic statements for each level of maturity as outline in various Lines of Action. Following a review of these comparison a Team Leader and others selected to participate

in the assessment matched the province or project with the best descriptions available. The Work Plans were then forwarded to the OPA desk officers. Off these submissions, the officers then developed a Provincial Overview, which provided something akin to a "provincial state of the union." The Provincial Overview summarized the Maturity Model, USAID PDS (Public Distribution System), CMO assessments, Intelligence reports (classification dependant), GRD IRMS (Gulf Region Division; Iraq Reconstruction Management System), RSO (Regional Security Officer) reports, and the Weekly SITREPs. The Chief of Mission reviewed this document and made decisions off of it that related to projects in individual provinces, and was an essential document for the Chief of Mission when making decisions affecting individual provinces.[44]

The Chief of Mission was not the only person to use these reports. Higher level members of the Joint PRT Working Group looked at them to understand the overall provincial picture. Issues that required further attention were forwarded to the Joint PRT Steering Group. They would determine if a change in direction was required.[45]

Similar to their colleagues in Afghanistan, there were several funding mechanisms available to Iraq PRTs. They had direct authority to allocate funds for several programs namely the Quick Response Fund (QRF) and the Provincial Reconstruction Development Council (PRDC) program. Both were State Department initiatives with the QRF being a joint program with USAID. The QRF was established to fund programs focused on enhancing capacity in the areas of social and civil society and the economy, while the PRDC focused on building capacity at the provincial level related to providing essential services to the population. Programs indirectly available to the PRTs include USAID's Local Governance Program, Community Action Program, and Community Stabilization Program; and the Department of Defense funded Commanders Emergency Relief Program (CERP). Under these programs the PRT did not have authority to allocate funds and was required to coordinate with the funding entity to participate in each program.

Not all of the programs in Iraq were highly centralized in Baghdad. U.S. and coalition partners founded the Local Governance Program enhanced the management skills at the city and provincial levels focused on providing essential services to the population. The Community Action Plan was designed to strengthen the link between the community and their governments at the local and provincial levels while the Community Stabilization Program focused on offering alternatives for young men to participate in sectarian violence through short term work programs.

The plan was to have active Iraqi PRTs active until 2011 when their projects and programs were either completed or authority turned over to the Iraqi civilian authority or

organizations such as USAID.[46] After August 2010, Iraqi PRTs focused on more "consular and diplomatic duties."[47] Map two below from 2011 provides a good visual of how the PRTs were distributed throughout the various provinces of Iraq to maximize assistance where it was needed most.

Overall, the PRT programs in Afghanistan and Iraq served unique roles and provided arguably successful civilian-military coordination in strategically determined provinces. But they were not flawless victories. There are a variety of criticisms of each from various sources, of which only a few will be discussed here. For example, one of the chief complaints of PRTs in both Iraq and Afghanistan was in the areas of strategic, operational guidance, and coordination. In the early days of the Afghan reconstruction, several complaints arose over the use of PRTs. The humanitarian community had several concerns, one being, PRTs did not have specific direction, their project planning and execution process at all levels were substandard and poorly coordinated. This caused duplication of effort.[48] In addition, the humanitarian community provides assistance because the local population needs it whereas the military lends assistance to "win the hearts and minds" blurring the lines between the two, making it dangerous for the humanitarian effort to carry out its mission.[49]

Early in Iraq a similar coordination criticism was voiced by some PRTs that they were unaware of programs underway in their area sponsored by other organizations.[50] That issue was addressed by May 2008 when coordination between PRTs and the local military commander had been markedly improved.[51]

A variety of challenges plagued the PRT program both internally and externally. For example, there were USG concerns about the lack of coordination between PRTs and the interagency or Civil/Military community, the abundance of financial resources but the lack of technical development expertise of military units. Communications were also an issue i.e. DoD had SIPR Net capabilities, Department of State had OpenNet and NATO had its own system. Additionally, USAID had program limitations that prevented PRT determination of project locations at the local level.[52]

Other complaints that plagued the PRT program, included NGO and intergovernmental organizations concerns that (in Afghanistan) the presence of PRTs jeopardized the overall reconstruction effort claiming that impartiality could not be maintained and would be detrimental for them to operate in the area for any length of time.[53] In addition, PRTs were said to blur the lines between combatants and civilians given they consisted of primarily military personnel.[54]

CURRENT PRT LOCATIONS & DOS CIVILIAN PRESENCE

United Nations Operations Conducting Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)

Similar to the United States and its allies, the United Nations has featured QIPs in its peacekeeping operations for a long time. According to the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Quick Impact Projects Provisional Guide*, the term "Quick Impact Project" was first used in 1991 to "describe small-scale, low cost projects designed to assist reintegration of refugees and displaced persons in Nicaragua."[55] In subsequent years, QIP projects grew from being "one shot" affairs to, in the words of the guide authors, to "elaborate sets of activities" that attached "relief to long term development." [56] QIP projects went from being short term or Band-Aid solution to more mid-term in nature. QIPs continued to evolve further in 2000. In August 2000 the authors of the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* recommended "The head of mission should have authority to apply a small percentage of

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mission funds to "quick impact projects" aimed at real improvements in quality of life, to help establish the credibility of a new mission in UN Peacekeeping operations." (See excerpt from page 6, Paragraph 37 of the document below) The panel envisioned QIP as part of a wider strategy for economic development. [57] Initially the budget threshold was set at USD $25,000 then extended to $50,000 per project. In December 2001, U.N. peacekeeping missions began using QIPs in a serious way. The mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) budgeted $700,000 USD for QIPs and several million USD were allocated to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Seven years after the "Report on the Panel of UN Peace Operations," a more formal policy was promulgated by the U.N. that solidified QIPs as part of all peace keeping missions. The *United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Services (DPKO/DFS) Policy on Quick Impact Projects*, first approved in February 2007, gave specific guidance for the conduct of all QIPs within all United Nations Peacekeeping mission. Updated in 2009, 2011 and 2013 the document provides detailed instructions on the purpose, scope, rationale and policy of the QIP program. Of particular note is the policy section of the document. It spells out in great detail not only the definition and purpose, nature and scope, value and duration of QIPs, but guidance on program and financial management and budgetary issues associated with QIPs.[58]

QIPs can come from many different sources within the U.N. or affiliated institutions. QIPs can and have been initiated by UN Agencies, NGOs, civic organizations, and Civil Military Operations/Civil Affairs or CIMIC units.[59] Unlike CA units attached to PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, UN CIMIC and CA sections are part of the Mission's Military Component and Civilian Component, respectively, whereas PRTs are entities unto themselves.

In substance the QIPs include emergency small-scale community projects, but can have a long term positive effect on a community or region. QIPs range from those that have as a main focus on infrastructure, environment and protection, to those focusing on livelihoods, food security, education, and coexistence. There are also differences between QIPs in rural and urban settings. In sum, QIPs come in many shapes and sizes with a variety of missions connected to the needs of the places they are launched.

When planning a QIP, three strategies are recommended. First, QIPs can be designed to kick start a number of activities which will promote additional and future projects with second and third order effects. For example, the purpose of building pit latrines for the Manda Elementary School (UNMEE) was to provide minimum ablution conditions for over 400 students. In turn, with adequate sanitation facilities both hygiene and school attendance was expected to increase. Waste management is an enormous concern both for human health and hygiene issues, but for the second, third order effect

on the environment, building pit latrines in Manda, as well as subsequent pit latrine QIPs made a positive contribution to protecting the area's environment.[60]

Secondly, QIPs can be built to support initiatives that already exist in communities, such as agricultural inputs to farmers (seeds, fertilizers, and tools); improvement of existing water-sources, and improvements of existing infrastructure. For example, the low-cost QIPs developed and executed in the area of Senafe, Eritrea (UNMEE) to build a chicken coop for a small community. Prior to this QIP, chickens roamed wild with little consideration for sanitation and other environmental concerns. The incident rates for salmonella and other chicken-borne illnesses for children were significant. Once the chicken coop QIP was implemented, the chicken population was better controlled and illness incident rate in children decreased. [61]

Thirdly, when launching a QIP planners must look at how the project can be a part of a larger, area-based development or recovery programme. MINUSTAH (Haiti) QIPs serve as a good example. MINUSTAH's projects (QIPs) that created immediate and visible benefits for the population, i.e., small scale, community-based, income-generating projects that sustain people have effect over multiple segments of the community. For example, there are QIPs that support small agriculture projects, i.e. communal plantations, farmers' cooperatives, fruit and vegetable processing, etc.), fish farming projects (i.e., "Bassin Piscicole" in Fort-Liberte), support livestock/poultry raising (Central Plateau, North East), and support waste and water management projects (i.e., Dame Marie, Grande Anse modeled after UNDP Carrefour Feuilles project).[62]

In all of these projects, environmental considerations matter. Environment impact is an integral part of the QIP planning process. It is important to ensure long-term sustainability of programs which require special attention. This can be done through partnerships with agencies that possess relevant environmental expertise to guide the planning and programming process. Environmental impact survey's assessments are important in order to understand the interaction between the physical environments and human activities in key areas such as sustainable agriculture and jobs creation.

QIPs in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

By 2009 Haiti's QIP program was approved for a sixth year budgeting 3 million USD to reinforce MINUSTAH's renewed drive to win the hearts and minds of the island population. Deplorable living conditions, due to food and energy cost increases on the world markets, and the 2008 hurricane season effectively decimated several years of economic growth.[63]

Due to the devastating earthquake, on 12 January 2010, the United Nations Security Council endorsed the recommendation to increase the overall force levels of MINUSTAH to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts with additional military and police components of 8,940 and 3,711 (respectively).[64]

QIPs, even though limited in scope, helped to significantly improve the environment for effective mandate implementation and help ameliorate security conditions for MINUSTAH personnel after those three years of increased duress, added to the already very poor living conditions in the poorest country of the western hemisphere. Owing to their popularity and high visibility, QIPs can make a difference in boosting and maintaining public confidence in the Mission, its activities, and the democratic process.

Three major areas of support have been sought by the Haitian Government – the rehabilitation of infrastructure, the resumption of the school year and sector emergencies such as agriculture and health.[65]

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1780 (2007) "underlines the need for the quick implementation of highly effective and visible labour intensive projects that help create jobs and deliver basic social services."[66] In light of the April 2008 mass demonstrations against the extreme poverty exacerbated by the hurricanes that left masses of lost/damaged lives and properties, the Mission faces a renewed requirement to address the real and apparent needs of the population if MINUSTAH is to continue winning the greater support of the population towards the Mission mandate and if it is to provide support to the security and stabilization in the country.

From 2004 to 2015 MINUSTAH implemented more than 1,600 QIP projects from 2004 to 2015 with a focus on infrastructure, training/capacity building, basic delivery of public services and social mobilization as the main areas of intervention.[67]

The QIPs in Haiti not only facilitated the delivery of basic public services, but also feed people, developed a sustainable base (agriculture and economic development), and directly benefited the population. Such QIPs have included:

- Solar-powered street lighting.
- Shore protection projects aimed at protecting water sources, preventing flooding of fields and increasing local production.

- Construction/rehabilitation of courts of justices, schools, public markets, canals, water wells and pumps, and basic electrification and solar-powered village lighting.[68]

Solar powered street lighting in Haiti.

In October 2010 an epidemic of cholera broke out in Haiti due to insufficient sanitation, access to clean water and adequate sanitation conditions. The area most affected has been rural areas, but the growing city population put them at risk as well. To date, the Ministry of Public Health and Population recorded 719,377 suspected cases and another 8,767 deaths related to the disease as of November, 2014.

Among other organizations MINUSTAH supported the effort by institutional support at the departmental and local level and instituting a number of QIPs. The focus of at least eight of these projects has been access to clean drinking water which has benefitted over 45,000 inhabitants.[69]

QIPs in UNMEE (UN Mission Ethiopia and Eritrea)

UNMEE began its QIP program in early 2001 with USD 700,000 supplied by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The mission then received an additional 1.7 million dollars from some fifty partners supporting programs in the areas of health, education, sanitation, and water projects for over three quarters of a million people in the affected area. By September 2005, approximately 123 QIPs were initiated with G5/CIMIC assistance, completing 96.

The QIPs provided a flexible disbursement option for addressing immediate and short-term needs in the 5K temporary security zone (TSZ) for portions of the population adversely effected by the conflict. These small scale projects focused on the areas of water projects, public sanitation, medical services, civil infrastructure, and training programs.

These projects, ranging in cost from $100 to $15,000, USD were implemented by UN agencies, non-governmental organizations and units of the UNMEE force, civil organizations and local administrations.[70]

The following projects were among those completed:

Safe drinking water for the town of Rama, Ethiopia. This QIP has provided safe drinking water for the town of Rama. It was authorized to repair the local well and water distribution system.

Clean Water Project in Rama, Ethiopia

A water distribution point QIP was constructed in Abo village Eritrea and continues to supply clean water to not only the 1,200 inhabitants of the village, but to the medical clinic and school minimizing water wastage from old rusted pipelines.

The water reservoir QIP constructed in Adi Genu, Eritrea is another water project providing clean drinking water for the town, provides pipeline maintenance and includes a motor pump to bring water to a central distribution point. The QIP was implemented by a local organization, the Comboni Missionary Sisters.

Another QIP, the construction of public latrines in Senafe, Eritrea provided the town with public sanitation facilities. It was implemented by a local NGO – the Eritrean Solidarity and Cooperation Association (ESCA).

As previously noted, the pit latrines for Manda elementary school provided minimum ablution condition for over 400 students. With adequate sanitation facilities both hygiene and school attendance increased. The project was implemented by the Manda local administration.[71]

QIPs in the Darfur (UNAMID)

In January of 2106 UNIMIDs Sector East completed two QIPs consisting of a two classroom building and a four- latrine structure to the Principal of Al-Um Basic School for Girls, in El Daein, Central Darfur. Combined, these projects cost UNIMID $50,000.00 USD.[72]

In another QIP related development, UNAMID Sector East also completed and turned over to the Acting Police Commissioner of East Darfur state, Major General Al-Radey Ali Omar. Mr. Ali expressed appreciation to UNAMID efforts in providing capacity-building training to the government police to enhance the policing system and equip police officers with the basic international policing standards.

The police training center is another example of a project funded by the Mission's QIPs program, costing over 60,000 U.S. dollars. The center will be used to train over 80 per cent of the nearly 3,000 police officers deployed in East Darfur state.[73]

In February, UNAMID's Sector West refurbished two water hand-pumps near in El-Nakheel and the Internally Displace Persons Camp, Krinding 2 in El-Geneina. The projects included indoor plumbing in the El Geneina, El-Shati and El-Tijaria Secondary schools, construction of two underground water tanks in Ardamata prison and construction and furnishing of El-Humaira Kindergarten School in Ardamata. These QIPs were initiated by the Indonesian Battalion of the Peacekeeping force and is expected to supply potable water to hundreds of area residents.[74]

The UNAMID Sector West is also responsible for four additions QIP water projects in El-Geneina, El-Shati and El-Tijaria Higher Secondary schools for girls, in addition to the El-Humaira Kindergarten School and Ardamata prison.[75]

QIPs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO)

In June of 2010 MONUC sponsored several key QIPs for the population in and around the city of Dungu. The first was to refurbish territorial administrative offices all but destroyed by rainstorms. According to local administrators once the buildings were

repaired, foot traffic from the local populations increased. The cost of rebuilding the offices was $22,000 USD with the work being done by the Indonesian Battalion of the Peacekeeping force.[76]

The second project included constructing pavilions as overhead protection for a local farmers market in the Baokandia district of Dungu. This quick impact project not only protected the vendors, but provided for more sanitary conditions of the sale of the local produce. All told the project cost was $14,000 USD and the money provided by the Peacekeeping force was allotted to a local NGO Belle Case Construct who completed the project.[77]

In and around the port city of Matadi, in the Bas-Congo province of the Congo, 17 villages of the province were the beneficiary of a QIP road building project that provided the rural population easy access to establish communications links in the region and surrounding areas.

The unpaved road was completed on 13 February 2012 in Tshimpi, one of the 17 villages and while only 16 kilometers in length, it provided the population a vital transportation link for the sale of their agricultural products.

While funded by MONUSCO, the Association for the Promotion of the Vulnerable and Support to the Mobilization of Community Actions (Association pour la Promotion des Vulnérables et d'Appui à la Mobilisation des Actions communautaires - APROVEMAC) completed the project for a total cost of $14,870 USD.[78]

Conclusions & Recommendations

There are several key conclusions to be drawn from the information presented in this paper to include:

a. Strategies of any reconstruction effort should first include security for the work force. For any reconstruction effort to be successful particularly in the early stages of post hostilities when violence is a very real possibility protecting the workforce to enable them to provide vital services for the population using QIPs such as access to clean drinking water is essential.

b. Clear and concise strategic and operational guidance with all stakeholders in conducting reconstruction projects and programs is essential. Critical stakeholders should include the host nation government, the humanitarian community as well as the Peacekeeping force. A coordinated effort is key to a successful reconstruction program in supporting the critical needs of the local population, particularly in the

vulnerable first stages of post conflict.

c. Given the purpose, objectives and duration of QIPs, the successful implementation of these projects will pay great dividends in building hope for the future among the populace by providing essential services i.e. access to potable water, improved sanitation conditions and medical treatment for the local population. QIP efforts no doubt improve the local populace's quality of life; whether or not QIP consistently positively influence or build trust between local populations and an outside military -- "winning their hearts and minds" -- remains unproven.

d. In peacekeeping missions, while QIPs may have an impact on the local community, thus providing support and acceptance of the mission and the peace process as a whole, it usually falls short on generating deep-rooted changes in the economic, social and cultural aspects. For long term positive effects to happen, political support should be secured at the highest echelons of the host nation government to ensure those improvements generated by QIPs are used as a foundation for deeper transformations in the society. Therefore, there may be the need for coordinating QIPs with changes in public policies to improve long-term stability in the country.

Recommendations:

a. Strict adherence to the established guidelines of QIPs is a must to include placing qualified individuals in key positions to ensure QIPs are done correctly and to standard. Without subject matter experts in leadership positions to properly plan, coordinate and execute these projects i.e. access to clean water and sanitation is a formula for disaster. When the public loses confidence in the mission due to incompetence, slipshod workmanship and cost overruns, the initiative is lost.

b. Strict adherence to contract standards, established timetables and being a good steward of the project's finances should is paramount for an effective QIP program. Unfortunately there have been occasions where cost overruns and slipped time tables have diminished the effectiveness of the original intent of QIPs which are short of duration, usually six months, and costing no more than $50,000.00 USD. In some instances, and due to delays contingents who initiate QIPs have rotated out of the mission area by the time the project is finally completed.

c. Effective coordination of all stakeholder efforts is essential to a successful outcome. Today more than ever before there are vast numbers of "civilians on the battlefield," meaning there are a plethora of civilian organizations in the area of operation. These organizations represent everything from U.S. and coalition interagency partners, non-governmental organizations, international organizations and local humanitarian organizations, in addition to the military force and their contractors. Each of these organizations has a different mandate and objective, making coordination of all reconstruction efforts a daunting task. In addition, in United Nations Peacekeeping missions troop contributing nations execute independent QIP projects on a routine basis. But, the overall QIP program is managed by the mission's Civil Affairs unit which is a civilian organization, so close coordination is even more essential.

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